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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the minimum conditions that must be satisfied to warrant 
the stigma and consequences of a criminal conviction. First the conduct element of 
criminal liability is examined and the need for voluntary agency advocated. Attention 
then turns to minimum capacities for moral reasoning and evaluation required to be 
morally and legally answerable for one's conduct in the sense that one may be subjected 
to a criminal trial. Consideration is given to what may be considered justifiable measures 
in respect of persons who lack minimum capacities for moral reasoning and evaluation 
sufficient to stand trial but whose conduct is dangerous to others. Finally an examination 
is made of the insanity defence, the principal mechanism for determining at trial whether 
a person is sufficiently rational to answer for his conduct. The defence of diminished 
responsibility is also considered, because of its close link in practical terms with the 
insanity defence. 
The law is stated as at 3 l " October 2001. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the minimum legal and moral conditions of an individual's 
agency and personhood in order for him to be held criminally responsible for his 
conduct. In the first part of Chapter One, attention is given to need for the defendant's 
conduct to be voluntary. Subsequently, consideration is given to the act requirement 
in criminal law, and to the position of state of affairs offences within this doctrine. 
Crimes of possession and addiction are examined and the possibility of criminal 
liability for thoughts is considered. The influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 in 
this area of law is also discussed. 
In the second part of Chapter One, the need for moral agency in respect of mala in se 
crimes is recognised, and examination is given to the minimum capacities for moral 
reasoning and evaluation required for an individual to be regarded as a moral agent. 
The two competing perspectives of the choice and character theories of excuse are 
addressed and consideration is given to which categories of individuals may not be 
regarded as moral agents. It is suggested that the only true categories in this respect 
are of infants below the age of ten and those individuals found unfit to plead, however 
extension of these categories could be made in order to include the severely and 
permanently mentally i l l . The severely personality disordered are also considered in 
this context, as are the socially deprived and are found to be capable of moral agency, 
the choice theory of excuse being favoured. 
In Chapter Two, consideration is given to what may be considered justifiable 
measures in respect of dangerous severely personality disordered individuals, who 
have not offended or who require detention beyond the level of their culpability; and 
persons who ought not to be considered moral agents, who may not therefore be liable 
to account for their actions at trial, but whose conduct is dangerous to others. The 
existing measures for preventative detention within the criminal law are examined, as 
are the proposals for the reform of mental health legislation and for the introduction of 
legislation specifically relating to dangerous severely personality disordered 
individuals. Discussion is made with regard to the difficulties in accurately predicting 
dangerousness and in ensuring compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The insanity defence, the principal mechanism for determining at trial whether a 
person is sufficiently rational to answer for his conduct, is examined in Chapter Three. 
First, theoretical considerations are made concerning: whether the insanity defence is 
a status or an excuse; the moral nature of the defence; the need for the defence to be 
concerned with an individual's rationality; and the extent to which compulsion may 
be included within the defence. In relation to the legal nature of the defence, 
discussion is made concerning whether the defence represents an absence of mens rea, 
whether there need be a causal link between the mental condition of the defendant and 
his act, returning again to the need for the defence to be concerned with the 
defendant's rationality. The M'Naghten Rules are examined, as are some of the 
procedural requirements of the defence, placed in the context of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. Consideration is given to the many possibilities for reform and a proposal is 
made. 
Finally, given its close l ink in practical terms with the defence of insanity, in Chapter 
Four the defence of diminished responsibility is considered. While this defence does 
not recognise an absence of rationality or exemption f rom criminal responsibility, in 
practice, many individuals charged with murder are compelled to rely upon this 
defence, even when they were not acting rationally, because of inadequacies within 
the insanity defence. Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 is examined, and a critique 
is offered of the defence, specifically with regard to the absence of any f i r m rationale 
surrounding the defence, the meaning of mental responsibility, and how criminal 
responsibility can be justifiably reduced rather than eliminated. The significant 
overlap with the defence of provocation is discussed, particularly in the context of the 
recent House of Lords decision in Smith (Morgan).^ Proposals for reforms are 
examined and recommendations made. Because of its close relationship with 
diminished responsibility, the offence of infanticide is also considered. 
' [2000] 3 WLR 654 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE BASIS OF C R I M I N A L L I A B I L I T Y A N D E L I G I B I L I T Y FOR B L A M E 
L The Basis of Criminal Liability 
An individual may be held criminally responsible for a vast range of conduct. Such 
conduct w i l l usually take the form of an act or omission, but may also take the form of 
'being in a particular state of affairs'. Where such a state of affairs is within an 
individual's control, then he may be held responsible because his conduct, in the form 
of an act or omission, has led to the prohibited state of affairs. This w i l l be so even 
where the definition of the offence only prohibits the state of affairs, rather than any 
act or omission leading to such a situation. Where however the state of affairs occurs 
through circumstances over which an individual has no control, i t should be wrong to 
hold him criminally responsible, given that it is an established principle of criminal 
law that the actus reus of a crime must be voluntary. Although the meaning of 
voluntariness may vary, the requirement that conduct should be voluntary is 
recognised by both the courts and legal commentators as an essential element of a 
criminal offence.^ 
LI Conduct must be voluntary 
The conduct for which an individual may be held criminally responsible must, as a 
general principle, be voluntary. The requirement of voluntariness should be integral to 
the actus reus of a crime. Even crimes of strict liability should require the actus reus 
to be voluntary. Where, however, the act or omission is involuntary, this w i l l also 
preclude the existence of any mens rea. For example, where D , carrying a pair of 
^ See e.g. Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386: "The requirement that [there] 
should be a voluntary act is essential in every criminal case. No act is punishable if it is done 
involuntarily." Lord Denning. See also Glazebrook, 'Situational Liability' in Reshaping the Criminal 
Law, ed. Glazebrook (1978), 114. 
sharp scissors, falls downstairs and inadvertently kills P, arguably, his involuntary 
conduct is more fundamental in explaining his lack of liability for murder. His 
conduct is involuntary; his lack of mens rea should not distract attention f rom the fact 
that on a correct analysis there is no actus reus attributable to him. 
Voluntariness may consist of a voluntary act involving a wil led muscular movement. 
Conversely, when D has his arm lif ted by X so that D strikes P, there is no wil led 
muscular movement and D's conduct is involuntary. However, this description does 
not adequately explain voluntary conduct through an omission. For example, where D 
omits to extinguish a fire which bums down a house, there is no muscular movement. 
Yet, i f D is under a duty to act, arising, for example out of his contract of 
employment, he w i l l be held criminally responsible for his failure to act.^ In such 
situations, a more appropriate view is that voluntariness requires a degree of control. 
Where his lack of activity is within D's control, his conduct is voluntary, a voluntary 
omission. 
1.2 Requirement of an Act 
It is a generally accepted requirement of criminal law that D w i l l be criminally 
responsible only where he has performed an act or omission. Some theorists view 
omissions as exceptions to the act requirement, without adequately explaining why 
this should be so."* While the theory that criminal conduct requires an act is capable of 
being descriptive of much of the criminal law, liability for omissions may not be truly 
exceptional. A coherent set of principles exists which sets out the duties out of which 
^ Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37. 
"* This is the view of Glazebrook, "Situational Liabihty" 114; see also Moore, Act and Crime (1993/7), 
23. 
liability for omissions will occur. Liability for omissions has a recognised place in the 
criminal law and, while criminal conduct in the majority of cases takes the form of an 
act, an omission ought not to be an exception simply because it cannot be explained in 
terms of the 'act requirement'. The explanation may lie in an individual's ability to 
control a state of affairs by omitting to act.^  Husak challenges the theory that criminal 
responsibility requires an act, by suggesting that there should instead be a 'control 
requirement'.^ The 'control requirement' would deny criminal responsibility to an 
individual for a state of affairs which he is unable to prevent.^ An individual will lack 
control where "it is unreasonable to expect him or her to have prevented" the relevant 
State of affairs from occurring. So, where an individual omits to act, he will be held 
criminally responsible if it was within his control to prevent the subsequent state of 
affairs from arising. 
1.2.1 State of Affairs Offences 
The act requirement ceases to be descriptive where there is no act or omission 
performed, but criminal responsibility arises from a prohibited state of affairs. Some 
commentators do not consider state of affairs offences to be of great importance 
today. Moore describes them as "rarely enacted today"; "once more prevalent than 
they are today"; or even invalid due to constitutional infirmities.^ Others point out that 
they are much more common and important than we might think.'° 
^ Husak, 'Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?' in Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and 
Critique, ed. A. Duff (1998), 82. 
^ Ibid., 60. See also, Clarkson and Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials (3"* ed., 1994), 93-95. 
^ Husak, above n.5,77. 
* Ibid., 78. 
' Moore, above n.4, 19. 
'° See e.g. Glazebrook, above n.4, 116 and Howard, Strict Responsibility (1963), 48. 
While there are offences which make 'being in a state of affairs' a crime, this should 
still require that the defendant was in such a position due to his own voluntary act or 
omission. S4(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 creates the offence of 'being unfit to 
drive through drink or drugs when in charge of a motor vehicle'. It is not the 
'becoming unfit' or 'taking' charge of the vehicle which is the criminal offence." 
However, the defence available under s4(3) deems a person is not in charge of such a 
vehicle if he proves that there was no likelihood of him driving it at the material time. 
While this defence appears to suggest the offence under s4(2) requires more than 
'being in a state of affairs', the burden of proof ought not to be placed on the 
defendant. Rather, the need for some form of voluntariness ought to be specified in 
the offence. 
It would be wrong to hold an individual responsible for a state of affairs over which 
has no control. It would be wrong, for example, to punish an individual for having red 
hair. However, aside from moral considerations as to whether such conduct may be 
criminalised, it would not be unwarranted in terms of the voluntariness requirement to 
punish an individual for dying his hair red as this is conduct over which he has 
control. Glazebrook'^ suggests "It must surely be unthinkable that parliament should 
ever consciously provide that a person who had neither done anything nor been at 
fault in not doing something should incur criminal liability." This view was also held 
in Lim Chin Aik v The Queen, where the Privy Council allowed an appeal against 
conviction where the defendant could not have ascertained he had fallen within a 
newly created category of proscribed person leading to a conviction under an 
" J.C. Smith, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law (9* ed., 1999), 42. 
Glazebrook, above n.4, 118. 
[1963] AC 160. 
unpublished immigration ordinance. The court found it could not have been the aim of 
the statute to find "a luckless victim".''* The court would not put the defendant under 
strict liability for a state of affairs entirely beyond his control. The court held that to 
take a contrary view would mean an individual's perfectly lawful conduct of 
remaining in Singapore would suddenly change and become criminal when an order 
prohibiting him from entering the country was made. Mens rea was therefore 
required.'^ 
However, while state of affairs offences may be viewed, generally, as exceptions to 
the 'act requirement', they may be better described as mistakes where an individual's 
conduct which has led to a prohibited state of affairs was apparently involuntary. 
There are a number of cases which warrant consideration. 
In Larsonneur'^, the defendant was convicted of "being an alien to whom leave to 
land in the United Kingdom has been refused was found in the United Kingdom."'^ 
She had been brought to the United Kingdom by the Irish Free State Police, a 
situation over which she had no control. The Court of Criminal Appeal found the 
circumstances under which the defendant returned to be "perfectly immaterial, so far 
as this appeal is concerned."'^ Had the defendant's conduct in Larsonneur been 
voluntary, there would have been nothing to make the case noteworthy. A 'state of 
affairs' offence is not objectionable where the defendant's conduct leading to such a 
state of affairs is voluntary. However, where there is no voluntary conduct, i.e. where 
Per Lord Evershed, 174 
176. See also Finau v Dept of Labour [1984] 2 NZLR 396. 
'*(1933) 24 Cr AppR74. 
" Contrary to Arts. l(3)(g) and 18(l)(b) of the Aliens Order 1920, as amended. 
' V e r Hewart L C J , 78. 
D has no control over the state of affairs, it should be wrong to hold D criminally 
responsible. 
Lanham sought to explain the decision in Larsonneur as barring a defence of 
compulsion due to the fact that the defendant brought the situation upon herself. As it 
was only "at the last moment" that her conduct was involuntary, she was justly 
convicted.'^ Further support for this proposition lay in the suggestion that "the 
preceding deliberate acts of the appellant" were not wiped out by the subsequent 
physical compulsion which resulted in her being found in the United Kingdom 20 
While such arguments, i f successful, would assist us in the pursuit of a coherent 
system of criminal law, they are not persuasive.^' To suggest that the defendant 
brought the act of compulsion on herself is a form of voluntary conduct which is too 
remote to allow it to be linked to the proscribed state of affairs which constitute the 
crime. This is the same as suggesting that she committed the voluntary actus reus of 
one offence and ought, therefore, to have been convicted of the another crime, for 
which her actus reus was involuntary. Husak argues that the injustice in Larsonneur 
stemmed from her lack of control rather than the absence of an act.^ ^ 
The decision in Larsonneur remains irreconcilable with the principle that D must have 
some control over the state of affairs she is in. The decision is not on its own. In 
" Lanham, 'Larsonneur R^y'isiiod' [1976] Crim LR 276 at 279 
°^ Doegar, 'Strict Liability in Criminal Law and Larsonneur Reassessed [1998] Crim LR 791 at 795 
'^ J.C. Smith, [1999] Crim LR 100, rejects these arguments, citing the Crown's successful proposition 
that "...how she got [t]here makes no difference at all. The word 'found' was used deliberately in the 
section so that if any alien who has no right to be here is here an offence is committed." (24 Cr App R 
74), 76-77. 
Husai<, above n.5, 84-85. 
Winzar v Chief Constable ofKent,^^ the Divisional Court affirmed the conviction of 
D, who had been found drunk in a hospital, removed by the police who then charged 
him with being found drunk on a highway. By contrast, a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Alabama of similar facts^ "* found that voluntariness was required. Where D 
was involuntarily removed from his home in an intoxicated state and arrested for 
being drunk on a public highway, his conviction was overturned. Also, in O 'Sullivan 
V Fisher^^ an Australian case, the same conclusion was reached on similar facts to 
Martin. Other jurisdictions respect the fundamental requirement for voluntariness 
unlike the courts in Larsonneur and Winzar?^ Yet, in Crump v Gilmore^^ parents of a 
school-age child were convicted under s39(l) of the Education Act 1944, which 
provides for parents to be guilty of an offence where a child fails to attend school 
regularly without reasonable excuse, despite proving they knew nothing and had no 
reason to know of the absences. The Divisional Court recommended that the 
magistrates should give an absolute discharge i f they believed the parents. This 
mitigation ought not to have been necessary. The provisions of section 39(1) appear 
relevant to situations where parents deliberately keep their child away, i.e. through 
voluntary conduct which creates a state of affairs. 
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Clarkson and Keating suggest that Martin was arrested at home and therefore in no 
way to blame for this situation, while it may be suggested that the defendants in 
Larsonneur and Winzar brought their convictions on themselves. As already 
discussed, such arguments are unconvincing. The reasoning in Martin should form 
" The Times, March 28, 1983 Co/1111/82 (Lexis). 
Martin v State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (1944). 
" [1954] SASR 33. 
See also Achterdam 1911 E D L 336 and Palmer-Brown v Police [1985] INZLR 365. 
" [19707 CnwL/? 28. 
109. 
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part of the general principles in English criminal law. Winzar may be further 
criticised. Not only was the offence procured by the police, but the court held that 
'being found drunk' meant 'perceived to be drunk'. The point at which this must 
surely have occurred was when the defendant was found slumped in the hospital. 
The decisions in Larsonneur and Winzar ought not to be followed or repeated. Care 
must be taken to avoid the creation of new offences making 'being in a state of 
affairs' criminal in circumstances where the individual is unable to control the 
materialisation of the relevant state of affairs and future decisions ought to be made in 
this light. Otherwise, we risk criminaHsing 'being' rather than 'doing'. Any 
consideration of an individual's eligibility to be held criminally responsible must be 
made in the context of D's conduct, i.e. act or omission, being voluntary or, 
exceptionally, D being in a state of affairs prohibited by law, a state of affairs by his 
previous voluntary acts or omissions. 
1.2.2 Crimes of Possession and Addiction 
Crimes of possession should be defined so as to include an act or omission. 
Certainly, it must be wrong to hold an individual responsible for being an addict, but 
what of taking illegal substances while an addict? In Robinson v Califomia^^ the 
Supreme Court considered a state law making it a criminal offence to 'be addicted to 
the use of narcotics'. The court held that imprisoning an individual for such an 
offence was a cruel and unusual punishment and therefore unconstitutional. In 
applying Robinson in the case of Powell v State ofTexas^^ two opposing views 
Glazebrook, above n.4, 119. 
°^ 370 US 660, 8 L Ed 2d 758 (1962). 
'^ 392 US 514 (1968). 
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emerged from the Supreme Court. D was convicted of 'being found in a state of 
intoxication in any public place.' His defence was that, as a chronic alcoholic, his 
conduct was involuntary, and the trial court ruled that this was no defence. While the 
Court held that Robinson did not apply because the crime was not to be an alcoholic, 
dissenting opinions regarded Powell's conduct as involuntary and considered 
Robinson stood for a principle disallowing penalties inflicted upon a person for being 
in a condition he is powerless to change. 
The dangers of going too far along this road are clear. The links between addiction 
and crime militate against allowing addiction as a state which gives rise to a lack of 
voluntariness. The criminal law must exist primarily as a method of social control. To 
allow an addiction-based defence would defeat this purpose on a widespread scale.''^  
The suggestion that responsibility should depend on the extent to which the addict is 
able to control his use of drugs^^ may still be too dangerous a road to follow. 
Addiction based crime may have to be viewed as a necessary exception to the general 
rule. 
1.2.3 Liability for Thoughts 
To impose criminal responsibility for thoughts is not a welcome prospect in the 
majority of situations nor is it descriptive of criminal law currently. Under the 'act 
requirement' the imposition of criminal liability for thoughts could neither be 
explained nor justified. The principal flaw of the 'control requirement' is that it is 
unable to exclude such a possibility. If the control requirement is to be favoured, then 
The Home Office estimates one third of 'acquisitive crime' is drug-related. See Editorial Comments 
[1999] Crim LR 767 on a report by NACRO, Drug Driven Crime (1999). 
" Husak, above n.5, 81. 
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imposing criminal responsibility for thoughts must be a possibility, there being no 
requirement of any act. Husak suggests that this would allow the scope of the law 
relating to inchoate offences to be expanded to situations where, for example, a 
suspect is apprehended and admits he was about to rob a post office but had not yet 
gone beyond mere preparation. '^^  However, the danger of this theory lies not only in 
the need for evidence, in the absence of any confession, which is best demonstrated 
by an act, but also in its extension of criminal liability to thoughts over which one has 
no control. While Husak suggests what is required is a "firm intention",^^ how is such 
an intention to be defined and demonstrated? Where the 'act requirement' is unable to 
accommodate a satisfactory explanation of omissions, the 'control requirement' is 
unable to exclude the possibility of imposing criminal responsibility for thoughts. 
It is suggested that the act requirement is to be favoured. It remains the case that the 
vast majority of criminal offences will require conduct in the form of either an act or, 
less frequently, an omission, and those offences which do not require either must be 
viewed either as exceptions or mistakes.'^ ^ 
L2.4The Human Rights Act 1998 
While it is likely that the Human Rights Act 1998, which implements the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law,''^ will be concerned 
principally with criminal process and sentencing, certain changes may be required 
within the substantive criminal law. 
Ibid., 89. 
Ibid., 89. 
Ibid., 66-67. 
" S3. 
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The classification of conduct as criminal may conflict with article 3 of the ECHR 
which states "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment." Arden gives the example of a factory owner who is 
prosecuted for a strict liability offence when he accidentally pollutes the surrounding 
environment.^* If he successfully argues that the conviction will seriously damage his 
reputation, and can demonstrate that he took all measures to avoid the pollution, could 
his rights under article 3 be infringed? It is feasible that such an issue could be raised 
also in relation to involuntary state of affairs offences. An individual who has no 
control over the state of affairs in which he finds himself, and is subsequently 
convicted of a criminal offence, might argue that he has been subjected to a degrading 
punishment. Such an interpretation would provide a welcome justification for the 
courts to move away from the decisions in Larsonneur and Winzar. 
Other articles of the ECHR may result in less discord. While article 14 gives a 
prohibition from discrimination, this is not a free-standing provision. It only provides 
that access to the rights set out in the Convention is equal.^' This may appear to give 
equality of access to a fair trial, for example, but will not extend to prohibiting 
legislation making certain conduct criminal, which discriminates against a group of 
individuals. 
The Hon. Mrs Justice Arden DBE, "Criminal Law at the Crossroads: The Impact of Human Rights 
from the Law Commission's Perspective and the Need for a Code." [1999] Crim LR 439,450. 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, (1995), 463; 
Wadham and Mountfield, Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, (1999), 111. 
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2. Eligibility for Blame 
When are we entitled to assume that a person, all other things equal, is a morally 
responsible agent who can fairly be held responsible for his conduct? Certain 
individuals ought not to be considered eligible for blame for their actions. An 
individual who is not eligible to be held criminally responsible ought not to be tried 
and should, ideally, have no need for a criminal defence. Criminal defences, strictly 
called, should exist for situations where, under normal circumstances, we would 
blame an individual for his conduct, but find a particular reason to remove such 
blame. Where D is old enough to appreciate he must not commit theft, is able to 
control his actions accordingly and is not in a delusional or affected state of mind, we 
will attribute blame to him if he steals. Only subsequently will we remove blame 
when we learn of exculpatory conditions which led him to act as he did. If, for some 
reason, D falls within a class of individuals who ought to be considered ineligible for 
blame, then his complete exemption from blame should mean he does not need to be 
excused at a later point. Arguably, he ought not even to be required to stand trial. 
Children under the age of ten fall within such a classification. The same may be true 
of a defendant who is found unfit to plead. Although there will still be a hearing, its 
purpose is not to attribute blame or to punish. 
There may be other individuals too, such as personality disordered persons and 
psychotic individuals who, like infants, lack the capacity for effective moral 
evaluation of conduct. I f these conditions can be reliably identified they should be 
held to preclude a criminal tiial. One should recognise however that reliable means of 
identification of these conditions whenever they arise is not to hand at present. For a 
long time to come a great many of these cases will arise in the course of insanity pleas 
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and claims of diminished responsibility. Nonetheless, an examination of who should 
be eligible for blame is relevant where pre-trial means of identification are to hand 
and also of the debate and proposals for the protective confinement of personality 
disordered individuals. 
2.1 Moral agency 
While, some crimes appear to require no form of moral wrongdoing but merely exist 
as a form of social control,'*'^  it is usual to expect serious mala in se crimes to be 
linked with moral blame.When we find a person liable for such crimes we are 
expressing a moral criticism."*^ This is because our laws may be seen as the expression 
of "our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulation 
purposes."'*^ So when we find a person criminally responsible, it should be on the 
basis of a proven culpability meriting blame and punishment.'*'* 
To justify moral blame, a person's act must warrant our disapproval and the person 
must be responsible for that act.'^ ^ It follows that a person should not be blamed for 
carrying out a serious crime for which he was not morally responsible. Accordingly, 
defences such as insanity, automatism and duress negate a person's criminal 
responsibility, undermining any moral judgment to be made against the defendant. 
Although it is possible to argue that all crimes involve making a moral judgment against the 
defendant for failing to conform to a standard required by law. 
Arenella, "Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and 
Moral Accountabihty", 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1511, 1513. 
Kadish, Blame and Punishment, (1987), 87. 
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, (1974), 25. 
This has not been the view taken by the courts. The Privy Council in Yip Chiu-Cheung [1994] 2 All 
E R 924 held that no additional element of culpability was required above the mens rea for common law 
conspiracy. The House of Lords in Kingston [1994] 3 A L L ER 353 would not allow a defence of 
intoxication where the defendant was still able to form the mens rea for a crime, despite being under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Kadish, above n.42, 141. 
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Moral responsibility may be taken away from a moral agent where, for example, in 
fear of violence, the reasonable person would have done as he did. The defendant 
would have a defence due to the state of affairs in which he was placed. However, it is 
also necessary that we do not blame an individual who is ineligible to be held 
criminally responsible and whose conduct ought not, therefore, to be judged by the 
criminal process.'*'^  
It may not be sufficient however, to say that a person is a moral agent because he is an 
adult and is not insane. The question must be how much of an understanding of moral 
rules and moral sentiments is required to constitute a person a moral agent? There are 
two possibilities. The first is that an intellectual knowledge of rules, a capacity to 
understand their content, is sufficient to make the defendant a moral agent. There is 
no additional requirement that the agent has any sense of moral obligation or a 
capacity for identifying with the concerns of others. Alternatively, we might require 
an understanding of the concept of morality and a sense of moral obligation as well as 
a knowledge of rules for a person to be regarded as a moral agent. These competing 
perspectives will now be addressed. 
2.2 Criminal Responsibility 
The need for criminal responsibility to be premised on an individual's free choice was 
emphasised by Hart. We find individuals criminally responsible in order to justify 
punishment.'*^ "[Ujnless a man has the capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to 
adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to be applied to him." 
It is not intended to exclude the possibility of a civil form of action, where necessary, for the 
protection of the individual or society 
See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (1968), 160. 
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Otherwise, an individual will not be able to predict how his life may be ordered within 
a system of law.'** 
The character and choice theories of culpability offer opposing views as to the 
requirements of eligibility for blame. The traditional requirements for attributing 
moral blame are that the defendant is a moral agent who violates a moral norm that 
fairly obligates compliance and is fairly attributed to the defendant's conduct.'*^ The 
choice theorists' claim is that the defendant's capacity to choose to act reprehensibly 
explains why he should be seen as blameworthy. When he freely chooses to act in 
such a way and has the opportunity to do otherwise then he ought to be blamed. 
Choice theorists are prepared to attribute blame without any reference to the 
defendant's goals, desires, values and emotions that motivate his choice.^" 
A defendant's culpability for his choice of action will depend on whether at the time 
of acting reprehensibly he had the 'capacity' to choose and a 'fair opportunity' to 
avoid acting as he did.^' While few wil l lack capacity to choose,^ ^ more often a 
defence compatible with the choice theory must rely on a lack of opportunity. 'Fair 
opportunity' is measured objectively. So, with duress, a defendant must choose to 
avoid an objective evil but wil l not be justified, merely excused, as it may be a lesser 
evil than the one he chooses to carry out.^ ^ 
Ibid., 181. 
Arenella, above n.41, 1520. 
°^ Arenella, 'Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the relevance of character to our moral culpability 
judgments', in Crime, Culpability, and Remedy, ed. E . F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (1990), 65. 
'^ Moore in 'Choice, Character, and Excuse', in Crime, Culpability, and Remedy, ed. E . F. Paul, F. D. 
Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (1990), 35. 
Choice theorists would limit this category of people to young children and the insane. 
Moore, above n.51, 40. 
The character theorist's criticism of the choice theory of excuse is that it does not 
require any reference to be made to a defendant's understanding of morality. While 
the choice theory purports to require a moral agent who breaches a moral norm to 
have a fair opportunity to avoid doing so in order to establish culpability, it does not 
take account of characteristics that enable a person to be a moral agent. Nor can it 
explain what qualities are necessary for the defendant to be morally responsive, 
beyond the requirement that the defendant is rational. Arenella insists that only the 
character theory is able to explain moral responsiveness.^ '* This is because a moral 
agent must have the capacity to appreciate the morality of his actions and an ability of 
self-revision in order to conform to a standard of morality. Such capacity cannot be 
explained without reference to the defendant's character. Arenella suggests that the 
choice theory fails because "[t]he moral agent cannot simply make a rational choice to 
experience the appropriate moral sentiments when he wishes to act morally."^^ Moral 
agency requires at least some capacity for moral insight and self-criticism. 
In defence of the choice theory, it has been suggested that i f a theory of criminal 
culpability required an understanding and a sense of morality, exemption from 
criminal liability would radically increase. Many people lack a deep engagement with 
morality and the importance of moral considerations in our lives can be over-
exaggerated. We are more often motivated by friendship, love or self-interest rather 
than moral principles and do not care about the interests of people outside of our 
"circle ofcare".^^ 
Arenella above n.50, 59-61. 
Ibid., 79. 
56 Haji, "On Psychopaths and Culpability", (1998) Law and Philosophy 117, 122-125. 
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A central claim of the character theory is that it is a defendant's character that causes 
him to carry out blameworthy conduct. The defendant's character is the primary 
object for his responsibility^^ and, therefore, his culpability. This theory of blame 
stems from Hume^^ and was adopted and expanded upon by Bayles, one of the most 
influential character theorists.^^ In his view, it is the moral quality of the defendant's 
character exemplified by his conduct for which he should be blamed. A defendant 
should be blamed for those of his acts that demonstrate undesirable character traits.''^ 
Therefore the blame is related to the character traits rather than the actions of the 
defendant which are merely evidence of his undesirable character traits.^' Blame is 
not attributed to a wrongful act; we attribute the blame to a wrongful actor. Our 
mental qualities are the objects of praise or blame, and our actions are only signs of 
our mental qualities. 
Duff describes character traits as "stable patterns of thought, emotion, and action." 
"A person's character traits embody her settled values, concerns, and attitudes."^^ 
However, the law is only interested in character traits that lead to harmful conduct, i.e. 
dangerous traits of character. This is because the law is not a "general moral 
inquisitor".^'* 
" Moore, above n.51, 29. 
58 
'"Ibid. 
Bayles, "Hume on Blame and Excuse" (1976) 2 Hume Studies 17. 
*° Bayles, "Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility", Law and Philosophy 1 (1982) 5-20, 7. 
Moore confines the relationship between action and character to the former being evidence of the 
latter. Statements about causal relations or behaviour which is in character open up the possibility of 
greater criticism: above n.51,47-48. 
Bayles, above n.50, 17. See also Pincoffs, "Legal Responsibility and Moral Character", (1973) 
Wayne Law Review 905, 923: "We are accustomed to think of acts in isolation as morally or legally 
right or wrong, but acts bespeak the man; and the man is in part his own creation." 
" Duff, Criminal Attempts, (1996), 178. 
^ Ibid., 179. 
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It follows, where a defendant's conduct does not indicate undesirable character traits, 
he does not deserve to be blamed.^^ He may assert that his conduct exhibited the same 
qualities as a person of good character. In a character-based defence the defendant 
would claim that his actions were the product of his condition or the circumstances in 
which he found himself, where his particular condition or circumstances could not be 
linked to his character. 
It is the 'moral capacity model' of the character theory that requires a moral agent 
must have the capacities necessary for moral decision making. As good character 
requires more than intellect and because we blame a defendant for failing to attain 
goodness, a moral agent must have an ability to be self-critical, and develop 
morally.^ *^ 
Character-based attributes should, therefore, attract moral blame, particularly for a 
lack of "capacity to care for the interests of other human beings".^^ Moral agents 
must have the capacity for self-reflection and an understanding of morality is required 
to know how to behave as a reasonable person. So, where a defendant fails to behave 
as a reasonable person the character theorist would claim it is because he did not 
address a particular aspect of his character earlier in his life.^^ 
The character theory challenges our perceptions of the types of individuals who ought 
not to be held criminally responsible and would render many personality disordered 
" Bayles, above n.60, 7. 
Pillsbury, 'The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character and 
Responsibility", (1992) 67 Indiana Law Journall\9, 734. 
Arenella, above n.41, 1525. 
Arenella, above n.50, 73. 
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individuals ineligible to be held criminally liable.^^ For this reason, until our 
perceptions change on blaming individuals who are able to perceive the wrongfulness 
of their actions but not appreciate why such actions are wrong, the choice theory is to 
be favoured. It prescribes that we punish an individual for his conduct rather than who 
he is and is capable of explaining why an individual should be held criminally 
responsible in the majority of cases. 
The following section will proceed to examine the types of individuals whom we 
ought not to blame, regardless of their conduct. This may be because they have not 
achieved a level of intellect to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions, as in 
infancy. It may be that they suffer from such a serious mental disorder that they either 
cannot control their actions or comprehend the nature of them. At present, in English 
Law, the only categories of individuals who will be considered ineligible for blame 
are children below the age of ten and those who are unfit to plead. The eligibility for 
blame of the insane, severely personality disordered, and individuals from socially 
deprived backgrounds will also be considered. 
2.3 Infancy 
There is an irrebuttable presumption that children below the age of ten are doli 
incapaxJ^ The exemption from liability for infants is couched in terms of a lack of 
capacity. A child under the age of ten is presumed incapable of forming the mens rea 
of a crime. For this reason, he is ineligible for blame. The same may only apply to 
some children aged ten and above if the effect of s34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
^' Discussed below at 2.6. 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933, as amended by Children and Young Persons Act 1963, sl6. 
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1998 proves only to abolish the rebuttable presumption that such a child is incapable 
of committing a crime because of incapacity to know right from wrong, rather than 
abolishing the defence entirely.^' It is submitted that the effect will be to retain 
infancy between 10-14 as a status defence, where appropriate, merely reversing the 
burden of proof. To allow such a claim will still be to allow a defence rather than a 
claim to ineligibility for blame. Thus, only children below ten are ineligible for 
prosecution. 
2.4 Fitness to Plead 
An individual who is unfit to stand trial will not have to do so, nor will he be 
punished. The question of fitness will depend on the defendant's ability to understand 
the difference between guilty and not guilty pleas, to follow the evidence in the 
proceedings, instruct counsel and challenge jurors, although he need not necessarily 
be able to act in his own best interests. Since the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, a jury may find D is unfit to plead, yet the same jury or 
a new jury, depending on the judge's discretion,^^ will still be required to decide on 
the evidence whether the defendant "did the act or made the omission charged against 
him as the offence." '"^  If the jury considers the defendant did not carry out the 
offence, it may acquit him and no further consequences will ensue. If, however, it 
finds he carried out the offence, the court may make a disposal as it would had there 
been a finding of insanity. This may range from a hospital order to an absolute 
" See also Walker, 'The End of an Old Song?' [1999] NU 64. 
" Robertson [1968] 3 All E R 557. 
" S4(5). 
S4A Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991. 
23 
discharge/^ save when the charge is one of murder where an indefinite term of 
detention is imposed. 
Until the House of Lords decision in Antoine^^ a jury had to find both actus reus and 
mens rea of the crime to be present^^ While the decision in Egan reflected the views 
of the Butler Committee/^ it did not accord with the previous interpretations of such a 
hearing as requiring only a trial of facts7^ Nor did the decision appear to reflect the 
wording of the legislation which does not refer to any finding of fault. It did offer the 
advantage, however, of allowing consideration, on a murder charge, to be made on the 
issue of diminished responsibility, thus enabling the judge to use a ful l range of 
80 
disposal options rather than compelling detention. In Antoine the House of Lords 
held, contrary to Egan, that the jury need not give consideration to any mental 
element, disallowing the prospect of a reduction in the defendant's charge to 
diminished responsibility. 
The rationale behind finding an individual unfit to plead is the fulfilment of the 
requirement of a fair trial. Opinion differs as to what would constitute a fair trial 
where the defendant's fitness to plead is in issue. A trial may be 'fair' if it avoids an 
unsafe verdict.*' This may or may not involve the defendant being able to fully 
participate in the proceedings. There may be occasions, involving, for example, a 
schizophrenic man who breaks a shop window and is charged with criminal damage. 
S5 CP(I )A 1964 as amended by CP(IUP)A 1991. 
[2000] 2 Al l E R 208. 
" Egan [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 121, 125. 
Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, (1975), Cmnd. 6244, para. 10.24. 
See Grubin, "What Constitutes Fitness to Plead?", [1993] Crim LR 748; Duff, "Fitness to Plead and 
Fair Trials: ( I ) A Challenge", [1994] Crini 419. 
For a commentary, see Mackay and Kearns, 'The Trial of the Facts and Unfitness to Plead", [1997] 
Crim LR 644. 
'^ Grubin, above n.79, 757. 
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where the defendant cannot fully participate, yet a safe verdict would still be reached 
in the proceedings, based on the clear available evidence, and such a verdict would be 
more expedient than drawing out issues of competency.^^ An alternative view, which 
is to be preferred, is that a fair trial implies the defendant being able to take 
responsibility for his actions and being condemned as such. A criminal trial holds the 
defendant accountable and answerable for his actions. An individual who is unable to 
play a proper part in a criminal trial ought not to be held responsible as he cannot 
respond to the charges against him.^^ On this account, the effect of a defendant being 
unfit to plead and therefore stand trial is to render him ineligible for blame and 
punishment. The trial must represent a two-way moral conversation between the 
defendant and the court. This cannot occur where the defendant is found unfit to 
plead. 
2.5 Insanity 
On either the choice or character theories, it is possible to argue that those individuals 
who are suffering from a severe mental disorder should be excluded from blame. Such 
individuals do not have the capacity to choose on rational grounds how to behave, 
which is required by the choice theory. To such an individual, although the defence of 
insanity attaches an apparently correct label, it does not give an accurate description 
of why she should not be eligible for blame. An individual who is unable to engage, 
for example, in the same reality perceived by the majority of us is unable to 
participate in something much greater than simply being unable to understand the 
nature and quality of her act or that it is wrong. 
Grubin, "Fitness to Plead and Fair Trials: (2) A Reply", [1994] Crim LR 423,424. 
" Duff, above n.79, 420-421. 
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Such a severely mentally disordered individual would, however, undoubtedly fall 
within the fitness to plead legislation. Here, the label may be inadequate, but the 
treatment would express more closely that the defendant is not eligible to be blamed 
and need not stand trial. 
More appropriately, perhaps certain severely mentally disordered individuals ought 
not to be held blameworthy due to their lack of moral agency. Gross wrote, "what in 
fact distinguishes the sane from the insane under criminal law is the inability of the 
insane to appreciate the culpability, not the punishabihty, of their conduct."^"* The 
severely mentally disordered individual may not understand why he should be 
blamed, nor why he is excused, if this should occur. He is unable to take part in such a 
moral conversation. 
A category of legal insanity, set apart from the M'Naghten Rules (1843) and unlinked 
to the issue of mens rea^ but which renders the 'very insane' ineligible for blame due 
to their mental incapacity may present a more accurate description as to why we 
choose not to punish in these circumstances. It would also reflect how such 
defendants are dealt with prior to trial. This was the suggestion of the Butler 
Committee. Some individuals who are 'very insane' will not fall within the 
M'Naghten Rules.^ ^ For example, where D kills the victim due to an overpowering 
urge or because he thinks the victim is spying on him, he may be suffering from a 
Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice, (1979), 304. 
See Chapter 3 for a discussion as to whether insanity is a status defence or better explained as a 'lack 
of mens rea' defence. 
See 2.4, above. 
87 Above n.78, para. 18.7. 
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defect of reason due to a disease of the mind, however he may still know the nature 
and quality of his act and that it is wrong.*^ 
The Butler Committee recommended a second element to the defence of insanity 
which would allow a defence of severe mental disorder, where D's mens rea is not m 
doubt.^ ^ The Report mentions 'exempting' D from responsibility^'* and 'displacing' 
legal responsibility,^' which suggests the use of a new type of defence, rendering the 
'very insane' ineligible for blame.^^ 
Similar criticisms are made elsewhere: "unless there is more clarity as to whether 
insanity is treated as a condition, like infancy, barring the jurisdiction of the 
court....the operation of the defence will continue to confound."^^ Wells also argues 
that insanity cannot be described as a denial of responsibility, as it currently stands, as 
so many mentally disordered defendants choose to plead guilty.^'* 
2.6 Severely Personality Disordered Individuals 
The well-used term 'psychopaths' was passed over in the most recent Consultation 
Paper^ ^ in favour of 'DSPD individuals'. Whatever label is attached, it will remain the 
case that the behavioural patterns of certain individuals challenge fundamental 
assumptions of our criminal law, in particular those principles which determine when 
Ibid., paras. 18.26-18.36. 
Ibid., paras. 18.17-18.18. 
Ibid., para. 18.17. 
'^ Ibid., para. 18.26. 
See Chapter 3, 2.7.2; 4.].2; 5.1. 
Wells, 'Whither Insanity?' [1983] Crim LR 787, 787. 
Ibid., 795. 
Managing People with Severe Personality Disorder: Proposals for Policy Development. July 1999. 
See also the White Paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act, Part 11, High Risk Patients, Cm.501611 
(2000). 
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a person should be held liable and when a person does not deserve blame. Such 
principles incorporate concepts of morality into the criminal law that would otherwise 
be merely a system of social control. Persons unable to understand the morality of 
their actions, such as young children and the legally insane, are excused from blame. 
On the assumption that DSPD individuals lack even minimal capacity for that 
empathy and concern which forms the basis of secular morality,^^ ought they not also 
to be excused? A DSPD individual may not be capable of being a moral agent and, 
even where he has committed a criminal offence, may not be a suitable candidate for 
punitive measures. 
The many different perceptions and definitions of the psychopathic personality do not 
give one clear picture of psychopathy. A DSPD individual is most frequently 
described as having no perception of morality or the emotions.^^ Psychopathy in the 
no 
past has been labelled 'moral insanity'. Yet, the DSPD individual has an 
appreciation of reality and may see that others have certain values, regardless of the 
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fact that he is unable to share them. 
Duff describes a DSPD individual as a person who has some concern for his own 
interests but sees no reason why the interests of others should have any impact on 
him. He has prudential reasons for following the law but has no concept of morality 
and so cannot understand why the law is t he r e .The DSPD individual does not learn 
from being blamed or punished. He will often have a history of repeat offending, yet 
Contradistinctive to 'command' moralities based on the observance of texts and doctrines. 
Elliott, The Rules of Insanity: moral responsibility and the mentally ill offender, (1996), 71. 
See e.g. Clecidey, The Mask of Sanity (1982) and Blackburn, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct 
(1997) for the development of a definition of psychopathy. 
" Elliott, above n.97, 84. 
Duff, Trials and Punishments, (1986), 181. 
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no feelings of conscience, nor any ability to despise himself."^' He will not usually 
commit serious crimes of violence; instead minor offences are more c o m m o n . H e is 
hard to identify, and may possess charm and intelligence together with a capacity to 
mimic appropriate emotions. Hence the description of psychopathy as a 'mask of 
sanity'.'"^ 
The various medical definitions of psychopathy do little to offer certainty as to who is 
a DSPD individual. There is a category for psychopathic behaviour under DSM-IV"^'* 
in which it is described as anti-social personality disorder, while Cleckley's criteria 
for diagnosing psychopathy have also been widely used."^ ^ Under the Mental Health 
Act 1983 the legal definition of a DSPD individual is limited to a person with a 
disorder or disabihty of mind persistently resulting in abnormally aggressive or 
seriously irresponsible conduct.'''^ However, the individual who falls within this 
definition will not necessarily be detained under the IVIental Health Act because in 
order to be detained he must be treatable.Psychopathic behaviour is commonly 
viewed as untreatable although much of the evidence for this is anecdotal. 
Nor will DSPD individuals come within the legal definition of insanity. Under the 
M'Naghten Rules a person will be entitled to a defence of insanity where "at the time 
of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was 
Cleckley, above n.98, 208. 
'"^ Ibid., 208. 
'"^  Ibid., 277. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM I V - R , American Psychiatric Association, 1995). 
Refined by Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (1991). 
Sl (2) Mental Health Act 1983. 
S s 3 , 2 0 , 37(2)(a) and72(l)( 
'"^  Blackburn, above n.98, 382. 
s  2 nd l)(b) all contain this requirement. 
29 
doing; or, i f he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." '""^  
The DSPD individual however, knows too much and, although his condition used to 
be characterised as a disease, it is not considered to be so now; instead it is termed a 
personality disorder."° 
Given that there may not be one accepted way of defining a DSPD individual, the 
legal commentator must beware of creating a category of individuals, which is either 
too broad or too restricted. A person with psychopathic tendencies, for example, may 
still show an understanding of morality, and by no means all DSPD individuals are 
serial killers. 
The choice theorist would say a DSPD individual does not lack capacity and is a 
moral agent, as he knows how society views his conduct, even i f he lacks any guilt or 
shame regarding his conduct. His culpability lies in his capacity to choose whether to 
breach what he recognises as a legal norm. Because he is able to recognise and 
comply with legal norms, he can be attributed moral blame.'" A moral agent need 
only be rational and autonomous."^ To the choice theorist, DSPD individuals are 
rational actors because "they experience pain at the hands of others, and they can see 
the pain they cause others. They are engaged in finding meaning in a readily 
comprehensible and morally challenging way.""^ 
""(1843) I O C . & P . 635. 
"° However, an inability or difficulty in controlling impulses, as was held in the case of a sexual 
psychopath, may still amount to an abnormality of mind for the purpose of the defence of diminished 
responsibility. See Byrne [1960] 2 Q B 396. 
" ' Arenella, above n.50, 66. 
Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, (1984), 49. 
Pillsbury, above n.66, 746. 
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The principal disadvantage of the traditional choice theory is that it submits the DSPD 
individual to a system of rules which for him lack meaning. An individual with no 
understanding of morality must only be able to view the law as "coercive orders 
backed by threats".'''* While the law should be able to present itself as a moral claim 
on our obedience, a DSPD individual would not share that perception. To use Duff's 
illustration, the difference between laws and gunmen is that gunmen can only use 
coercion to exact obedience, i.e. "Obey, or else", whereas the law enforcers are able to 
say "Obey, because you ought to, or else.""^ While the DSPD individual has an 
understanding of coercion, he cannot see why he should be so coerced. 
By contrast, some character theorists,"^ would not describe DSPD individuals as 
moral agents. The contention is that they cannot contract in to our system of laws as 
they lack the necessary moral frame of reference - they are 'outlaws'. The character 
theory is attractive as it appears to offer a coherence of explanation that the choice 
theory cannot provide in the debate on psychopaths. Moral blame should be a process 
of rational communication with the person blamed."^ Morally to blame a person is to 
treat him as a fellow member of the community and ought not to be seen as 
l i s 
manipulating him into obedience. Such a discussion of blame could not be entered 
into with a psychopath as he lacks the qualities that make him a moral agent. The 
character theory explains why such qualities are required. If, like the severely 
Duff, above n. 100, 181. 114 
'"Ib id . , 182. 
Although not all character theorists would agree on this point. Bayles did not believe psychopathy 
should excuse a defendant from blame, but that this did not mean the defendant had to be punished: 
Bayles, above n.58, 17-35. It is submitted that, for a character theorist, this view is inconsistent with the 
character theory for reasons discussed within this chapter. 
Duff, above n.lOO, 56. 
"Mbid.,70. 
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mentally disordered, the DSPD individual is unable to understand why he should be 
blamed, the character theory suggests he ought not to be held eligible for blame. 
However, until we have in place adequate measures for the detention through civil 
process of such dangerous individuals, until we have sufficient medical knowledge of 
their condition to enable their identification and assist in altering the public's 
perception of them, the character theory will remain unacceptable. The choice theory 
allows for the removal of a dangerous person from society. The DSPD individual, if 
regarded as a moral agent, cannot escape criminal liability or punishment unless, for 
reasons unassociated with his psychopathy, he falls within one of the criminal 
defences. The choice theory satisfies society's desire for retribution. DSPD 
individuals do not usually come into the public eye until there is a good reason for 
condemnation of them. To hold them criminally liable satisfies our need to have 
someone to blame when an atrocity is committed. We do not yet wish to have our 
perception of such individuals challenged and the choice theory does not challenge it. 
Bentham argued the threat of punishment would not deter people who committed a 
crime due to their mental condition and this is so for DSPD individuals."^ Duff also 
suggests that such an individual may not be justifiably punished for failing to obey the 
law because he cannot be obliged by a law to which he cannot relate.However, it 
will depend on the purpose of punishment whether a DSPD individual may be 
justifiably punished. Only if the purpose is individual deterrence, is there no utility in 
punishing a DSPD individual who cannot learn from his punishment.'^' As other 
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch X I I I "Cases Unmeet for 
Punishment", (1978), 77. 
Duff, above n. 100, 182. 
Ibid., 264. 
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purposes of punishment are general deterrence and protection of the public by 
removal of a dangerous offender from society, there can be still social utility in 
punishing him. 
2.7 Social Deprivation 
It must be considered whether social deprivation should be an additional consideration 
in determining eligibility for blame. If we are claiming that moral blame is the basis 
of criminal law and that an individual should only be blamed where he has a free 
choice not to commit a crime, then, as social deprivation influences choice to a large 
extent, why should it not be a factor in excusing blame? Individuals who have 
grown up in social situations where they have been exposed to severe poverty and 
witnessed violent crimes as the norm may have an inadequate appreciation of morality 
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and insufficient opportunity to avoid continuing a cycle of crime. Bazelon suggests 
that " i f a 'socio-economic situation' can render one impervious to trauma, would it 
not also render one impervious to the sanctions of the law?" A youth from a social 
background in which he has been educated in telling right from wrong, has not been 
deprived of material comforts and has good prospects for the future, ought to be held 
more morally culpable when he breaks the law than the individual who, for example, 
steals because he knows no better. It may be correct that the youth who has not been 
materially deprived finds it easier not to break the law, however, while social 
deprivation may remove choice of lifestyle to a large extent, it does not remove 
entirely the choice to comply with the law. That choice may be more difficult, but it 
still exists as a choice because not all socially deprived individuals commit crimes nor 
'^ ^ See Bazelon, "The Morality of Criminal Law", in Criminal Law, E d . T . Morawetz, Dartmouth 
Publishing, (1991), 7. 
Ibid., 13. 
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would the majority of such individuals wish to be perceived in such a way. Not all 
children below the age of ten commit crimes. Their lack of criminal responsibility is 
due to their perceived lack of capacity. Should insanity be allowed as a status defence, 
the same argument might apply. To suggest that individuals who are socially deprived 
lack capacity to be criminally responsible due to their lack of choice is to take a 
deterministic view which will ultimately suggest that none of us is responsible for any 
of our actions. Certainly, we are all subject to external pressures at times which make 
our choices harder.'^ "^ To suggest that the lack of criminal responsibility is due to a 
status held by socially deprived individuals is discriminatory and disturbing. Defences 
are recognised where there is a "general social consensus" that the defendant's choice 
was too hard to make, and it is unlikely that such a consensus would be achieved for a 
poverty defence.While poverty may be a causal factor which leads to crime, it is 
merely a contributing factor and does not remove the free choice of an individual. 
Similar arguments apply to the inheritance of character traits by virtue of a person's 
genes.'^ ^ We may be more likely to blame when the cause of harm is human rather 
than a natural cause ,ye t i f we become increasingly able to attribute an individual's 
character traits to his DNA, and discover a predisposition to crime, ought we to 
remove his responsibility due to the fact he was not acting entirely freely? This 
theory, as with social deprivation, is unlikely to attract much support. A disposition to 
crime will not be sufficient to guarantee the actor has no free choice at all. He may 
find certain impulses harder to resist, but it is unlikely we can say he could not help 
what he did. In any event, we would not wish to give such blanket exemptions. An 
124 Morse, "The Twilight of Welfare Criminology", in Criminal Law, E d . T . Morawetz, (1991), 29-30. 
Ibid., 30-32. 
Wells, " ' I Blame the Parents': Fitting New Genes in Old Criminal Laws", [1998] 61 MLR 724 
Ibid., 727. 
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individual with a predisposition to crime is the very individual from whom we expect 
to be protected. 
"It is important for criminal doctrine to limit the role of excuse....As soon as the 
phenomenon which is sought to excuse moves away from the exceptional, the harder 
it is for criminal law to see it Factors such as family background, social and 
economic circumstance, all of which may have both an explanatory and an excusing 
force, are....out of bounds."'^^ There are many reasons why an individual may be 
driven to commit a crime. If we are prepared to excuse for such reasons, we take away 
the purpose of a system of criminal law. 
Wells viewed the reaction of the House of Lords inRv Kingston'^'^ as an indicator of 
the probable reaction to a genetic-based defence.'•'° The defendant, who had 
paedophiliac tendencies, claimed he indecently assaulted his victim due to the effect 
of sedative drugs which were involuntarily administered to him. Despite this, he was 
still capable of forming the necessary mens rea. The House of Lords in this case 
would not recognise a new defence at common law. From this case, it appears there is 
a reluctance to recognise that a choice which is extremely difficult to make will not be 
a free choice. The same must also be true for any defence of social deprivation. While 
there is support for the new type of defence upon which the defendant in Kingston 
sought to rely,''" as will be discussed below, social deprivation or genetic dispositions 
will not fall into any such exceptional category. 
Ibid., 735. 
'^"[1995] 2 A C 355. 
'^ ^ Wells, above n. 126, 735. 
See e.g. Sullivan, "Making Excuses" in Harm and Culpability, ed. Simester and Smith, (1996). 
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3. Conclusion 
Criminal conduct may take the form of an act, omission or, exceptionally 'being in a 
state of affairs' and must be voluntary. The requirement of voluntariness is especially 
pertinent where such conduct involves 'being in a state of affairs'. An individual 
ought not to be held responsible for a state of being over which he has no control. A 
'state of affairs' offence ought not to be held to apply to circumstances where an 
individual is powerless to prevent such a state from existing. 
An individual who lacks moral agency ought not to be eligible to be held criminally 
responsible. For practical reasons, moral agency should involve the ability to 
understand legal rules and the consequences of their breach, rather than requiring a 
deeper capacity to engage in a moral understanding of such rules, and even a minimal 
capacity will suffice to make D a moral agent, regardless of how difficult it may be 
for an individual to comply with the law. As the law stands currently, this renders all 
but children below the age of ten moral agents and exempts those individuals unfit to 
plead for the procedure of a trial. If ineligibility for criminal responsibility is to be 
extended at all, then certain severely insane individuals ought to be afforded a similar 
position within the law as they lack capacity on either the choice or character theories 
of criminal responsibility. Al l other individuals may be held criminally responsible 
unless circumstances exist which are capable of excusing or justifying their criminal 
conduct due to a lack or either capacity or fair opportunity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PREVENTATIVE DETENTION OF DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS 
1. Introduction 
Certain severely mentally i l l individuals, who are not eligible for criminal 
responsibility due to their lack of moral agency, may exhibit dangerous behaviour. 
Equally, society may require protection from dangerous severely personality 
disordered individuals who have not yet committed a criminal offence, or whose 
detention is necessary beyond the level of their culpability. Where the purpose of 
detention is not to punish, then this should occur within the civil law. Where 
preventative detention is available through civil process, it can no longer be justified 
within the criminal law. We must be careful to treat fairly and consistently all 
individuals who are not deserving of punishment, but who may nonetheless require to 
be detained in the public interest. 
This chapter will examine the issues involved in detaining those individuals who 
remain a danger to society but who cannot be held criminally responsible, and those 
individuals who require detention beyond the level of their culpability. Existing 
measures for preventative detention within the criminal law and mental health 
legislation will be considered alongside proposals for changes in these areas of law. 
The problems concerning accurately predicting dangerousness and the potential 
conflict with the Human Rights Act 1998 will also be examined. 
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2. Preventative Detention 
2.1 Current Measures For Preventative Detention within the Criminal Law 
Preventative detention is already in use within the criminal justice system. Penal 
measures may be imposed which go beyond the level of a person's culpability. The 
discretionary life sentence consists of two parts: the 'relevant' part which is specified 
by the judge passing the sentence and represents the period of punishment;'^^ and the 
remaining part which is dealt with by the Secretary of State and is determined by 
considerations of risk to the public.'''^ A discretionary life sentence may be imposed 
where the offender has been convicted of a very serious offence and there are good 
grounds for believing he may remain a serious danger to the public for a period, 
which cannot be determined at the date of sentence.'^ '* Such grounds will often relate 
to mental conditions which could not allow for detention under the provisions of the 
Mental Health Act 1983.'^^ In addition, the offender need not have previous 
convictions^^^ in order for the court to exercise its power under s80(2)(b) of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Considerations which go 
beyond the defendant's level of culpability feed into the decision not only whether to 
impose a discretionary life sentence but also as to determination of its length. 
Section 109 of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act goes further and requires a court 
to give reasons why a life sentence should not be passed rather than why it should. 
Where a defendant conmiits a serious offence, having previously committed a serious 
'^ ^ S34 Criminal Justice Act 1991. See also s85 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
Practice Direction (Crime: Life Sentences) [1993] 1 WLR 223. 
'^^ Attorney-General's Reference No. 32 of 1996 [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 261. 
Ss3, 20, 37(2)(a) and 72(l)(b) all contain this requirement. 
R V Smith (Wayne Anthony) (1999) The Times, 22 June 1999. Formerly, the same provision was 
contained within s2(2)(b) Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
This provision states that a custodial sentence shall be "... where the offence is a violent or sexual 
offence, for such longer term (not exceeding the maximum) as in the opinion of the court is necessary 
to protect the public from serious harm from the offender." 
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138 offence, the court must impose a life sentence unless there are exceptional 
circumstances to justify not doing so. The intention of Parliament was "to alter the 
existing law by extending the power and imposing a duty to impose a life 
sentence."'^ ^ Initially, a narrow approach was adopted towards this provision in /? v 
Kelly Attorney-General's Reference (No. 53 of 1998). However, since the Court of 
Appeal decision in Rv Offen,'''^ the provision must be applied so that it does not result 
in offenders being sentenced to life imprisonment when they do not constitute a 
significant risk to the public, to avoid bringing it into conflict with articles 3 and 5 of 
theECHR.''*' A judge remains obliged to pass a life sentence, unless the offender 
"poses no significant risk to the public""*^ and must provide reasons if he does not do 
so. However, sensibly, this decision represents a more flexible approach to the 
application sl09. 
Existing legislation allows the detention of offenders who are considered to be a 
danger to the public. They are detained not for what they have done in the past but for 
what dangerous conduct they may undertake in the future. I f we are prepared to accept 
that this is necessary and justifiable, it is only one, though significant, step further to 
allow the detention of a class of people who have not previously conmiitted a serious 
offence, yet pose a serious risk.''^'' 
A serious offence is defined under s 109(5) and includes, inter alia, attempt, conspiracy or 
incitement to commit murder; soliciting murder; manslaughter; wounding or causing grievous bodily 
harm with intent. 
R V Kelly Attorney-General's Reference (No. 53 of ]998) [1999] 2 All ER 13, 21. 
[2001] 2 All ER 154. 
Ibid., 175. 
''^ Ibid., 176. 
'""^  In Managing People with Severe Personality Disorder: Proposals for Development, July 1999 ("the 
Consultation Paper") the Government estimates there are 1400 men in prison who fall into the category 
of DSPD individuals and 400 male patients detained on court orders under the category of 
psychopathic disorder in secure psychiatric hospitals. It is estimated there are between 300 and 600 
DSPD individuals in the community well known to social services and the local police due to their 
dangerous and demanding behaviour: 9, paras. 3-5. 
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DSPD individuals''*'* are already being detained for the protection of society. Of the 
estimated 2000 DSPD individuals in England and Wales, most are in prison or secure 
hospitals.''*^ The Consultation Paper Managing People with Severe Personality 
Disorder: Proposals for Policy Development proposes to continue and extend 
preventative detention to such dangerous individuals who have committed no criminal 
offence. 
The Consultation Paper outlines two options for the preventative detention of 
individuals with a severe personality disorder. Option A would retain the present 
legislative framework with amendments."*^ Under Option A there would be provision 
for greater use of the discretionary life sentence.''*^ The treatability requirement, 
which is a condition for detention of patients under the Mental Health Act 1983,''*^ 
would be removed for the DSPD individual. Hospital and prison facilities would be 
improved to deal better with such individuals. 
Option B would create new criminal and civil powers for the indeterminate detention 
of psychopaths.'"*^ A 'DSPD direction' could be attached to any sentence'^ ^ allowing 
for detention in a new specialist facility. Such an order could also be made during an 
offender's detention in prison resulting in the individual's transfer from prison to 
specialist facilities. The same result could alternatively be achieved through civil 
proceedings where there has been no criminal conviction. 
See Chapter 1,2.6. 
The Consultation Paper, 3. 
'^ ^ Ibid., 14, paras. 14-19. 
The availability of the discretionary life sentence may be extended to a wider range of offences. 
'"^  Above n. 135. 
'"^  The Consultation Paper, 16, paras. 24-26. 
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Under the new legislation, in criminal cases, the court would make a decision for a 
compulsory order which would be based partly on the availability of treatment. 
Similar proceedings would apply to the DSPD individual where initially it would be 
unclear whether he is suffering from a severe personality disorder or some other 
mental disorder.'^' There would be a single power to remand for assessment which 
would exist irrespective of subsequent disposal. For a DSPD individual, assessment in 
hospital may be followed by assessment in a specialist unit.'^^ 
The White Paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act, Part II, High Risk Patients,' 
noted that the majority of views taken in response to the Consultation Paper favoured 
Option B, but, before making any decisions, has implemented pilot projects in order 
to evaluate the assessment and treatment of such individuals.'^"^ The term DSPD 
individual was noted to be only a working definition which would be refined as a 
clearer picture emerged of the nature and characteristics of such an individual.'^^ 
For the detention of such individuals through criminal proceedings, there would be 
simplified procedures for the courts to obtain medical assessment and to order 
treatment at any stage of the trial.'^^ The options available to the courts would range 
from a disposal through the criminal justice system; the making of a care and 
treatment order; a restriction order or a hospital and limitation direction.'^^ 
Save for the mandatory life sentence. 
The Consultation Paper, ch.8, para. 16. 
Ibid., para. 17. '"Ibi .
Cm.5016II (2000), ch.2, para. 2.6. ('The White Paper, Part I I ) . 
Ibid., para. 2.12. 
'"ibid., ch.2, para. 2.18. , ^ , ^ 
White Paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act, Part I. The New Legal Framework, Cm. 50161 
(2000). ('The White Paper, Part I'), para. 4.5. 
Ibid., para. 4.10. 
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In assessing the proposals for the detention of DSPD individuals, the extent to which 
the use of preventative detention is appropriate within the criminal justice system 
must be considered. We must decide whether the treatment of DSPD individuals 
should fall within the criminal justice system at all and consider whether we can 
justify the detention of individuals who have committed no offence and who are not 
ordinarily detainable under the Mental Health Act 1983. This will involve 
consideration of the extent to which it is possible accurately to predict dangerousness. 
Deprivation of liberty may be justifiable for the protection of society in circumstances 
where an individual is detained on the basis of a reliable assessment of a higher 
propensity for violence. However, where an individual is identified merely as 
potentially dangerous and is innocent of any past offence, the balance of risk may 
have to be borne by the public. 
One uncomfortable factor raised by either proposal is that certain individuals may be 
detained indefinitely. If we are prepared to detain a person for the rest of his natural 
life, we must be sure to the highest standard of proof that we are detaining an 
individual who will commit a dangerous crime i f released into society. We must also 
be able to confirm our certainty at regular intervals. 
2.2 Mental Health Law 
In implementing new legislation, the Consultation Paper must complement the 
proposals for a new Mental Health Act. The White Paper, Reforming the Mental 
Health Act, Part I, The New Legal Framework recommends a broad definition of 
mental disorder by removing categories of mental disorder.'^^ This new definition is 
158 Ibid., Part I, paras. 3.3-3.5. 
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aimed at including personality disorders where a serious risk of harm is posed to 
others, moving away from the narrow concept of treatability.'^^ 
The Consultation Paper Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983: Proposals for 
Consultation^'^ appeared to place those DSPD individuals suffering from severe 
personality disorder and no other form of mental disorder outside of the new Mental 
Health Act proposals. Compulsory care and treatment was to be authorised only 
where a patient with capacity to consent to treatment presented "a substantial risk of 
serious harm to the health and safety of the patient or to the safety of other persons if 
s/he remains untreated, and there are positive clinical measures included within the 
proposed care and treatment which are likely to prevent deterioration or to secure an 
improvement in the patient's mental condition."^^^ 
However, the White Paper, Part I seems to suggest criteria for the use of compulsory 
powers which are wider than those contained within the MHA Consultation Paper: 
• The patient must be diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder; 
• The mental disorder must be of such degree or nature to warrant specialist care 
and treatment; 
• A plan of care and treatment must be available to address the mental disorder, and 
for people who are considered to be dangerous to others, the plan must be 
considered necessary to treat the disorder and/or manage behaviours arising from 
the disorder. 
Ibid., Part I, para. 3.5. 159 
Cm. 4480 (1999), ch.2, para. 18. ('The MHA Consultation Paper').These proposals have been 
superseded by the White Paper, Part I. 
Ibid., ch.5, para. 4. (Emphasis added). 
The White Paper, Part I, para. 3.18; also contained in the White Paper, Part II, para. 3.4. (Emphasis 
added). 
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This reduced treatability requirement, i f adopted by Parliament, will almost certainly 
allow for the compulsory detention of DSPD individuals under any new mental health 
legislation. The detention of such individuals through civil proceedings would be by 
means of a single pathway for compulsory care and treatment, which could be broken 
down into three stages: decisions for use of compulsory powers; formal assessment 
and initial treatment under compulsory powers; and the making of a care and 
treatment order, initially for a period of six months. 
3. Predicting Dangerousness 
Dangerousness is currently gauged by the criminal justice system in an arbitrary 
manner. Where a defendant has previously committed a serious offence, the court 
must impose a life sentence unless there are exceptional circumstances to justify not 
doing so.'^ "* Despite the more liberal interpretation of this provision by the Court of 
Appeal in Ojfen,^^^ a court still must look for reasons why a defendant is not 
dangerous rather than reasons why he is. The MHA Consultation Paper clearly 
envisaged the need for care in identifying a DSPD individual and assessing the risk he 
poses to the public. The MHA Consultation Paper proposed specialist centres be 
formed where an individual would be assessed over a period of several weeks by a 
multi-disciplinary team with input from probation, health, prison and social services. 
The centres would inform decisions on initial detention and provide for assessment 
reviews on a similar basis.'^ ^ 
Ibid., paras. 3.9-3.10. 
S109 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
[2001] 2 All ER 154. SI09 must be applied so that it does not result in offenders being sentenced to 
life imprisonment when they do not constitute a significant risk to the public. 
The MHA Consultation Paper, 18-19, paras. 36-42. 
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In predicting the dangerousness of an individual, a distinction must be drawn between 
DSPD individuals who have already exhibited dangerous behaviour through 
committing a serious offence and those who have not yet offended, although show 
dangerous traits of character. Predicting the continued dangerousness of the former 
category may yield more accurate results than predicting the potential dangerousness 
of the latter, although such results ought still to be viewed with suspicion, given that 
an individual's right to liberty may be deprived as a consequence. 
While versions of utilitarianism could justify detaining indefinitely a person who is a 
danger to society, the human rights issues, which such detention would raise, are far-
reaching. To remove the DSPD individual's right to liberty for an indefinite period 
before he has even committed a crime should cause us great concern, even though 
such an occurrence would necessarily only occur under exceptional circumstances. 
Preventative detention prevents the detainee from carrying out not only dangerous 
conduct but also harmless activities. Accordingly, the minimum amount of restraint 
should be used in order to achieve the aim of prevention.'^^ While a person who has 
committed a serious offence may lose his right to be presumed harmless, there ought 
to remain a right to be presumed harmless and a corresponding right to liberty where 
there is no evidence of previous serious dangerousness. This is because it is not 
167 Walker, "Harms, Probabilities and Precautions" [1997] OJLS 611, 614. 
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possible to accurately predict dangerousness on all occasions even where the sample 
against whom predictions are made consists only of offenders.'^^ There is as much 
chance of the courts being wrong as there is right,'^^ and in a study where laymen and 
parole officers predicted parole survival, the laymen predicted more accurately, 
moreover a better result could have been predicted randomly.'^° Where a prediction is 
made which results in preventative detention, it will be impossible to prove its 
accuracy as the potential offender will have been taken out of circulation and will be 
unable to offend. As little is currently known about severe personality disorders, the 
vahdity of any predictions of risk where there has been no serious offence committed 
must be questioned. In a specialist centre, it is likely that speciahsms will develop and 
much more may be learned about severe personality disorders in time. However, if 
either of the Government's proposals is implemented, initial decisions may be no 
more than steps in the dark. 
4. Human Rights 
All UK legislation passed before or after the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998 must be read and given effect in a manner which is compatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.'^' Provided that the Government's proposals 
are properly implemented, it is unlikely that they will contravene the Human Rights 
Act. Issues arising from the interpretation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention must 
be kept in mind. Article 5 provides that: 
Von Hirsh, 'Predictions and False Positives' in Principled Sentencing, ed. Von Hirsh/Ashworth 
(1992), 115. 
Floud, 'Extending Sentences for Dangerous Offenders' in Principled Sentencing, ed. Von 
Hirsh/Ashworth (1992), 125. 
'™ Von Hirsh, above n.l68, 115. 
S3. 
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"(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: 
... (e) the lawful detention... .of persons of unsound mind,..." 
Deprivation of liberty will be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law where 
it conforms with the applicable municipal law and is not arbitrary.'^^ Where the 
detention is under Article 5(l)(e), it will not be arbitrary provided the individual is 
reliably shown by objective medical expertise to be of unsound mind, the individual's 
disorder is of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement and the disorder 
persists throughout the confinement.'^^ Given that medical expertise in the field of 
mental disorders is still developing, the Court is unlikely to intervene in evidential 
decisions by national authorities. For the same reasons, 'unsound mind' has not been 
given a definitive interpretation due to the medical profession's growing 
understanding of what may constitute a mental disorder. However an individual 
whose views or behaviour merely deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular 
society will not be of unsound mind.'^'* 
Generally, under Article 5 the Court appears to allow a margin of discretion to 
national authorities. Detention may be justified under more than one sub-paragraph of 
Article 5(1)'^^ and in Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium^^^ the Court was flexible in 
finding that later periods of detention still related to an original court sentence and 
Wintenverp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387. 
Ibid. 
"Ubid. 
Eriksen v Norway 102/1995/608/696. 
'™ (1982) 4 EHRR 443. 
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were authorised under Article 5(l)(a). Detention for the purpose of protecting society 
will be lawful'^^ and national authorities may exercise caution in delaying release 
where an individual's condition has improved if the individual may be a danger to the 
public. 
Article 5(4) entitles a person to have the lawfulness of his detention confirmed at 
reasonable intervals and to be released if the detention is not lawful. Under the Mental 
Health Act 1983, the present inability to treat DSPD individuals renders their 
continued detention unlawful.'^^ The lawfulness of an individual's detention has been 
successfully challenged during the discretionary period of life sentences where it is 
now necessary to allow at reasonable intervals a challenge to the legality of such 
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detention. When an offender has served that part of his sentence representing his 
punishment, a 'court' must consider at reasonable intervals whether he still represents 
a threat to society. A review procedure in excess of one year for a person of unsound 
mind will be a breach of Article 5(4).'^' The period may have to be shorter where 
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there is clear evidence of some change in an individual's mental condition and four 
months has been held to be too long a period for a person of unsound mind.'*' Review 
procedures must take such conditions into account. 
Article 5(4) is equally applicable to Mental Health Review Tribunals, entitling the 
detainee to have the lawfulness of his detention speedily decided and the continued 
Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 13 EHRR 333. 
Luberti v Italy (1984) 6 EHRR 440. 
'™ S72(l)(b); R v Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex parte A [1984] 1 All ER 481. 
Weeks v UK ( m i ) 10 EHRR 293; Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v UK {\990) 13 EHRR 666. 
Herczegfalvy V Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437. 
'^^ M V FRG (1984) 38 DR 104. 
'^^ Koendjbiahrie v Netherlands (1991) 13 EHRR 820. 
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lawfulness reviewed at reasonable intervals.'*"* Expediency of obtaining evidence will 
be primarily a matter for the national authorities'*^ and the review must be in respect 
not only of the legality of the procedure but also the grounds for detention.'*^ Since 
the implementation of the Human Rights Act, the Court of Appeal in Regina (C) v 
Mental Health Review Tribunal'^^ has held that a routine listing of applications for 
hearing eight weeks after the date of application contravened article 5(4). 
Article 6 concerns the right to a fair trial and covers both criminal and civil 
188 
proceedings. There should be equality of arms, a trial within a reasonable time and 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Article 6(2) provides for a 
presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings. If the detention of DSPD 
individuals is dealt with through civil proceedings, there is no such presumption. As it 
is the Government's intention to detain dangerous individuals who have not yet 
offended, it would be preferable to avoid using criminal proceedings because 
rebutting the presumption of innocence by the prediction of future conduct is likely to 
be impossible. However, recent cases'^° indicate that the courts will construe civil 
proceedings as criminal where they are criminal in nature, taking into account the 
three criteria for determining whether an individual is the subject of a criminal 
charge.'^' These are 1) the classification of the proceedings in domestic law,'^^ 2) the 
nature of the offence and 3) the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the 
'*' 'Xvf/^(1981)4EHRR 188. 
'^^ Eriksen v Norway 102/1995/608/696. 
XvUK (1981) 4 EHRR 188. 
'"TheTimes, U'''July 2001. 
Neumeister v Austria (1968) lEHRR 91. 
Article 6(1). 
"° See King v Walden (Inspector of Taxes) [2001] STC 822; Han and Yau v Commissioners of Customs 
and Excise [2001] STI 87; Murell [2001] EHRLR 185. 
Engel V Netherlands [1979-80] EHRR 647; AP. MP, &TPv Switzerland [1998] 26 EHRR 541. 
'^ ^ Which will be taken as no more than a starting point: Han and Yau v Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise [2001] STI 87. 
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person risked incurring. Preventative detention, where it is punitive in nature, and may 
last indefinitely, may have to be classified as criminal. Where such detention is 
construed in terms of 'treatment' rather than 'punishment', the more stringent 
requirements of criminal proceedings may be avoided. 
In summary, provided UK law is altered to allow for lawful detention where a person 
of unsound mind is not treatable and the conditions for detention and review of DSPD 
individuals are met, it is possible that measures for preventative detention can be 
introduced to comply with the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998.'^^ The greatest 
obstacle from Europe may be meeting the required standard for a fair hearing. Is a fair 
hearing likely to occur i f dangerousness must be shown where there is no evidence of 
such from past criminal conduct? What is crucial is that the evidence from which a 
prediction of dangerousness is made is both sufficient and transparent, and that 
adequate opportunity is given for the defendant to contest the allegations made against 
him. This will be particularly so if the proceedings are considered to be criminal, 
regardless of their original classification in domestic law. 
5. Conclusion 
While our current measures for preventative detention of dangerous personality 
disordered individuals within the civil law are inadequate, criminal provisions have 
been developed and are in use for the detention of individuals who remain a danger to 
society after serving the punitive element of their sentence. However, such provisions 
fail to address the reality of the incarceration, which is the deprivation of liberty after 
This view was supported by the Court of Session in Anderson and others v The Scottish Ministers 
and Another, The Times, 21 June 2000, and the Privy Council in Anderson and others v The Scottish 
Ministers and Another, The Times, 29 October 2001. 
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the individual has paid his debt to society. This deprivation of liberty should not take 
the continued form of punishment. Option B of the Government's proposals 
recognises that DSPD individuals are better dealt with by specialist provision under 
the civil law,'^'* rendering the non-punitive element of a discretionary life sentence 
unnecessary. 
Option B takes into account the ineffectiveness of punishment on DSPD individuals 
and may allow for a pooling of knowledge within the specialist centres. Since 
psychopathy is a personality disorder rather than a disease, treatment may be 
developed to involve the provision of 'coping skills' rather than a cure.'^^ If people 
are to lose their liberty even though they have not yet offended, we must address their 
conditions of incarceration. They must suffer no disadvantages other than their 
incarceration. For this reason, specialist faciUties described under Option B may be 
more appropriate than prison detention which would continue under Option A for 
those offenders who have served the punitive element of their sentence and are being 
detained in order to protect society. 
However, it is debatable whether sufficient safeguards against wrongful detention 
could be implemented. The DSPD individual many appear completely sane, charming 
and even intelligent. I f psychopathy is a mask of sanity, are we certain we will 
recognise it correctly and how many safeguards would be enough? In view of the fact 
that dangerousness cannot be predicted accurately, the presumption of harmlessness 
ought to be given to all non-offenders. Where the present sentencing law is 
' The Consultation Paper, 17, para 26. 
' Blackburn, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, (1997), 382. 
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inadequate, electronic tagging and monitoring through probation or the police should 
be considered as a first alternative to incarceration. The constraints on a person's 
freedom ought to be restricted to a minimum where dangerousness can only be 
estimated. Only in exceptional circumstances, and then only where a person has 
shown repeated evidence of serious dangerousness, should preventative detention be 
used. There should only be a redistribution of the risk of serious harm between 
potential victims and potential offenders under such circumstances. 
Best evidence of future dangerousness is past conduct. Predictions not solidly 
grounded will be unsafe. Within the criminal law we already detain an offender 
beyond his level of culpability, according to his dangerousness. While this may be 
justified in saying the offender has forfeit his right to be presumed safe by the public 
and the balance of risk should be borne now by him, certainly preventative detention 
within the criminal law should go no further than this. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSANITY 
1. Introduction 
Insanity is a rarely used defence,'^^ although its use has increased since the 
introduction of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 
which provides for a greater degree of flexibility in sentencing.'^^ While the 
significance of the insanity defence as a subject for academic debate may appear 
disproportionate to its use within the criminal law, it is at the extremes of our system 
of criminal law that the most serious injustices can occur and at which we are able to 
observe whether the system is operating correctly in accordance with principle. Quite 
rightly, the insanity defence remains the subject of much scrutiny and criticism. 
The insanity defence in English law is very narrow in scope, applying only to those 
individuals who do not know, at the time of committing the offence, what they are 
1 OR 
doing or that what they are doing is legally wrong. Any individual who suffers, for 
example, from paranoid delusions or irresistible urges, which lead to him offending, 
will have sufficient understanding of the nature of his act and its criminality not to be 
afforded a defence of insanity. The effect of this narrow defence is to attribute legal 
responsibility for mala in se crimes onto individuals who are unable to satisfy the 
conditions of the defence but who, in general terms, we view as insane. 
There were 49 special verdicts between 1975-1988. There have been 44 since the 1991 Act until 
1996: Mackay and Kearns, "More Facts About the Insanity Defence" [1999] Crim LR 714, 716. 
Ibid., 725: over 50 per cent of disposals now result in community based orders. 
The M'Naghten Rules will be examined in detail below at 3. 
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The defence must succeed in balancing two competing aims: recognition of a lack of 
culpability and the protection of public safety.'^^ It is questionable whether the cunent 
defence of insanity fully addresses these aims. In order to consider these points in 
greater detail, the following issues will be examined below: whether the insanity 
defence operates as a status or excuse; the legal and moral nature of the insanity 
defence; the operation of the M'Naghten Rules; and procedural considerations, 
including the Human Rights Act 1998, the use of expert evidence and disposal 
provisions. Finally, proposals for reform will be considered and recommendations 
made. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
Until we are able to understand and explain the purpose of the insanity defence, we 
are unable to say whether it is achieving its aims and, if it is not, what reforms may be 
appropriate. We must decide whether the defence ought, in principle, to confer an 
immune status on mentally i l l offenders or whether it would be more appropriate to 
excuse them from responsibility for their actions. We must decide then under what 
circumstances we are prepared to remove culpability and, therefore, corresponding 
legal responsibility; whether this should be on the basis of a condition of mind alone, 
or whether there must be a causal link between the mental illness and the act. 
199 See e.g. comments in Sullivan [1983] 2 All E R 673, 677-678. 
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2.1 Status or excuse 
The defence of insanity is perceived by some academic writers as a condition, or 
status, while others maintain it is an excuse.^ *^ '' In its present form, it cannot accurately 
be described as a condition, although it may be preferable to be able to do so. 
2.1.1. Advantages of a Status Description of Insanity 
Some writers advocate a move away from causality, the requirement that the 
defendant's behaviour at the time of acting was caused by mental disorder, towards a 
status approach to the defence of insanity. Moore writes,^"' "the very status of being 
crazy precludes responsibility. Seeking some hidden cause of the accused's behaviour 
is, accordingly, beside the point." This may be particularly so where an individual is 
suffering from a permanent psychosis. However, while it is Moore's view that this 
202 
should be correct in principle, he recognises that this does not occur in practice. 
Fingarette argues^ "^  that insanity does not "preclude blameability or mens rea but it 
does preclude responsibility", also viewing insanity in the same way as infancy, as a 
status rather than an excuse. Thus, "questions of voluntariness, self-control, or intent 
become beside the point."^"'* It is possible to envisage such a situation with the 
severely mentally i l l , as was recognised by the Butler Committee,^''^ for example, 
where the defendant's illness is of such severity and permanence that all 
investigations into his state of mind at the time of the actus reus are irrelevant. Such 
Wells, "Whither Insanity?" [1983] Crim LR 787, 793. 
Moore, "Causation and Excuses" (1985) California Law Review 1091, 1139. 
Ibid., 1109-1110. Discussed below under 2.3.2. 
Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, (1972), 136, 141. 
^""Ibid., 141. 
Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, (1975), Cmnd. 6244, para. 18.17. The 
Law Commission opted to retain a degree of causality {A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law 
Commission No. 177 (1989) Vol. 2, para. 11.16). 
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an individual ought not to be viewed as a moral agent.However such a blanket 
status to all types of mental illness would carry the disadvantages outlined below. 
2.1.2. Disadvantages of a Status Description 
Currently, the insanity defence does not operate as a status defence. The defence does 
not offer a true denial of responsibility as a status to those who are undeserving of 
criminal punishment. At best, the defence will excuse the defendant for a particular 
set of actions and many mental conditions will not entitle the sufferer to a defence, 
due to a failure to satisfy the narrow M'Naghten Rules. '^'^  
The problem pointed out by Mackay^°^ in recognising insanity as a status defence is in 
establishing the point at which an individual ceases to be rational, because 
irrationality will not be a constant factor with most mentally i l l individuals. While 
infancy can be determined by a fixed age, there is no such general point at which the 
condition of legal insanity can be fixed, nor would it be desirable to do so. If this were 
to be the case, the question then would have to be at what point does an individual 
cease to be legally insane? Mackay sees an analogy between infancy and insanity as 
inappropriate as we do not fix infancy at a particular IQ.^''^ Rather, allowing the 
defence of infancy reflects our attitude of support and encouragement towards 
children. This attitude differs to our perception of the mentally i l l whom we may 
regard as dangerous.^'" While Arenella is of the view that we do not hold children to 
^°*See Chapter One, 2.]. 
Wells, above n.200, 795. 
Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995), 77. 
Ibid., 83. 
Ibid., 84. 
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be moral agents as they have not yet fully developed the capacity for moral reason,^" 
Mackay suggests that such a view ought not to be extended to the mentally il l as, to 
do so, would compel extension of such a status to psychopaths.^'^ This is not 
necessarily so, since we may be more prepared to afford sympathy to the mentally il l 
than to psychopaths, who often evoke feeUngs of fear. The difficulty lies in 
determining what level of mental abnormality ought to confer a status exemption. 
2.1.3. Summary 
The status of individuals suffering from a mental abnormality does not and should not 
automatically exempt all such individuals from criminal responsibility.^''' While there 
is merit in the argument that certain severely mentally i l l individuals ought to be 
entitled to an exemption from liability on the grounds of their status, a causal element 
is unlikely to be removed from the existing defence or any new defence.'^ ''^  Now may 
be the time to recognise that, rather than be entitled to a defence of insanity, certain 
severely mentally i l l individuals, who are not eligible to be considered moral agents, 
ought to be given a blanket exemption from prosecution. However, for the vast 
majority of cases, the defendant will be suffering from a temporary or treatable mental 
condition which warrants him not to be held responsible for his actions at that point in 
time?^^ To allow a status of insanity to be conferred and removed at appropriate 
intervals would add unwanted complexity, both in theory and practice, to the defence. 
^" Arenella, "Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and 
Moral Accountability", 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1511, 1519 
212 
213 
'^^  Mackay, above n.208, 85. 
See Chapter 1. 
Discussed below at 4.1.2. 
'^^  In the first five years since the introduction of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to 
Plead) Act 1991, 52.3% of Special Verdicts related to a diagnosis of schizophrenia: Mackay and 
Kearns, above n.l96, 717, a condition which can be treated and controlled with medication. 
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2.2. The Moral Nature of the Insanity Defence 
Fingarette writes^'^ that by deciding that an individual is not a responsible agent, "we 
mean by this not to express a moral judgment of him but to indicate that one must 
abstain from judging such a person morally." To label such a person 'innocent' is not 
the same innocence as that of a rational person, but is the innocence of an individual 
lacking the capacity to be a free and responsible citizen.^'^ In deciding when we are to 
hold an individual a rational agent, Morse suggests that minimal rationality and 
minimal self-control or lack of compulsion are the necessary preconditions for 
responsibility^'^ and that these conditions will apply regardless of whether the 
defendant has carried out the actus reus with the mens rea of the offence. In addition, 
the presence of irrationality and compulsion must be nonculpable.^'^ We will deal 
with the requirements of rationality and lack of compulsion in turn. 
2.2.1 Rationality 
Individuals who are able to share our perceptions, values and attitudes, amongst other 
qualities, are eligible to be considered culpable. Where such qualities are lacking, then 
it is necessary to consider an individual's rationality. 'Rational' may mean 
'intellectual', 'prudent' or 'wise', but Fingarette suggests^^° that irrational means not 
only the opposite of rational, but much more. A person may be irrational in terms of 
his conduct, emotions and attitude and the word needs to be used in these contexts in 
application to the defence of insanity. Yet, while an intoxicated person may behave 
irrationally for the duration of his intoxication, this is insufficient to describe him as 
Fingarette, above n.203, 132. 
'^^  Ibid., 134. 
'^^  Morse, in "Excusing the Crazy the Insanity Defense Reconsidered", [1985] Southern California LR 
779, beheves that we should recognise these requirements intuitively, 782. 
Ibid., 787. 
Fingarette, above n.203, 179-180. 
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insane. An individual must act irrationally as a result of a defect in his capacity which 
is a product of his 'autonomous working mind' in order to be described as insane.^ '^ 
Morse produces a 'working definition' of rationality as requiring consideration of "the 
sensibleness of the actor's goals and the logic of the means chosen to achieve 
them."^^^ For example, a degree student would not be considered rational who had the 
goal of graduating but believed this could be achieved by failing to attend classes and 
submit assignments. 
Insanity is not merely a failure to make a moral discrimination, it is a defect in the 
capacity to make a discrimination.I t is not a failure in moral judgment, it is a 
failure in capacity for rational conduct.^ '^* 
2.2.2. Compulsion 
A distinction must be made between compulsion due to a lack of restraint, which 
ought not to give rise a defence of insanity, and true compulsion which can be 
described as causing irrationality. An individual who has a strong but resistible urge 
to kill wil l remain criminally responsible; one who suffers an obsessive irresistible 
urge to continuously wash his hands acts irrationally. Morse defines compulsion as 
presenting a defendant with hard choices with which society cannot expect him to 
comply. In order to claim compulsion, a defendant must be able to satisfy three 
criteria. First of all, the pain of performing the lawful act must be outweighed by the 
Fingarette, above n.203, 197. 
Morse, above n.218,783 
Fingarette and Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility (1979), 38. 
Ibid., 39-40. 
59 
pain of carrying out an unlawful act.^ ^^  Secondly, the defendant must not be carrying 
out the unlawful act for personal gain but must do so out of fear of the pain which 
would be suffered by him in carrying out the lawful act. Finally, there must be no 
reasonable alternative to the unlawful act. So, for example, a kleptomaniac who has 
not undergone a range of available treatments would not be able to claim compulsion. 
However, where the compulsion is internal, Morse suggests it is too difficult to 
measure,^ ^^ and it is also unclear whether the fear of dysphoria can ever be sufficient 
to excuse an individual from criminal conduct except where the behaviour can only be 
228 
explained as a lack of rationality. In such case, a rationality test may be more 
229 
appropnate. 
2.2.3. Summary 
Fingarette summarised^''" that "[t]o impute insanity is to refer not so much to the 
person's knowledge or ignorance, his beliefs or intention, or even his purportedly law-
violating conduct per se, as it is to refer to a certain defect in the way he comes to 
these, a defect to which we allude when we use the phrase 'mental disease' in this 
context". To impute insanity is to hold an individual not to be morally accountable 
and, so long as our system of criminal law is based on notions of morality, 
blameworthiness must be taken into account in attributing criminal liability.^^' 
Irrationality is the factor which must be taken into account in deciding whether an 
Morse, above n.218, 784-785. 
Ibid., 786. 
Morse, "Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law" (1978) 51 
Southern California LR 527, 584. 
Ibid., 584. 
Considered below under 4.2. 
Fingarette, above n.203, 157. 
Morse, above n.218,793. 
60 
individual is responsible enough to be morally accountable. Compulsion should be 
treated as a relevant factor only where it allows for the individual to be described as 
irrational. 
2.3. The Legal Nature Of The Insanity Defence 
If the insanity defence is to be treated as an excuse rather than a status, what is the 
nature of such an excuse? The insanity defence is viewed by some as a denial of 
criminal responsibility due to the defendant's unresponsiveness to punishment as a 
deterrent, or represents an absence of mens rea. It must be queried whether the 
actions of an insane defendant are excused due to their being caused by mental illness 
and, accordingly, whether all conduct should be excused since all conduct is caused. 
As with the moral nature of the defence the construction of a legal defence of insanity 
should be centred more appropriately around a lack of rationality. 
2.3.1. Lack of Mens Rea 
One description of the insanity defence is that it operates as a defence due to lack of 
mens rea. It has been suggested that each of the limbs of the M'Naghten Rules, if 
satisfied, indicate an absence of mens rea}^^ For example, a defendant who kills a 
baby, thinking he is strangling a cuddly toy, does not know the nature or quality of his 
act but also lacks the mens rea of murder .Wil l iams suggests^ ^^ the nature and 
quality limb of the M'Naghten Rules "exempts the lunatic only where a sane person 
would be exempted on the ground of lack of mens rea." 
Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility, (1978), 84. 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2"" ed., 1983), 644. 
While knowledge that an act is legally wrong does not form the mens rea of most crimes, Williams 
argues that this second limb of the Rules adds nothing to the definition of the offence, 645. 
^^"Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (1961), 482. 
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While it is true that the defence of insanity deals with issues surrounding an 
individual's cognition, this is not a complete description of the defence. The 
description cannot be true for crimes requiring objective recklessness, gross 
negligence or crimes of strict liability,^^^ for which no subjective form of mens rea 
must be shown. Although the Court of Appeal in DPP v H^^^ held that insanity is a 
defence based on lack of mens rea and has no relevance to a crime of strict liability, it 
238 
is submitted that this is wrong. The defence can be seen as taking the form of either 
insane automatism or a lack of knowledge that an act is wrong. Automatism, whether 
sane or insane, is "not a denial of mens rea^P"^ Although mens rea may be absent 
under the first limb of the M'Naghten Rules, this limb may be more appropriately 
described as an involuntary actus reus. The defence has been used in Hennessy^'^^ to 
the strict liability offence of driving whilst disqualified and, furthermore, mens rea is 
present for the second limb of the Rules. A lack of knowledge that an act is against 
the law does not form part of the mens rea for any offence: "the exculpatory force of 
this limb of the defence is as strong in cases of strict liability as any other." '^*' J.C. 
Smith, in his commentary on Antoine,^'^^ pointed out that the decision in Horseferry 
Magistrates Court, ex p K^'^^ that the defence is based on an absence of mens rect''^ 
may have misled the court in DPP v H into its erroneous decision. In ex p K, J. C. 
Smith suggested the court failed to notice the distinction between mens rea as is 
Wells, above n.200, 794. 
^" (also called DPP v Harper) [1997] 1 WLR 1406. 
See Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (2000), 167, and Ward, 
'Magistrates, Insanity and the Common Law" [1997] Crim LR 796, 802. 
139 , 
240 , 
Simester and Sullivan, above n.238, 167. 
'(1989) 89 Cr AppR 10. 
•^•^  [2000] 2 All ER 208; [2000] Crim LR621, 625. 
Upon which the defendant based his case. 
Ward, "Magistrates, Insanity and the Common Law" [1997] Crim LR 796, 802. 
' ' '[1996]2CrAppR574. 
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involved in the definition of a crime and mental responsibility which is a wider 
concept than mens rea?^^ 
Another criticism of this description is that individuals lacking mens rea will , under 
normal circumstances, be acquitted without requiring recourse to the insanity defence. 
Since the insanity defence when raised displaces the ordinary principles of criminal 
liability, then it demonstrates a concern with issues of disposal. 
2.3.2. The Causal Theory of Excuse 
The causal theory of excuse creates some difficulty in establishing either a) whether 
the insanity defence can exist as a status defence,^ "*^  and b) whether we are indeed 
responsible for any of our actions.^ '^ ^ The causal theory of excuse operates on the basis 
that a defendant will be excused where his actions were caused by some factor not of 
his making. For example, with duress, the threat must cause the defendant to fear 
death or serious injury, and must cause him to engage in the alleged criminal conduct. 
Mistaken beliefs cause the defendant to behave in a certain way, thus allowing an 
excuse. 
Insanity cannot be regarded as a status excuse by the causal theorist. An insane 
defendant is excused his criminal actions because his insanity caused them.^ '^ ^ This 
accurately describes all of the existing definitions of insanity which require a causal 
link between the criminal act and the defendant's state of mind at the time of 
[2000] Crim LR62\, 625. 
"^^  Wells, above n.200, 794; Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 26. 
See above at 2.7. 
"^^  Moore, above n.201, 1092. 
Moore gives a detailed examination of the causal theory before rejecting it. Ibid., 1101-1109. 
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committing the act. 
The causal theorist is able to say that his theory satisfactorily describes existing legal 
excuses but Moore maintains that a good legal theory must do more than this. It is not 
sufficient that excuses follow the theory deductively; also, the theory must be morally 
correct. This is possible since an individual deserves to be excused where his 
behaviour was caused by factors outside of his control. 
However, the causal theory of excuse falls apart in the face of determinism. If all of 
our actions are caused, ought we not to be excused for everything? Since excuses 
"presuppose that some people are to be punished even i f others are to be excused",^ '^ 
the causal theory cannot operate as a universal theory of excuse. 
Causal theorists counter this argument with degree, or partial, determinism. Some 
actions are less determined than o t h e r s . I f freedom of choice is viewed on a 
continuum, then a baseline may be drawn below which actions are sufficiently free to 
disallow any excuse and above which actions are sufficiently determined to allow an 
excuse. Opinions as to where that line is drawn will result in conclusions either that 
the insanity defence should be abolished, as the insane have as much freedom of 
choice as, for example, the socially deprived^^'' or that an excuse of social deprivation 
should be created on the basis that the behaviour of those individuals seeking to rely 
upon such a defence is no less determined than that of the insane.Moore disagrees 
^^"ibid., 1111-1112. 
Ibid., 1113. 
See e.g., Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (1982), 61. 
Ibid., 62. 
Bazelon, "The Morality of the Criminal Law", (1976) 49 Southern California LR 385, 394-397. 
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with the explanation of partial determinism, since "to speak of being partly 
determined or partly free makes as much sense as to speak of being partly 
pregnant."^^^ Ultimately, all behaviour has a cause; some causes will be more 
significant than others but it makes no sense to ask "how much causation was 
there?"'^' 
Another, less convincing, strategy in defence of the causal theory of excuse is 
ignorance determinism. Here, accepting that all behaviour is determined, a 
defendant's responsibility is established not by the degree to which he was caused to 
act but by the degree to which we are able to know what the cause of his behaviour 
was. However, as Moore points out,^ ^^ it is immoral to allow a person an excuse on 
the basis of our current knowledge, but to deny one due to our ignorance. 
Dualistic determinists take the view that there are two types of causation. First of all, 
there is 'causation that necessitates' and, secondly, there is 'causation that inclines.' 
Only the former type of causation will excuse. The problem with this dualism is that 
'inclining causation' may be another word for partial determinism and may be 
defeated by the same arguments, plus it is difficult to reconcile two types of causation 
as both impacting on human behaviour.^^^ Moore suggests that this must lead causal 
theorists to the conclusion that no one is morally responsible. In order to maintain that 
punishment must continue in part to depend on moral culpability, the causal theorist 
must either give up his theory of excuse or give up on determinism.^^" 
Moore, above n.201, 1116. 
Ibid., 1116. 
^"Ibid., 1119. 
Ibid., 1120. 
259 Ibid., 1121. 
^^"Ibid., 1128. 
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Arguments can be advanced against the causal theorist who has abandoned 
determinism as follows. As far as compulsion is concerned, it is insufficient to say 
that a threat caused the defendant to commit a crime. The defendant must have been 
threatened to the extent that a reasonable and sober person, sharing certain of his 
characteristics, would be unable to resist. In other words, causation is not enough in 
itself to attribute responsibility. The actor must face a choice which is too hard to be 
resisted.^''' A caused act will not automatically excuse. Caused behaviour will not 
excuse unless the defendant lacked a fair opportunity and capacity to conform with 
the law.^ ^^ Moore suggests that the insane are not excused because of what they are 
caused to do, rather they are excused because of their status.^ ''^  However, this view is 
not supported by current legal practice. 
To summarise, Morse suggests that we may unnecessarily confuse causation with 
excuse.^ "^^  I f causation were an excuse in itself, none of us would be responsible for 
anything. Causation is not the issue with which we should be dealing; all behaviour is 
caused, the issue is a nonculpable lack of rationality or compulsion. The problem this 
leaves choice theorists is that actors' choices must be free but 'factors that cause 
choice, being themselves unchosen, preclude choice ' .Al though the determinist's 
reductio ad absurbum is that all behaviour is caused and therefore no one is 
responsible for his actions, Moore suggests an individual should be held responsible 
for the "proximate" cause of his actions which will be based, regardless of genetic. 
Ibid., 1132. 
Ibid., 1136. 
^"^Ihid., 1137. 
"^^  Morse, above n.218,789. 
Moore in 'Choice, Character, and Excuse', in Crime, Culpability, and Remedy, ed. E . F. Paul, F. D. 
Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (1990), 35. 
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social or other factors, on his decisions and bel iefs .Mackay, agreeing with Moore, 
suggests^ ^^ that we should say an actor is responsible for actions done by his own 
choice, even if factors influencing his choice are unchosen. Conversely, an actor is not 
responsible for his actions where he lacks capacity to make his own choice. So, while 
all behaviour is caused, this is not the real issue. An actor is, in any event, responsible 
for the proximate causes of his actions which are based on his decisions and beliefs. 
The real issue is whether he is sufficiently rational in his decision-making and beliefs 
to be capable of living as a member of our community. 
2.3.3. Lack of Rationality 
As discussed above, the key to any insanity defence appears to be dependent upon a 
268 269 
lack of rationahty. Mackay suggests that we must consider the following factors 
in constructing an insanity defence: 1) are we to consider the individual's capacity for 
rational choice or his character? 2) what is the boundary between rationality and 
irrationality? 3) how is that boundary to be established? 
Fingarette contends^ ^*' that the insanity defence should accord with all of the 
following: 
1) it should match our intuitive understanding of the conditions which the insanity 
defence should encompass; 2) it should designate a condition easily associated with 
mental illness/disease/disorder, etc.; 3) it should be a condition where it is 
inappropriate to attribute responsibility; 4) it should apply to voluntary conduct, not a 
Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (1984), 190-245. 
Mackay, above n.208, 87. 
' ] 
269 , 
Ibid., 75. 
Ibid., 77. 
"° Fingarette, above n.203, 174-175. 
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reflex; 5) it should be possible to say that the person did not have control of himself or 
know what he was doing or appreciate its wrongfulness; 6) it should be the definition 
we all have in mind when referring to the defence of insanity. The root of these 
conditions again appears to stem from a lack of rationality.^^' 
In dealing with the criteria suggested by Mackay, the accepted view on the theories of 
character and choice is that the choice theory should p r e v a i l . A n individual who 
lacks the capacity to be a moral agent will be incapable of making a free choice as to 
how he behaves.^ ^^ While there are many meanings to 'irrationality', Mackay 
recommends^ '^^  that it be described as 'an aberration of normal mental functioning'. 
The boundary between rationality and irrationality has been established through an 
over-reliance on medical definitions which has resulted for too long in concepts 
geared to treatment concerns rather than with the grounds of criminal responsibility. 
The alternative may be to use medical evidence in order to establish facts of the 
defendant's condition and allow the jury to consider a lack of rationality."^ 
Slobogin criticises the need for a test of insanity based on rationality,"^ commenting 
that in the same way compulsion cannot be measured neither can rationahty. 
However, while a compulsion test can be subsumed into a rationality test, we cannot 
abandon a rationality test simply because we are ignorant of how to measure 
rationality. I f rationality is the basis of criminal responsibility, there can be no 
Ibid., 175 
See Chapter 1. 
See e.g. Lord Simon's comment in Lynch [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 933-4, 
™ Mackay, above n.208, 79. 
See under J.2.7, below. 
Slobogin, "An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases" (2000), 
34. 
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justification for holding an irrational individual blameworthy. Rehance must be 
placed on medical expertise for a description of the defendant's condition. 
2.3.4. Summary 
In constructing an insanity defence, the question should not be about the individual's 
cognition, but about his culpability based on his rationality which must establish 
whether he may be held a responsible agent. Moore writes^^^ that "the legal definition 
of [insanity] should embody those moral principles that underlie the intuitive 
judgment that mentally i l l human beings are not responsible." Only an individual who 
is rational can be a moral agent. Only a moral agent can be responsible in law. 
3. The Insanity Defence in the UK 
According to the M'Naghten Rules,^ ^^ an individual who is able to show on a balance 
of probabilities that, at the time of committing a criminal offence, he was suffering 
from a defect of reason due to a disease of the mind as to not know the nature and 
quahty of his act or that it is wrong, will be afforded a defence of insanity. The narrow 
legal definition of insanity differs substantially from medical definitions: there will be 
many occasions where an individual who is medically insane may not be entitled to 
rely upon a defence of insanity, while it is possible for an individual who is medically 
sane to successfully assert the defence. Equally, there wil l be occasions where a 
defendant is not sufficiently rational at the time of committing an offence, yet 
Moore, above n.266, 244. 
'(1843) 10 CI & Fin 200. T 
ER 673 to have provided a comprehensive definition of insanity since 1843. 
hese Rules were accepted by the House of Lords in Sullivan [1983] 2 All 
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will be held criminally responsible with no possibility of recourse to any defence. 
3.1 The Substantive Law 
3.1.1 Disease of the mind 
Lord Denning in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Irelancf^^ described a 
disease of the mind as "any mental disorder that manifests itself in violence and is 
prone to recur". While the term 'disease of the mind' covers the range of mental 
280 
illnesses, the defence now incorporates many other conditions which include 
epilepsy/^' diabetes,^ ^^ arteriosclerosis^^^ and sleepwalking.^^'* Any condition which 
is identified by the courts as a disease of the mind falls now within the scope of the 
insanity defence. There need be no degeneration of the brain as a consequence of the 
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disease of the mind. There appears to be no compelling rationale for the inclusion 
of such conditions within this defence, save that the cause is internal. This reasoning 
emerged from the Court of Appeal case of Quick,^^^ in which Lawton LJ chose to 
qualify Lord Denning's statement in Bratty by adding that a malfunctioning of the 
mind of transitory effect cannot be a disease of the mind where it is caused by an 
287 288 
external factor. Wilhams criticised this exception to Lord Denning's rule 
querying whether this was necessary in order to avoid an insanity defence for Quick, 
as Lawton LJ had assumed to be the case. There is no reason to believe that where a 
diabetic becomes hypoglycaemic through an injection of insulin the condition will 
"'[1963] AC 386, 412. 
The defence is used most frequently in relation to schizophrenia: Mackay and Kearns, above n.l96, 
716. 
Sullivan [1983] 2 All ER 673. 
Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9; Bingham [1991] Crim LR 433. 
^^Kemp[\951] 1 QB 399. 
Burgess [\99\]2QQ 92. 
Sullivan [1983]; Kemp [1957]. 
^'^[1973] QB910, 922. 
Such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences. 
Above n.233,671. 
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recur or, i f it does, that it will result in violence. This should take the condition outside 
of Lord Denning's definition of disease of the mind. 
However the rule in Quick was accepted by the House of Lords in Sullivan and 
approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rabey}^^ In Rabey, the court held that 
the defendant's violent reaction to a rejection by a woman whom he admired was so 
abnormal and extreme that its cause was due to an internal factor triggered by 
rejection but held, obiter, that extreme traumatic events might allow a defence of 
automatism where they are sufficient to trigger a state of disassociation in normal 
people. This distinction was recognised at trial in Re T^^^ where the defendant who 
had been raped three days before taking part in a robbery was allowed to plead a 
defence of automatism. 
3.1.2. The Internal/External Dichotomy and Absence of Mens Rea 
There is a likelihood and a danger, not only in the case of the mentally i l l , but also in 
the case, for example of a diabetic or epileptic who has killed and claims not to have 
known of the nature and quality of his act, that this will discharge the prosecution 
from the need to show any mens rea. In fact, this danger has been confirmed in 
relation to both limbs of the Rules in A-G'^ Reference (No 3 of 1998in which the 
Court of Appeal held that where insanity is assumed the Crown need prove only the 
actus reus of the o f fence .Th i s decision is consistent with the House of Lords' 
^'"(1980) 114DLR(3d) 193. 
^'"[1990] CrimLR256. 
[1999] 3 All ER 40. 
This case gives an interpretation of s2(l) of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 which provides that 
where insanity is proved, the special verdict will follow if the jury is satisfied the defendant did the act 
or omission. At trial, the judge had felt bound by the ruling in Egan [1998] 1 Cr App R 121 (now 
treated as per incuriam since the House of Lords decision in Antoine [2000] 2 All E R 208) to rule that 
the prosecution must also show mens rea. See All ER Annual Review 1999, 123. 
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decision in Antoine^^^ concerning fitness to plead^ '^* in which it was held that, 
contrary to Egan^^^ for the purpose of s4A of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 
1964, as substituted by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 
1991, a jury need only determine whether the defendant committed the act or 
omission charged against him, with no requirement to consider any mental element. 
Curiously, Lord Hutton in Antoine was prepared to allow a jury to consider mistake, 
accident or self-defence as negating the 'act', all of which can be described as 
defences due to lack of mens rea^^^ 
As a result of these decisions, the defendant who has killed and is able to satisfy the 
insanity defence will have no consideration of his mens rea at trial, even if he relies 
upon the second limb of the M'Naghten Rules, and may become subject to the special 
verdict to a charge of murder, where a charge of voluntary manslaughter may have 
been more appropriate. The outcome would be to compel an indefinite hospital order 
which could bring us into breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and direct conflict 
with the ECHR.^^^ Aside from such conflict, it cannot be right to claim that insanity is 
a true defence where it operates to discharge the prosecution from part of its duty. The 
prosecution should be compelled to prove both actus reus and mens rea and should 
there be failure of proof, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The disadvantage of taking this purist route is that dangerous individuals who do not 
meet the treatability requirement of the Mental Health Act 1983 may go free. 
^" [2000] 2 All ER 208 
See Chapter 1, 2.4 above. 
^'^[1998] l C r A p p R 1 2 1 . 
See case comment: [2000] Crim LR621, 624. 
Sutherland and Gearty, "Insanity and the European Court of Human Rights" [1992] Crim L/? 418 at 
420. See below under 3.2. 
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However, it is likely that such a difficulty will be overcome by the introduction of the 
new Mental Health Act with its reduced treatability requirement,^^^ which will allow 
for the civil detention of the severely personality disordered. 
The internal/external dichotomy which originated from Quick needs to be addressed. 
While it may be suggested^^^ that the division allows the courts to distinguish between 
those in need of treatment and those who are not, it would be inaccurate to claim that 
all of those individuals falling within the insanity defence are in need of treatment or 
continue to pose a risk. It is also possible that the stark division between internal and 
external factors may be ignored in practice. Since the introduction of the 1991 Act, 
there may be no longer such a compelling reason to avoid an insanity plea, although 
no doubt the stigma will continue to operate as a deterrent. Whatever replacement is 
ultimately found for the present insanity defence, as Mackay writes,^'^' "one is forced 
to accept that the defence of insanity in England will continue to remain a rarely used 
but legally discredited mechanism of last resort." 
3.1.3. Defect of Reason 
While the term 'disease of the mind' has been afforded a wide interpretation, 'defect 
of reason', along with the knowledge requirements under the M'Naghten Rules, has 
been given a narrow interpretation, so as to exclude 'the vast majority of mentally 
disordered persons from the realms of the insanity defence.'^°^ The defect of mind 
White Paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act, Part I, The New Legal Framework, Cm. 50161 
(2000), para 3.18. See Chapter 2 above, at 2.2. 
Baker, "Human Rights, M'Naghten and the 1991 Act" [1994] Crim LR 84, 89. 
As occurred in Mcfarlane, Guardian, 11* September 1990, 3. 
Macicay, above n.208, 143. 
Ibid., 100. 
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must be "enough to make the act irrational and therefore to deny responsibility in 
law".^"^ Acts done out of "brutish stupidity" will not suffice. 
There must be a causal relationship between the defect of reason and the disease of 
the mind. This nexus becomes significant in considering cases of somnambuHsm. 
Mackay refers^"^ to the Canadian case of Parks,^'^^ in which the defendant was 
acquitted on the grounds of automatism caused by sleepwalking. Although the court 
described somnambulism as an abnormal condition, this was not considered to be the 
cause of the impairment. As the defect of reason could only be traced back to sleep 
rather than sleepwalking, there was no causal connection. La Forest J compared the 
combination of sleep deprivation, stress and sudden noises in the night to the effect of 
concussion on a waking person, blurring the distinction between internal and external 
factors. This suggests that somnambulism brought on by such factors may lead to a 
defence of automatism while if the condition were to be induced by a disease, of 
which somnambulism was a symptom, the defence may still be insanity. 
However, this line of reasoning was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Burgess^^^ 
where it was held that a transitory abnormality or disorder caused by an internal 
factor, whether functional or organic, which manifested itself in violence amounted to 
insanity even where a likelihood of repetition of the violence was rare. Lord Lane CJ 
commented on Parks that while sleep is a normal condition, sleepwalking is not.^ ^^ 
Medical evidence in this case described somnambulism as a pathological condition. 
Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399, 406. 
Mackay, above n.208, 47-49. 
305 Ontario Court of Appeal, (1990) 78 CR (3d) 1, upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, (1992) 95 
DLR (4*^ ) 27. 
[1991] 2 All ER 769. 
Ibid., 775. 
74 
Since pathology is the science of diseases, Lord Lane CJ commented that "in this 
respect at least there is some similarity between the law and medicine". '^^ ^ Given that 
somnambulism appears to be on the borderline of normal/abnormal conditions, which 
may assist in explaining the two contradictory authorities, it is difficult to envisage 
another internal condition which, in this country, would break the causal nexus 
between defect of reason and disease of the mind. 
3.1.4. 'Nature and Quality of the Act' and 'Knowledge that the Act is Wrong' 
The defect of reason must lead the defendant either not to know the nature and quality 
of his act or that it is wrong. This is a narrow test of mental capacity. An individual 
who cuts his victim's throat believing he is slicing a loaf of bread will satisfy this part 
of the definition. Such an error which could not be explained by mental illness 
normally would lead to a failure by the prosecution to establish mens rea?^^ Where it 
can be explained by a disease of the mind, the defendant will be subjected to the risk 
of detention, by virtue of the Special Verdict. However, an individual who commits 
an offence while suffering from an irresistible impulse will not fall within the insanity 
defence.'"" 
Williams is critical of the view that even if an insane person knows he is killing, he 
might not have any real appreciation or understanding of his act, countering that even 
a sane individual cannot be "credited with the transcendental insight of the mystic."^" 
[1991] 2 All ER 769, 776. 
See J. 7.2 above. 
Kopsch (1925) 19 Cr App Rep 50. 
WiUiams, above n.235, 491-492. 
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It has been suggested that the word 'know' is not as easy to interpret as 'appreciate' or 
'understand'. 
Knowledge that the act is wrong requires knowledge only that it is legally wrong. '^•^ 
While ignorance of the law will not normally excuse, it may be that this rule applies to 
those individuals who are capable of knowing what is right, '^"^ since the insane 
individual who does not know that his act is illegal will be excused by virtue of the 
M'Naghten Rules. Alternative views that the defendant need only fail to believe that 
his act is morally wrong even if he is aware that it is against the law are wrong.^'^ 
Despite this, it appears that expert witnesses tend to follow the latter interpretation of 
the M'Naghten Rules,^'^ where the Rules are followed by them at all. It is apparent 
from the research conducted by IVIackay and Keams that expert witnesses may be 
assessing this limb on the basis of a defendant's culpability rather than on a strict 
interpretation of the Rules and this may have the indirect effect of expanding the 
M'Naghten Rules. Such a development of the Rules may be correct, since Williams 
suggests '^^  it would be unfair to punish a woman who killed her children, thinking she 
was saving them from torture. Under the strict interpretation of the Rules, she would 
be punished. 
An individual suffering from insane delusions is likely to fall outside of the scope of 
the insanity defence where, for example, he believes he is acting on divine authority 
but still recognises what he is doing is against the law. Yet, the most likely defendant 
'^^  Fingarette, above n.203, 146. 
^^^Windle[l952]2QB 826. 
3'" Williams, above n.235, 495. 
Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 358. 
Mackay and Keams, above n.l96, 723. 
'^^  Williams, above n.235, 494. 
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in insanity trials is the one who recognises cognitively what he is doing and yet goes 
on, for example, to kill . 318 
3.1.5. Summary of M'Naghten Rules in the Light of Theoretical Considerations 
Out of cognition, volition and affect (moods or emotions), the M'Naghten Rules only 
deal with cognition.'"^ The Rules also exclude impairments of practical reasoning, 
such as those produced by a psychotic disorder.^^^ Since the common perception, as 
discussed above, is that minimal rationality is required as a condition of moral and 
legal responsibility,''^' it can be seen that the Rules are grossly lacking in this respect. 
There are many conditions which may cause an individual to be irrational but he may 
still know what he is doing and that it is a crime. Given that irrationality may be 
described not as a failure in moral judgment, but a failure in capacity for moral 
judgment,^^^ the M'Naghten Rules are concerned more with a failure in judgment than 
in capacity. 
The M'Naghten Rules do not focus on a lack of capacity. They focus on the defendant 
not knowing the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong. The question ought 
not to be whether the defendant's mental condition caused his actions but whether it 
prevented him from having the capacity to choose rationally his actions.^ ^^ The key is 
not what caused the defendant to act, but what caused him to lack capacity to be held 
a responsible agent. 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 29. 
Fingarette, above n.203, 144. 
Fulford, "Value, Action, Mental Illness, and the Law", in Action and Value in the Criminal Law, 
Eds. Shute, Gardner and Herder, (1993), 300-310. 
Morse, above n.218, 782; Fingarette, above n.203, 132. 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 39-40. 
^" Mackay, above n.208, 87. 
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The boundary between rationality and irrationality should be determined by a jury, not 
medical experts, who should only be entitled to comment on the defendant's medical 
condition. Most significantly, use of the phrase 'disease of the mind' not only carries 
with it a social stigma but also encourages medical experts to interpret the Rules in 
medical, rather than legal terms. An 'aberration of normal mental functioning', for 
example, offers a more neutral term from which a jury would be entitled to draw its 
own conclusions. 
3.2. Procedural Requirements and Human Rights 
Since the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 all UK legislation passed 
before or after its implementation must be read and given effect in a manner which is 
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.^ '^* The Act, which lists 
the Articles and Protocols of the Convention in s l ( l ) and Schedule 1, thereby creating 
"Convention Rights" in English domestic law, wil l have the most effect on rules of 
evidence and procedure in criminal law, rather than the substantive criminal law.^ ^^ 
Even with regard to the need for certainty of law, while it can be said that a law must 
be "formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct",^^^ such formulation need not be in statute,^ ^^ and applies to criminal 
offences rather than the defences. It appears then that the definition of the insanity 
defence, although defined only at common law, will avoid conflict with the ECHR. 
'^^S3. 
Buxton, "The Human Rights Act and the Substantive Criminal Law" [2000] Crim L/? 331. 
Article 8: Silver v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 347 [87]-[88]. 
See e.g. common law breach of the peace. Steel v UK [1988] Crim LR 893, which passes the Silver 
test. 
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However, there may be greater conflict in the area of evidence.''^ ^ Early decisions 
following the implementation of the Human Rights Act indicate that the UK 
Government has been in breach of article 6 with regard to the right to silence. The 
European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the limited nature of making an 
adverse interference from an accused's silence^^" and the Court of AppeaP^' in 
Condron has been prepared to give a broad interpretation to the 'safety' test on 
reviewing convictions.However, such an expansive view of the ECHR has not 
been taken by the House of Lords in respect of the burden of proof in diminished 
responsibility.^^^ The same may be the case for the insanity defence. 
The burden is on the defendant to prove he is entitled to the defence on a balance of 
probabilities. It is, as yet, unresolved as to whether, following the implementation of 
the Human Rights Act 1998, this will contravene Article 6(2) ECHR which raises a 
presumption of innocence. The Divisional Court's decision in Kebilene'^^'^ suggested 
that the burden may have to become evidential only, bringing the procedural 
requirements in line with the defence of automatism. 
In Kebilene^^^ the Divisional Court, allowing for judicial review of a decision by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to prosecution, upheld the trial judge's 
ruling that sections 16A and 16B, as inserted in the Prevention of Terrorism 
See Jennings, Ashworth and Emmerson, "Silence and Safety: The Impact of Human Rights Law" 
[2000] Crim LR 879. 
Condron v UK [2000] Crim LR 679. 
™ Averill v UK [2000; Crim LR 680. 
[1997] 1 Cr AppR 185. 
Since s2(l) Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended by Criminal Appeal Act 1995, the one criterion 
for reviewing a conviction is that it is unsafe. 
Lambert [2001] 3 All ER 577, discussed below. 
[1999] 3 WLR 175. 
335 Ibid. 
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(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, were incompatible with article 6(2) ECHR, which 
guaranteed the presumption of innocence. The offence of sl6A concerns the 
possession of articles for terrorist purposes.Neither the possession nor the terrorist 
purposes need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Subsection (4) places a reverse 
burden of proof on the defendant and so "[a] defendant who chooses not to give or 
call evidence may be convicted by virtue of presumptions against him and on 
reasonable suspicion falling short of proof."^^^ Both sections were found to 
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"undermine, in a blatant and obvious way, the presumption of innocence", and 
contravened Article 6(2). 
However, the House of Lords^^^ unanimously overturned the Divisional Court's 
decision. The decision regarding article 6(2) was taken at too premature a stage. Lord 
Steyn added that issues as to the interpretation and compatibility of sl6A of the 1989 
Act and article 6(2) are "arguable" but that it would be wrong to express views on 
those issues: "[t]he effect is that those issues are undecided and entirely open at all 
levels in the criminal proceedings .Lord Hope mentioned that the defence of 
insanity is the only exception to the presumption of innocence recognised by the 
common law, but pointed out that the reason for this is that "[t]he presumption is one 
of sanity, not responsibility".^'*^ He also considered that article 6(2) "is not regarded as 
imposing an absolute prohibition on reverse onus clauses, whether they be evidential 
(presumptions of fact) or persuasive (presumptions of law)."^'*^ 
Section 16B contains similar provisions. 
[1999] 3 WLR 175, 190 per Lord Bingham CJ. 
Ibid., 190. 
(2000) 2 AC 326. 
Ibid., 372. 
Ibid., 377. 
"^^  Ibid., 385. 
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J.C. Smith commented on the House of Lords decision that deciding each case on its 
merits wherever there is a reverse onus provision would lead to "a long period of 
uncertainty and a vast amount of expensive and wasteful l i t i ga t i on" .He suggested 
that the Government should follow the recommendation of the CLRC in its Eleventh 
Report^'^ by converting all reverse onus decisions "into evidential burdens only".^ "*^ 
Since Kebilene, the Court of Appeal has held in Lambert, Ali and Jordan^'^^ that the 
defendant's burden of establishing a defence of diminished responsibility on a balance 
of probabilities was less objectionable than placing a burden on the defendant to prove 
an essential element of an offence,^ '*^ since a defendant who did not seek to rely on 
diminished responsibility would not have to prove anything in relation to the actual 
offence. In balancing the competing interests involved, a degree of deference must be 
paid to the intentions of Parliament,^ '** and therefore section 2 of the Homicide Act 
1957 was not incompatible with article 6. Subsequently, the House of Lords in 
Lambert^'^'^ took a more sceptical view of probative burdens, commenting that 
legislative interference with the presumption of innocence "requires justification and 
must not be greater than is necessary", taking into account the principle of 
proportionality.^^'' 
As no mention was made of the defence of diminished responsibility by the House of 
Lords in Lambert, it remains unclear whether the burdens of proof in insanity and 
^^ '^  [1999] Crim LR 99A, 997. 
Evidence (General) Cmnd 4991, (1971), para. 140. 
Now contained in clause 8 of the CLRC's draft Bill. 
'"^[2001] 1 All ER 1014. 
Ibid., 1022. 
Ibid., 1022. 
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"° Ibid., per Lord Steyn, 590. 
[2001] 3 All ER 577. 
diminished responsibility will conflict with the ECHR. However, Jennings, Ashworth 
and Emmerson suggest that as a result of the Human Rights Act justice must now not 
only be done, but also be seen to be done.^ '^ This could mean a shift to an evidential 
burden only in these defences. While removal of the presumption of sanity would 
place an unreasonable burden on the prosecution, it is submitted that the suggestion of 
J.C. Smith and the CLRC that the defendant's burden should be evidential would 
accord more closely with article 6(2) and better protect those individuals who are not 
deserving of blame and punishment. Granted there must be a balance between the 
rights of the individual and the safety of the public. However, in the case of the 
insanity defence, public safety would not be compromised by reducing the burden on 
the defendant who will be subject in any event to disposal consequences should his 
defence succeed. In Salabiaku v France^^^ the European Court held that under article 
6(2) states must confine presumptions of fact or law within reasonable limits, taking 
into account the importance of what is at stake. What is at stake with this reverse onus 
is potentially the difference between punishment and treatment. 
The effect of the special verdict also could bring the UK into conflict with the ECHR. 
Article 5(l)(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the 
detention of persons of unsound mind. From the leading case of Winterwerp v 
Netherlands^^^ three requirements must be satisfied. The mental disorder must be such 
as warrants compulsory confinement, there must be a close correspondence between 
the definition of the mental disorder and expert medical evidence and the court's 
decision must be based on objective medical expertise. Three areas of potential 
Jennings, Ashworth and Emmerson, above n.328, 894. 
"^(1988) 13 EHRR 379 [28]. 
"^(1979) 2 EHRR 387. 
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conflict emerge. The definition of mental disorder stems from a test formulated in 
1843 and which has been extended to include sleepwalking, hyperglycaemia and 
epilepsy. Secondly, the medical expertise required under section one of the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity and Fitness to Plead) Act 1991 may not be attributed sufficient 
importance.^ '^^  Finally, although the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Fitness to 
Plead) Act 1991 abolished the mandatory indefinite hospitalisation requirement for 
the majority of o f f e n c e s , i t was retained for murder.^ ^^ The mandatory detention 
where the special verdict is returned on a murder charge does not allow for objective 
medical expertise and could result in, for example, a diabetic who kills being made 
subject to such an order. It seems likely that successful challenges could be made in 
this respect to the special verdict under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
3.2.1. Expert Witnesses 
Expert witnesses in insanity cases may comment only on the facts of the defendant's 
condition. The judge decides whether there is a defect of reason due to a disease of the 
mind. The jury makes a factual finding of NGRI. In practice, medical experts are 
prone to comment on the defendant's mental illness and its relationship to the insanity 
defence.''^'' In so doing, they can be described as acting as a 'thirteenth juror.'^^^ 
The danger of over-involvement by the medical profession with the defence of 
insanity is that the two distinctive disciplines of law and psychiatry are not easily 
'^•^  Baker, above n.299. 
The court now has a choice, inter alia, of making a guardianship order under the Mental Health Act 
1983, a supervision or treatment order or an order for an absolute discharge. 
It is not surprising that the insanity defence was used to a charge of murder on only four occasions 
between 1991-1996, given the availability of diminished responsibility as an alternative defence. 
Mackay, above n.208, 104. 
Morse, above n.218, 823. 
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compatible. The former must deal with concepts of rationality while the latter must 
deal with the various diseases of insanity. "Psychiatry ... is inherently deterministic 
... while law normally assumes freedom of choice."^^^ 
It may be preferable for medical experts not to be involved in legal decision 
making.^^^ Clearly, their opinions as to whether an individual is medically insane 
would not be relevant in cases involving epilepsy, etc. They may also be unable to 
apply their expertise to the legal principles concerned. 
4. Reform 
4.1. Existing and Proposed Definitions 
4.1.1. The Insanity Defence Abroad 
The product test which originated from a New Hampshire case^ *^ ' in 1869 was 
introduced into the District of Columbia in 1954 in the case of Durham v US as 
follows: "It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible i f his unlawful act 
was the product of mental disease or mental defect."'"'"' This decision reflected a 
discontent with the M'Naghten Rules and was hailed by some as a major 
breakthrough in the development of the insanity defence.^ '''* However, the Durham 
Rule was abandoned in 1972. Judge Bazelon, who had taken part in the Durham 
decision, found that the product test had not taken away the issue of criminal 
Fulford, above n.320, 279. 
^^ "See 4.7.4 below. 
State of New Hampshire v Pike 49 NH 399 (1869). 
214 F 2d 847 (DC Cir 1954). 
Ibid., 874-875. 
Moore, above n.266, 228. 
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responsibility from the medical experts which left the jury in no better a position to 
make a moral judgment than with the M'Naghten Rules. 
The American Law Institute's test of insanity is worded as follows: "A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law."^^^ Until the Hinkley trial, this test was adopted in some form by all of the 
federal courts of appeals and many states.^ ''^  
Provoked by the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict of Hinkley for the 
attempted assassination of President Reagan there was an outcry against the insanity 
defence, the consequence of which resulted in five major groups of change across the 
United States.^ *^ ^ 
1) Some states opted to change the test of insanity: 
The trend for those who have changed the test has been to move away from the A L I 
test and any form of volitional test. This has resulted in a re-emergence of the 
M'Naghten Rules.^ ^^ 
2) Some states enacted a verdict of Guilty But Mentally 111 (GBIVII): 
The GBMI verdict was enacted by some states as a response to the Hinkley verdict 
and its merits are discussed below. 
Bazelon, "Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process", Scientific American 230 (1974), cited in the 
Butler Report, para. 18.15. 
The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code. Proposed Official Draft {1962) s4.01(l), 66, cited 
in Mackay, above n.208. 111. 
Moore, above n.266, 220. 
Mackay, above n.208, 113. 
'^'ibid., 113-117. 
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3) Some states changed the rules of evidence: 
The prosecution in the Hinkley trial had to prove the defendant was sane beyond 
reasonable doubt. This was thought to be a major factor in the outcome of the trial. 
Now, two thirds of states which have retained the insanity defence place the burden of 
proof on the defendant on a preponderance of evidence. 
4) Others changed the disposal consequences: 
The tightening up of disposal consequences has been the most prevalent response to 
the Hinkley verdict. Two cases are worthy of note. In Jones v US'^^' a defendant was 
committed to hospital as a consequence of the NGRI verdict. The issue which came 
before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of detaining Jones beyond the 
maximum term of the offence for which he was acquitted. The Supreme Court found 
that Jones could continue to be detained without any need for a finding that he 
remained dangerous and mentally i l l . The burden was on Jones to prove an absence of 
these factors. However, in Foucha v Louisiana'''^ the Supreme Court has found that an 
individual cannot continue to be detained on the grounds of his dangerousness alone. 
There must be a continuing mental illness. 
5) Some opted to abolish the defence: 
Several states have opted for partial or total abolition of the insanity defence since the 
Hinkley verdict."^ 
Only the Durham and New Hampshire tests of insanity attempt to link legal insanity 
and mental illness. With the other tests, mental illness forms only one part of the 
""ibid., 117-118 
463 US 354(1983). 
372 
Abolition is discussed in more detail below at 4.1.6. 
112 set 1780(1992). 
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test.^ '^* Moore suggests that the reason for this was the need to f i t a test for legal 
insanity into a similar template to other excusing conditions, i.e. that of non-culpable 
ignorance or compulsion.^^^ Hence, all other insanity tests either excuse due to the 
ignorance of the mentally i l l individual or due to his being compelled to act. In the 
case of the M'Naghten Rules, the former category clearly applies. The knowledge 
required of the defendant relates to a mistake as to some fact or law.^^^ Moore points 
out that it is wrong to categorise the insanity defence in this way. This may be correct 
but Moore then argues that insanity is a status rather than an excuse. For reasons 
discussed above,^ ''^  such a general classification of insanity is not acceptable. 
Irrationality is not a constant factor in many insane individuals. Only certain severely 
and permanently mentally i l l individuals, such as those suffering from a severe 
subnormality, ought to be entitled to benefit from such an exemption. Those suffering 
from a severe mental illness at a point in time should still satisfy a test of insanity, 
rather than claim a blanket exemption on account of their status. 
However, Moore's criticisms remain valid: "[pjeople are not responsible because they 
are crazy, not because they always lack intentions, are ignorant, or are compelled.""*^ 
As discussed above, the insanity defence should represent a lack of a capacity to 
choose resulting from irrationality.^^^ While the product test in Durham failed to 
dissociate itself from the interpretation of medical experts, the link between the 
mental illness and insanity defence has much to be commended. Were such a link to 
Moore, above n.266, 220. 
Ibid., 220. 
Ibid., 221. However, a sane defendant would not be entitled to plead a defence due to ignorance of 
the law. 
See 2.7.2 above. 
Moore, above n.266, 223. 
See 2. J. J . 
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be made between irrationality and the defence of insanity, more just decisions, 
properly considered by juries, may result. 
4.1.2. Causality 
The Butler Committee proposed a new verdict of not guilty on evidence of mental 
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disorder which should be available where mental disorder negates mens rea and in 
all cases where the defendant is suffering from severe mental illness or abnormality. 
The Law Commission has proposed that an element of causality be retained.^^' 
Mackay suggests that removing the causality would give too much power to 
medical expertise which, in turn, would take us further away from notions of 
causality. This may reflect what happened in America with the product test in 
Durham. Now contained in clause 35(2) of the Draft Criminal Code, it is allowed for 
the prosecution to show that the offence was not attributable to the disorder. While it 
be may advisable to allow a blanket exemption for those exceptionally few 
individuals who are permanently incapable of being moral agents, such an exemption 
ought not to be based on a medical definition pertaining to the severely mentally i l l . It 
should be based on the permanent inability to engage in a moral dialogue. A 'severe 
and permanent mental condition' could be defined as 'a severe mental condition 
which has endured from childhood, (or as a result of brain damage induced by serious 
illness or accident) from which there is no prospect of recovery.' It would incorporate 
predominantly those individuals suffering from the more severe organic illnesses 
listed under the ICDIO classification of mental and behavioural disorders,''^ '* such as 
Above n.205, para. 18.18. 
A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Law Commission No. 177 (1989) Vol. 2, para.11.16. 
Mackay, above n.208, 90. 
See Chapter 1,2.5. 
World Health Organisation, The ICDIO classification of mental and behavioural disorders: clinical 
descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, (1992), F00-F09, the organic mental disorders. 
dementia in Alzheimer's disease, dementia in Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and mental 
disorder due to brain damage and dysfunction and to physical disease. Severe mental 
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retardation and profound mental retardation would also be included. 
4.1.3. Social Stigma 
Reform suggested by the Butler Committee may have the effect of removing the 
stigma and widening availability of the defence for the severely mentally i l l . What its 
proposals do not completely achieve is the removal of the stigma of a mental illness 
defence. It is debatable whether this could ever be achieved although it is certainly 
desirable that the term insanity be substituted for a less emotive phrase. Mackay 
suggests a not guilty verdict based on "an aberration of normal mental functioning 
present at the time of the commission of the alleged offence." This view supports the 
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opinion of Williams who also uses the term 'mental aberration'. The effect of such 
a type of verdict would be to allow for a demedicalised term, where the condition has 
to be present at the time of the offence but may be transitory. 
4.1.4. Medical Evidence 
It may not be preferable to encourage greater compatibility between the M'Naghten 
Rules and the Mental Health Act, since the former ought to be directed at a denial of 
criminal responsibility, and the latter at the treatment of those suffering from serious 
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mental disorders. In proposing a new defence, the Butler Committee sought to 
avoid the use of medical terms and allow psychiatrists to state facts without deciding 
F72 and F72. 
Mackay, above n.208, 140. 
Williams, above n.235, 445. 
Baker, above n.299, 88. 
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on responsibility which is a legal term.^^^ Williams suggests^^" that the term 'insanity' 
is used in court to mean both mental derangement and legal irresponsibility, thus 
creating difficulty for juries in separating the legal term from the medical. Moore 
suggests^ '^ it would be 'pure coincidence' i f the medical definition of mental illness 
turned out to be the same as the condition which excuses defendants from 
responsibility. The need to separate medical terms from legal definitions is echoed by 
Morse who recommends reforming the role of medical experts by asking them the 
right questions. I f medical experts are restricted to providing a clear, clinical 
description of facts, the scope for dispute between experts on opposing sides will be 
reduced greatly. Fulford suggests^ ^^ there is a need for recognition of the dividing line 
between the expert's role as a fact provider and the role of the jury in making value 
judgments. 
4.1.5. Guilty But Mentally III (GBMI) 
The GBMI verdict has little to offer the debate on the insanity defence. It may ensure 
treatment is made available to the mentally i l l defendant, but a jury verdict is probably 
not the best means of doing so, since treatment will be made available where 
necessary in any event. To use Morse's example, "[i]s the verdict 'guilty but herpes' 
sensible or necessary to ensure the medical treatment of inmates suffering from 
herpes?"^ '^ '^  
Above n.205,para. 18.17. 
Williams, above n.235, 446. 
Moore, above n.266,227. 
Morse, above n.218,821. 
Fulford, above n.320, 305. 
Morse, above n.218, 804. 
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More significantly, i f the mentally i l l are to be described as nonresponsible agents, 
then it is inappropriate to attribute culpability in the form of a guilty verdict under 
such circumstances.^^^ The Disability of Mind doctrine proposed by Fingarette and 
Hasse is flawed perhaps by it leading to a verdict of "Guilty of , with 
Nonculpable Disability of Mind".''^^ While the doctrine recognises a lack of 
culpability, this recognition does not transfer to a lack of guilt. While it is possible to 
employ the term 'guilt' to illustrate merely that the necessary elements of the offence 
were present,'^ ^ the word suggests more than a mere presence of actus reus and mens 
rea. It also suggests responsibility for the commission of the offence. Given that 
Fingarette and Hasse later suggest that the maxim for the Disability of Mind doctrine 
is, "Where there is no mens there can be no mens rea" it does not seem possible 
that any individual could be entitled to use their suggested verdict since, to have a 
'nonculpable disability of mind' would mean the defendant was lacking 'mens' and 
thus could not have satisfied both elements of the offence in order to be found guilty. 
4.1.6. Abolition 
Abolition of the insanity defence, either partial or complete, is difficult to justify. 
With a complete abolition, either it must be argued that no defendant is insane at the 
time he acts and all defendants must therefore be punished, or that all insane 
defendants will be lacking either the actus reus or the offence (due to lack of 
voluntariness) or the mens rea (due to lack of foresight) in order to escape conviction. 
The former assertion will be impossible to prove. The latter, it is submitted, is 
Ibid., 804. 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 67. 
Ibid., 67. 
Ibid., 200. The verdict of Guilty of , with Nonculpable Disability of Mind is discussed below at 
4.2.3. The rationale behind the defence is not rejected. The criticisms made above relate only to the 
ascription of guilt. 
Morse, above n.218, 780. 
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inadequate in place of the full insanity defence. One objection to the abolition of the 
insanity defence is that few insane defendants will act as automatons due to mental 
illness or disorder. Their acts are still willed and, in the strictest sense, voluntary. 
Thus, the actus reus of the offence still will be possible to prove. Another objection to 
this option is that most mentally disordered individuals will be capable of fonning the 
mens rea at the time of the offence.'^ '^ '' Further, i f we are able to say that an individual 
who suffers from a mental disorder is not responsible and therefore is not a moral 
agent, it is inaccurate and artificial to describe such an individual as lacking mens rea. 
An absence of responsibility ought to precede consideration of any of the elements of 
an offence. 
The only remaining argument in defence of abolition must be that it is justifiable to 
punish where there is no blame, an argument which is contrary to our system of 
criminal justice where mala in se crimes are concerned. Alongside the precondition of 
just desert for punishment in respect of such stigmatic offences lies the requirement 
that the actor be a moral agent. Responsibility may not be attributed to an actor who is 
not a moral agent."*"' While this continues to be the case, the insanity defence must be 
retained and this should be so regardless of how few defendants are able or choose to 
rely on it. 
Slobogin proposes "an intermediate position", a partial abolition of the defence 
which allows the defendant to rely upon his mental disorder in support of his claim for 
^ Ibid., 801-802. 
See, inter alia, Morse, above n.218, 781. 
•^ "^  Slobogin, above n.276, 1. 
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a defence of duress, self-defence'*''^  or absence of mens rea.^^'^ So, for example, a 
defendant who, due to his mental disorder, mistakenly believes he will be killed i f he 
does not act in a certain way will be entitled to a defence of duress rather than 
insanity.'**'^  The compromise offered with this partial abolition is to allow an excuse 
for a "general ignorance of the law.. .which would excuse those rare individuals who 
intentionally carry out criminal acts without understanding the concept of good and 
J ,,406 j^^^g ji^^j ^ ^^^ ^ blanket exemption is reminiscent of the Butler 
Committee proposal for defendants suffering from severe mental illness or 
abnormality.'*"^ This proposal does not appear to represent an abolition of insanity to 
any real extent and carries the added danger of allowing psychopaths within its scope. 
Mentally i l l defendants, who seek to rely on their illness as a defence, do not offend 
because they are acting under duress or in self-defence; they offend because they are 
mentally i l l . A better label for their type of excuse should be a lack of rationality. 
4.1.7. Disposal 
Where an individual is found not guilty by reason of insanity, his detention, where 
necessary, must not aim to punish and must offer treatment.'**'^  There must be criteria 
justifying detention and enabling release.'*"^  We must be prepared to "tak[e] some 
risks in the name of liberty and justice".'*"' Some criminals who have served a 
sentence will reoffend following release. Similarly, some acquittees on grounds of 
Slobogin suggests that these defences have moved towards a more subjective approach, which 
would allow more easily for the use of mental disorder: ibid., 15. 
404 
Ibid., 3. 
Ibid., 8. To allow a "specific ignorance excuse" would allow the defendant "to define the scope of 
self-defense and other justificatory doctrines", which would be unacceptable; 38. 
407 
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insanity will become insane again. This should not mean that we should extend 
preventative detention, especially nonculpable detention, beyond its current limits. 
4.2. Proposed Definitions 
Fingarette proposed, as a starting point for a definition of criminal insanity that a 
defendant should be entitled to a defence of insanity where "[t]/ie individual's mental 
makeup at the time of the offending act was such that, with respect to the criminality 
of his conduct, he substantially lacked capacity to act rationally (to respond relevantly 
so far as criminality is concerned)"'^'' This was not intended as a fixed formula, rather 
a set of principles from which a defence may be developed. The causal link remains. 
The criteria for formulating a test should employ common sense understandable terms 
rather than the terms mental disease or defect, which do not give sufficient 
guidance."*'^  Morse'*''' adapts the test suggested by the American Psychiatric 
Association as follows: 
"It is a defense to a prosecution for an offense that, at the time of the conduct alleged 
to constitute the offense, the defendant's perception and understanding of reality was 
grossly and demonstrably impaired and, as a result of that impairment, the defendant 
did not... [cognitive and/or volitional criteria]." This avoids the use entirely of 
medical criteria and provides a solely legal test in understandable language. 
Psychopaths, who are not out of touch with reality, would not fall within the ambit of 
this defence. 
Fingarette, above n.203, 211. Parenthesis and emphasis from original. 
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4.2.1. The Cognitive Test 
The difficulty in determining how a cognitive test of insanity should be formulated 
lies in the fact that most 'insane' defendants will have a knowledge of their actions, 
but will be motivated by irrational thoughts.'*''* Such a test must excuse the 
'fundamentally irrational''*'^ while still allowing for conviction of those deserving of 
blame. Moore writes'"'^ that the only appropriate question to put to a jury is: "Is the 
accused so irrational as to be nonresponsible?" 
The M'Naghten Rules require the insane defendant to have made a mistake either as 
to the nature and quality of his act or as to its legality. However, as Fingarette and 
Hasse point out, it is not correct to call such an individual's delusion a mistake of fact. 
"He is mad, not mistaken"as mistake "implies at least a certain minimum capacity 
for rationality"'*'^. Insanity concerns a defect in capacity, not in the exercise of 
419 
capacity. 
4.2.2. The Volitional Test 
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment reconmiended that a defence of 
insanity should arise where "at the time of the act the accused was suffering from 
disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be 
held responsible."'* '^' This definition would allow for a volitional limb to the defence. 
Ibid., 810. 
''^ Ibid., 811. 
•"^  Moore, above n.266, 245. 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223,25. 
Ibid., 25 
Ibid., 25 
"•^^ Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmnd. 8932 1949-1953 (1953), para. 333(ni). 
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The introduction of the defence of diminished responsibihty has taken this volitional 
definition on board, but there has been no such progress with the insanity defence. 
Morse argues that the relationship between volition and insanity is "frustratingly 
vague"."* '^ Where an individual feels overwhelmingly compelled to act, the excuse 
should be based on his irrationality rather than compulsion'^ ^^ since a person whose 
desires are in conflict is not rational.'*^^ However, Morse doubts whether insane 
individuals act because of 'hard choice' situations.'* '^* Where there is no hard choice, 
he suggests that an individual acting out of a 'crazy' desire is no more compelled to 
act than one acting out of a normal desire."*^ ^ 
It is doubtful whether a volitional impairment will or should be included within any 
insanity defence. One possibility would be to expand the M'Naghten Rules to include 
volition as part of a direction to be given to a jury. However, it may be better 
contained within diminished responsibility where irresistible impulse is recognised as 
reducing an individual's liability for punishment"*^^ without wholly removing 
responsibility. Morse suggests"*^ ^ that "[t]he law should require such persons to 
restrain themselves, even if it is hard for them to do so." An individual should only be 
excused on the basis of his irrationality.'*^^ 
Morse, above n.218, 812. 
'^^ ^ Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 61. 
Morse, above n.218, 816. 
"2" Ibid., 812. 
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With impulse disorders such as kleptomania, such individuals are "cognitively 
rational",'*^^ yet will be suffering from a recognised mental disorder. Claims of 
compulsion will not be credible "except perhaps in extreme cases". '*'''' Objectively, we 
do not think it is fear of pain that compels an individual to act. We think that it is 
pleasure which compels such individuals. Where an individual is clearly disgusted 
with his compulsion, yet still act, then he may be regarded as irrational.'*^' 
Agreeing with Fingarette and Hasse,'*^ ^ Morse concludes that extreme cases call for 
the individual's actions to be described as irrational, not involuntary. Compelled 
behaviour is still intentional.'*^^ Including a volitional branch to an insanity test which 
distinguishes between resistible and irresistible urges where the defendant otherwise 
appears rational "is simply too difficult."'*^'* 
4.2.3. Summary 
The complete test proposed by Morse is "[a] defendant is not guilty by reason of 
insanity if, at the time of the offense, the defendant was so extremely crazy and the 
craziness so substantially affected the criminal behaviour that the defendant does not 
deserve to be punished."'*^^ There is much merit in removing the test of insanity away 
from medical definitions. However, this test does not do much to remove the stigma 
of the insanity defence, which must be phrased sensitively enough for it to be pleaded 
Ibid., 813. 
Ibid., 815. 
Ibid., 815. 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 61. 
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by those in need of it, rather than have them compelled into entering a guilty plea. 
The Disability of Mind doctrine proposed by Fingarette and Hasse, is expressed in the 
maxim, "Where there is no mens there can be no mens rea."'^^^ An individual whose 
mental powers have been so disabled as to render him irrational in the control of his 
conduct will either have a reduced form of criminal responsibility or be free from it 
entirely. Where he is in this condition without any culpability on his part, he will not 
be held responsible.'*^^ Such a test has merit, although, as discussed above,'*^^  any 
form of guilty verdict does not reflect a lack of culpability. 
5. Recommendations: 
5.1 Substantive Definition 
The insanity defence should not be abolished. It is not just to convict those who were 
not acting culpably, i.e. who were not responsible for their actions, at the time of 
committing a criminal offence. It is not sufficient to rely upon the ordinary principles 
of criminal law to achieve justice in such cases. There will be occasions where an 
'insane' defendant who acts voluntarily and with mens rea should be excused his 
actions due to a lack of responsibility. It would be equally unfair to attach a label of 
'guilty but mentally i l l ' . 
There needs to be a clear separation between the diagnosis of mental illness and the 
concept of legal insanity. This can be achieved in the first instance by adopting a non-
medical, non-stigmatic term to the defence. It is clear that the term 'legal insanity' 
Fingarette and Hasse, above n.223, 200. The verdict of Guilty of , with Nonculpable Disability 
of Mind is discussed above. 
Ibid., 201-202. 
See 4.7.5. 
should cease to be used. In its place should be one of the phrases proposed by 
Mackay, Williams or Fingarette. It is suggested that the preferred verdict should be a 
not guilty verdict based on "an aberration of normal mental functioning present at the 
time of the commission of the alleged offence."'*^^ 
The substantive definition of the new defence should hinge around the defendant's 
lack of rationality at the time of committing the offence. Save for the most severely 
and permanently mentally i l l , the causal connection should be retained. While, in the 
majority of cases, the causal link will be self-evident, it is possible to envisage an 
undesirable situation where, were the causal link to be removed, a defendant suffering 
from acute schizophrenia may kill for his own motives rather than for reasons due to 
his mental condition. For example, it is possible that such an individual might kill his 
wife in a fi t of rage, motivated solely by jealousy of her receiving the attention of 
another man, rather than acting for reasons arising from his mental illness. 
The new defence must contain three elements: 
I ) It must set a minimum level of rationality. This could be achieved by adapting 
Fingarette's phrase, "[t]he individual's mental makeup at the time of the offending act 
was such that, with respect to the criminality of his conduct, he substantially lacked 
capacity to act rationally (to respond relevantly so far as criminality is concerned)".'*'*" 
A jury could be guided as to the meaning of 'responding relevantly' in the following 
terms. 'A defendant is unable to respond relevantly where he is unable to appreciate 
Mackay, above n.208, 140. 
Fingarette, above n.203, 211. Parenthesis and emphasis from original. 
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the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct, or he honestly believes that he is unable 
reasonably to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' Such a guideline 
would cover the defendant who does not appreciate the nature and quality of his act, 
or that it is wrong, but also would include the schizophrenic defendant who believes 
he must act on the instructions of a divine authority. It is hoped that the latter phrase 
also would include the defendant who acts compulsively to the point of being 
irrational. 
2) As the insanity defence ought not to rely purely on an individual's status, a new 
defence must set out a causal link. If we are to reject a status defence of insanity, we 
must be prepared to offer more guidance than that suggested by Moore: "Is the 
accused so irrational as to be nonresponsible?"'*'*' as it is not satisfactory, for reasons 
already discussed, to remove the causal element in any form of an insanity defence. It 
may be worthwhile removing the stigmatic element from the definition proposed by 
Morse in order to use the cognitive element as follows ''and D's irrationality so 
substantially affected the criminal behaviour that the defendant does not deserve to be 
punished."'^^ 
3) The defendant's mental condition must be nonculpable. It is not desirable to 
include a further volitional test. To include the volitional element within the definition 
below may be tautologous. An irresistible urge so strongly felt as to cause the 
defendant to act in an irrational manner should satisfy the above definition without 
requiring further elaboration. 
'"" Moore, above n.266, 245. 
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Thus, a tentative proposal for a revised insanity defence is: 
1. A defendant will be found not guilty by reason of an aberration of normal mental 
functioning if: 
a) at the time of commission of the offence, his mental condition was such that, 
with respect to the criminality of his conduct, he substantially lacked capacity 
to act rationally; 
and 
b) his lack of capacity to act rationally: 
i) was nonculpable; and; 
ii) so substantially affected his criminal behaviour that he does not 
deserve to be punished. 
2. A defendant lacks the capacity to act rationally i f he is unable to respond relevantly 
in deciding whether or not to commit a criminal offence, and he is unable to respond 
relevantly where: 
a) he is unable to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct, or 
b) he honestly believes that he is unable reasonably to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. 
3. A defendant who, by reason of severe mental illness or severe mental abnormality, 
permanently lacks the capacity to act rationally need satisfy only the criteria in l.a) 
above. 
4. 'Permanently' shall be construed as 'enduring from childhood, (or as a result of 
brain damage induced by serious illness or accident) from which there is no 
reasonable prospect of recovery.' 
Morse, above n.218, 820. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY 
1. Introduction 
The defence of insanity is used infrequently. Where diminished responsibility is 
available as an alternative, many defendants will opt for its more favourable disposal 
consequences,'^ '^  choosing unnecessarily to concede criminal responsibihty and suffer 
punishment. While diminished responsibility should not be concerned with moral 
agency and the minimal conditions of criminal responsibility, in practice, individuals 
who are not eligible to be held criminally responsible are using the defence for want 
of a more appropriate alternative. This inappropriate and overuse of the defence 
warrants consideration. 
The partial defence of diminished responsibility allows a reduction in the criminal 
responsibility of a defendant who kills with mahce aforethought. The defence gives 
the court the discretion to punish according to its perception of the defendant's 
reduced level of culpability, thus avoiding the constraint of the mandatory life 
sentence for murder. Despite the narrow wording of the test, which requires the 
defendant to be suffering from an abnormality of mind, arising from arrested or 
retarded development of mind, inherent causes, disease or injury,'*^ the defence has 
been pragmatically'*^^ interpreted in the courts "in accordance with the morality of the 
case rather than as an application of psychiatric concepts."'*'*^ The defence has been 
allowed in situations where the defendant was suffering from PMT,'*'*^ battered 
See below, n.453. 443 
^ ^ S 2 ( l ) Homicide Act 1957. 
•"•^  Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995), 184-85. 
•"•^  Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2'"' ed., 1983), 693. 
Smith [ m i ] CrimLR5-i\. 
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woman syndrome,'*^^ jealousy,'^^ and also where the defendant has carried out a 
mercy killing.'*^*^ However, even in the most extenuating circumstances, the defence 
will reduce murder to manslaughter but not lead to an acquittal. In such cases, an 
absolute or conditional discharge is possible. 
Mental disorder plays a significant role in removing or reducing criminal 
responsibility and the defence of diminished responsibility constitutes a major part in 
this process. Of the forty murder charges in 1992 which resulted in a transfer from 
prison to a mental hospital under section 48 of the Mental Health Act 1983, twenty-
nine of them were reduced to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility, 
with only six of the charges resulting in murder convictions."^^' Of the remainder, one 
charge was withdrawn, there was one acquittal, and the remaining cases resulted in 
verdicts of insanity, unfitness to plead and infanticide. 
Since its introduction in 1957, the defence of diminished responsibility has "eclipsed" 
verdicts of insanity and unfitness to plead."*^ ^ Where it might have been expected that 
these verdicts would remain static and diminished responsibility would f i l l a gap not 
already covered by the two existing mental disorder defences, this has not been the 
case.'*^ ^ While the scope of diminished responsibility has been to include those 
'^^ Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All E R 889. 
Miller, The Times, May 16, 1972; Asher. The Times, June 9, 1981. 
Price. The Times, December 22 1971. 
Mackay, "Diminished Responsibility and Mentally Disordered Killers", in Rethinking English 
Homicide Law (2000, Oxford University Press), 56. 
Ibid., 57. 
Ibid., 58. Research conducted by Mackay and Kearns shows that, in the fust five years of operation 
of the 1991 Act, murder was charged in only 9.1% of special verdicts and in only 8.2% of cases where 
the unfitness provisions were used. This can be contrasted with the incidences of diminished 
responsibility which peaked at 109 in 1979 but fell to 47 in 1997/8: See Mackay and Kearns, "More 
Facts about the Insanity Defence" [1999] Crim LR 714; Mackay and Kearns, "An Upturn in Unfitness 
to Plead? Disability in Relation to the Trial under the 1991 Act" [2000] Crim LR 532; Home Office, 
Criminal Statistics for England and Wales for 1998 (Cm. 4649), Table 4.7. 
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individuals who do not satisfy the rules on insanity or unfitness to plead, the defence 
has also "partly replaced the plea of insanity, rather than supplementing it,'"*^"* the 
effect being that the number of individuals who have killed and seek to reduce their 
murder charge on the grounds of their mental disorder has not increased. The 
inexorable conclusion must be that certain individuals are now being held criminally 
responsible where, previously, under the M'Naghten Rules, they would not have been 
so regarded/^^ Although it is not known why this has occurred, the refusal of 
Parliament to incorporate more flexibility of disposal where the special verdict is used 
in murder cases into the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 
1991 must serve as a strong deterrent to individuals who kill while suffering from a 
mental disorder. 
While diminished responsibility has largely taken over from the insanity defence on a 
charge of murder, the role of the jury has decreased where a diminished responsibility 
plea is made.'*^ *^  Since 1968, when the Court of Appeal in Cox*^^ confirmed that where 
medical evidence was in agreement, the prosecution could accept a plea of guilty to 
manslaughter, the majority of cases have been dealt with without the need for a 
jury.'*^^ It is surprising, given the obscure wording of section 2, that medical experts 
are able to provide such a level of judgment in place of a j u r y e s p e c i a l l y in the 
light of the comments by Lord Parker C.J. in Byrne, that the question as to whether 
impairment is substantial is a matter for juries to determine and "a matter on which 
Sparkes, "Diminished Responsibility in Theory and Practice" [1964] 27 MLR 9, 32. (Emphasis in 
original). 
Mackay, above n.451, 57. 
This is in contrast to the defence of provocation where the jury must play an active role in deciding 
issues relating to loss of self-control: Mackay, above n.451, 63. 
'*"(1968) 52 Cr A p p R 130. 
Mackay, above n.451, 61. By 1986-8, less than 15% of diminished responsibility pleas were 
contested at trial, compared with a figure of 20% during 1976-7. 
Ibid., 62. 
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juries may quite legitimately differ from doctors."'* '^' The effect of this decreased role 
of the jury is that the most significant mental disorder defence to a murder charge is 
rarely put to the test at trial, which may account for its inadequacies being sufficiently 
masked in order for it to operate in a pragmatic manner."* '^ However, it cannot be right 
that a defence which is employed more "in accordance with the morality of the case 
rather than as an application of psychiatric concepts"'*^^ and is more likely to succeed 
in cases of mental instability or where compassion requires a reduction of sentence'^ "^' 
should be left to the judgment of medical experts without any input from a jury. 
This chapter will proceed to examine the substantive definition of the defence. A 
critique of the defence wil l be provided, taking into account the overlap with the 
defence of provocation in the light of the House of Lords decision in Smith 
(Morgan)^^ Proposals for reform will be reviewed and a recommendation made. 
2. The Substantive Defence 
This section will examine section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 in the context of the 
leading case of Byrne and the introduction of a voHtional element to the defence. The 
four aetiologies will be considered, as will the meaning of mental responsibility, with 
a view to examining the widening conditions which may now attract a defence of 
diminished responsibility. 
Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 provides that a person shall not be convicted 
' ' " [ 1 9 6 0 ] 3 a l l E R l , 5 . 
Mackay, above n.445, 184-5. 
"•^ ^ Williams, above n.446, (1983), 693. 
Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part, (1961), 546. 
[2000] 3 W L R 654. 
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of murder " i f he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a 
condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or 
induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired"^^^ his mental responsibility for 
his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing." The intention behind 
this wording was to exclude killings caused by emotions such as anger, jealousy and 
hate, which include cases which could be supported by medical evidence.'*^^ 
2.1 Abnormality of Mind as Substantially Impairs Mental Responsibility 
The Court of Criminal Appeal in the leading case of Byme'^^^ held that abnormality of 
mind "means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the 
reasonable man would term it abnormal." It is a term which is wide enough to cover 
"the mind's activities in all its aspects", including the ability to exercise will power 
and to control physical acts. This decision goes beyond issues of cognition and 
enables account to be taken of irresistible impulse in the criminal law, but only for a 
charge of murder. That this defence allows a defect of volition to reduce culpability 
marks perhaps the most significant distinction between the defence of insanity, which 
wil l only be allowed as a defence where there is a defect in cognition, and that of 
diminished responsibility. 
Psychopaths and other individuals who suffer from irresistible impulses which can 
only be satisfied by killing another human being, may be able to rely upon this 
defence. This perception is supported by the decision in Byme'^^^ which resulted in the 
•"•^  The term 'substantial impairment' involves a subjective judgment: Williams, above n.463, 548. 
•"^ ^ Governmental statements on the second reading of the Bi l l , November 15, 1956 (Pari. Deb., H. of 
C , Vol.560, cols. 1154, 1252) from Williams, above n.463, 542. 
"^^[1960] 3 Al l E R 1,4. 
^•^^Ibid. 
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inclusion of psychopathy as a mental abnormality for the defence of diminished 
responsibility, there being no reason why it should be allowed for sexual psychopathy 
but excluded from application to non-sexual psychopathy."*^^ 
However, allowing impaired volition to amount to a defence of diminished 
responsibility carries with it problems of proof. An impulse that could not be, rather 
than was not, resisted is "incapable of scientific proof''* '^^  and can only be determined 
by the common sense of a jury, rather than reliance on medical expertise.'* '^ It should 
be noted also that the defendant need suffer only a substantial, rather than total 
impairment. On this point, the Butler Committee commented that "[t]he idea that 
ability to conform to the law can be measured is particularly puzzling."'*'^ Critics of 
Byrne have described the notion of irresistible impulse as "incoherent".'*^^ However, 
as a consequence of the defendant's substantial impairment of his mental 
responsibility, his criminal responsibility will only be reduced.^^'^ There is no 
requirement for evidence showing that his impulse could not be resisted."*^^  He need 
only show that the difficulty in controlling his impulse "was substantially greater than 
would be experienced in like circumstances by an ordinary person not suffering from 
mental abnormality."'*'^ Mackay suggests this means there will never be evidence that 
the impulse could not be resisted by the defendant and therefore there may be no 
reason to excuse him. This leads to the question of whether it is ever right to excuse 
an individual where he could have avoided committing the offence if the impulse was 
Williams, above n.463, 542. 
•""[196013 A l l E R 1,5. 
Mackay, above n.451, 63. 
''^ ^ Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd. 6244 (1975), para. 19.5. 
••^ Kenny, 'The Expert in Court" (1983) 99 L Q R 197, 210. If an individual acts on impulse, he must be 
acting voluntarily. If acting voluntarily, he must have been able to act otherwise. 
Mackay, above n.451,71. 
""Ibid. , 71. 
J . C . Smith, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law (9*^  ed., 1999), 213 (emphasis in original). 
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not uncontroUable.'^ ^^ While J.C. Smith argues that an individual who is less able to 
resist an impulse than the ordinary man should bear a reduced amount of 
responsibility for his act,'*^ ^ Mackay suggests that this will be true only where the act 
is murder. Further, while there are policy reasons for allowing a reduction in 
responsibility for murder, this should not compel the conclusion that it is wrong to 
punish those who kill intentionally due to a voHtional defect."*^^  However, nor should 
this compel the opposite conclusion. It may be preferable to argue that Smith's 
statement should be applied to all offences, and the defence of diminished 
responsibility extended accordingly.'^ ^^ 
The meaning of the phrase 'abnormality of mind' has not been analysed to a great 
degree by the courts,'* '^ yet it is clear that this term has allowed an increasing number 
of conditions falling far short of insanity. The meaning of abnormality of mind is left 
to medical expertise, and opinions vary.'*^^ Lord Parker in Byme'^^^ originally 
envisaged a state "which in popular language (not that of the M'Naghten Rules) a jury 
would regard as amounting to partial insanity or being on the border-line of insanity." 
However, it has become clear that the defendant's mental state need not be viewed in 
such a way for a defence of diminished responsibility to succeed. In Seers,^^^ the 
Mackay, above n.451, 71 -72. 
J . C . Smith, above n.476, 214. 
"•^  Mackay, above n.451, 72. 
See below, 4.2. 
In Australia, there has been some attempt at interpretation of the term 'abnormality of mind'. In 
McGarvie (1986) 5 N S W L R 270, 272 the court required an abnormality of mind to have 'some 
continuance'. However, the Criminal Court of Appeal in Whitwortfi (1987) 31 A Crim R 453 criticised 
McGarvie commenting that if, for example, stress is severe enough, the mind may not be able to endure 
and then it may be described as an inherent cause. It will also be a question of degree in each case 
whether the stress caused injury. Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 also disputed McGarvie on the 
basis that the inherent cause must be permanent but the abnormality may be fleeting. 
Dell, Murder into Manslaughter - The Diminished Responsibility Defence in Practice, 39. 
[1960] 3 Al l E R 1,5. 
''*'*(1984) 79 Cr A p p R e p 2 6 I . 
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Court of Appeal, following comments made by the Privy Council in Rose v R,^^^ 
found that it was a material misdirection to tell a jury that the defendant must be on 
the borderline of insanity. An abnormality of mind as substantially impairs mental 
responsibility can include, inter alia, battered woman syndrome,"^ ^^ depressive illness, 
and even a mercy killing.'*^^ 
The only constraint to this apparently generous interpretation of s2 is that the 
abnormality of mind must be attributable to the causes listed in parenthesis: arrested 
488 
or retarded development, inherent causes, disease or injury. In Sanderson the Court 
of Appeal held that abnormality of mind could be equated with paranoid psychosis 
arising from an inherent cause. In this case the inherent cause was upbringing. 
However, it should be noted that dicta in this case suggest that reactive depression 
may now be excluded from within the scope of the defence."*^^  Roch U said that a 
judge should tailor his directions to the jury to suit the facts of the case,"*^ ^ which will 
allow juries to ignore irrelevant causes."*^ ' He also added that the term 'disease' meant 
disease of the mind which could cover both organic and functional mental illness.''^^ 
This may exclude psychological causes, i.e. neither functional nor organic which may, 
in turn, render it difficult to allow the use of the defence in the future in cases of 
mercy killings.'*^'' 
[1961] 1 Al l E R 859. 485 
Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All E R 889. 
^^'^ Price [1971] The Times, 22 December. 
488 (1994) 98 c r App R 325, 336 (Roch L J ) 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (2000), 582. See also Mackay, [1999] 
C r i m L R 117. 
Sanderson (1994) 98 Cr App R 325, 334. 
Mackay, "The Abnormality of Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility" [1999] Crim LR 111, 
121. 
"'^ Sanderson (1994) 98 Cr App R 325, 336. 
Mackay, above n.491, 122. 
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Mackay suggests that the words in parenthesis are legal rather than medical terms but 
notes a reluctance of the courts to delve into this area.'* '^' The parenthesis qualifying 
'abnormality of mind' in section 2(1) originated from the definition of mental 
defectiveness in section 1(2) of the Mental Deficiency Act 1927. While the 
parenthesis seemed to allow for a broad interpretation of the phrase in 1927, it was 
intended for limitation in the 1957 Act."^ ^^  Hence, "it becomes vital to know what 
kinds of causes are 'inherent', what kinds of trauma will count as 'injury' and 
what.. .is meant by 'disease.'" In turn, this places greater reliance on the opinion of 
medical experts. 
2.2 Abnormality of Mind and Intoxication 
Where alcoholism has caused brain damage or psychosis, this will amount to an 
abnormality of mind under section 2^^^ Where a state of intoxication brought about 
by alcoholism is claimed to amount to an abnormality of mind, nothing less than a 
craving for a drink will suffice for the defence of diminished responsibility'*^^ The first 
drink must be involuntary. I f the craving is irresistible, this may be sufficient 
abnormality to allow a defence 498 
It has been suggested that the courts are using "the taint of intoxication" to remove the 
possibility of diminished responsibility as a defence."*^ ^ It wil l be extremely difficult to 
show, in cases of alcoholism, that it was the first drink, and not subsequent drinks 
Mackay, above n.445, 185. 
"^ ^ Griew, 'The Future of Diminished Responsibility" [1988] Crim LR 75, 77. 
Tandy [1989] 1 All E R 267; Inseal [1992] Crim LR 35. 
•"^ Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261. 
Tandy [1989] 1 All E R 267. 
Mackay, above n.445, 197. 
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taken during the course of the day, which was irresistible. '^^ '^  In addition, differences 
between equally culpable members of the same class may arise. It is possible that one 
defendant could begin drinking first thing in the morning in order to suppress 
withdrawal symptoms, while another may be unable to purchase an alcoholic drink 
before the onset of withdrawal symptoms. Both may be in the same state of 
intoxication when committing a crime, yet different decisions could result, with the 
law favouring the second defendant. 
Where the defendant is suffering from another abnormality of mind, the Court of 
Appeal in Gittens held that any disinhibiting effect of alcohol on the defendant's 
personality should be disregarded. The test was consolidated in Atkinson.^^^ A jury 
must consider i f the defendant had not taken drink or drugs 1) would he have killed as 
he did and 2) would he have been acting under a diminished responsibility when he 
did? These hypothetical questions are impossible to answer. 
The test was used again in Egan°^ where the Court of Appeal ruled that the question 
which should have gone to the jury was "was the appellant's abnormality of mind 
such that he would have been under diminished responsibility, drink or no drink?". 
The Court's application of the test may be wrong given that there may not need to be 
a causal link between the abnormality of mind and the killing. In Egan it may have 
been more appropriate to direct the jury 'to be satisfied that i f D had killed in the same 
SuUivan, 'Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility', [1994] Crim LR 156, 157. 
Ibid., 158-159. 
[1985] Crim LR 314, approving Gittens [1984] 3 Al l E R 252. 
'"^[1992] 4 All E R 470. 
I l l 
circumstances but in a sober state his responsibility would have been substantially 
impaired because of his borderline subnormality.'^"'* 
One case which may have a considerable impact on the application of intoxication to 
the diminished responsibility defence is O'Connelf^^ in which dicta of the Court of 
Appeal excluded alcohol from falling within the term 'injury' within the four 
aetiologies. The Court did not distinguish between a soporific drug, as was used in 
this case, and intoxicants such as alcohol. Rather than such a restrictive approach, it 
may be preferable for the Court to allow 'injury' to include a temporary 
malfunctioning of the mind caused by drugs with the exclusion of self-induced 
intoxication, which will require reference to the common law principle that 
intoxication will not excuse.^ '*^ This case perhaps illustrates best the dangers of 
defining the four aetiologies beyond use, and the need for greater clarity to avoid 
confusion. 
3. Critique of Diminished Responsibility 
This section will provide a critique of the defence of diminished responsibility, 
addressing three main issues: the lack of firm rationale for introducing the defence; 
the obscure wording of the defence, in particular, the ambiguous meaning of 'mental 
responsibility'; and whether responsibility can ever be only diminished, rather than 
removed completely. Finally, a detailed consideration of the overlap between 
^""Sullivan, aboven.500, 160. 
[1997] Cr/OTL/?683. 
Mackay, above n.491, 124-125. 
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provocation and diminished responsibility will be made in the light of the House of 
Lords decision in Smith (Morgan). 
3.1 Lack of Rationale 
The defence of diminished responsibility was enacted in England almost a century 
after its adoption in Scotland, but for essentially the same reason: the avoidance of the 
death penalty for murder.^ *'^  Since the death penalty was abolished in 1969, the 
original aim of the defence of diminished responsibility has been redundant. However, 
it has continued to provide an alternative function in the avoidance of the mandatory 
life sentence for murder, as "a special device for untying the hands of the judge in 
SOS 
murder cases", or, less positively, as "a device for circumventing the 
ef\n 
embarrassments that flow from a mandatory sentence." The defence also recognises 
that certain types of mental abnormality may fall short of insanity but still warrant 
more lenient treatment of the defendant.^'° 
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment chose not to recommend the adoption 
of the diminished responsibility defence, opting instead for an extension of the 
insanity defence.^" Yet, Parliament ignored the Commission's advice and introduced 
the defence. That the Commission's expertise was disregarded and the defence 
introduced due to an unsatisfactory inflexibility over the penalty for murder signifies 
that it was not drafted as a defence aimed at recognising a reduced level of culpability 
Dell, above n.482, 1. For a history of the development of the defence, see Walker, Crime and 
Insanity in England, vol.] (1968) 
Above n.472. 
Dell, "Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered" [1982] Crim LR 809, 814. See also Wootton, 
"Diminished Responsibility: A Layman's View [1960] 76 LQR 224, 236: "The concept.. .is simply an 
attempt to escape from the shackles of a penalty that is rigidly fixed by statute." 
^'"Williams, above n.463,541. 
Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmnd. 8932 (1953), paras. 333(iii), 413, 595. 
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in an individual. Rather, it was introduced as a matter of policy apparently in order to 
avoid the death penalty and, subsequently, the mandatory life sentence. 
3.2 Mental Responsibility 
While the four aetiologies have been criticised for their lack of c la r i ty ,^ i t is the 
phrase 'mental responsibility' which gives perhaps the greatest cause for concern. It is 
not clear whether this means moral or legal, i.e. criminal, responsibility. I f the phrase 
is taken to mean 'liability to a reduced punishment'^^^ then it cannot be said, in 
substitution of the phrase in s2(l), that this is something from which a person is 
suffering. I f it means mental capacity which is a precondition of legal responsibility, 
then it may be inappropriate to punish an individual, even in a reduced form, who was 
mentally incapable for whatever reason at the time of the act.^ '"* An agent who is 
mentally incapable is not rational. An individual who is not rational is not a moral 
agent and should not be liable to punishment. 
The common perception appears to be that the term is referring to mental capacity. 
The Butler Committee recognised the term as either 'a concept of law or a concept of 
morality; it is not a clinical fact relating to the defendant.'^'^ Williams suggested it 
was not a legal concept as 'legal responsibility in the sense of liability to conviction 
either exists or it does not',^'^ but that the term 'responsibility' has a 'strong ethico-
legal tinge', which may be equivalent to 'culpability'.^'^ Griew suggests '^^  that in 
'^^  See 2.7 above. 
''^ Sparks, above n.454, 13. 
5'" Ibid., 14-15. 
Above n.472, para. 19.5. 
Williams, above n.446, 686. 
Williams, above n.463,548. 
Griew, above n.495, 81-82. 
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using the phrase 'mental responsibility'. Parliament has confused two concepts "-
those of reduced (impaired) capacity and of reduced (diminished) liability. The former 
presumably justifies the latter by virtue of a third idea - that of reduced culpability." 
If, then, the concept is one of morality, it certainly does not follow that medical 
experts are in a better position to make an assessment of the defendant's moral 
responsibility^'^ and the use of medical expertise must be questioned.^^'' 
'Irresponsibility' is often associated with anti-social or bad behaviour.^^' Yet, this is 
not the context in which mental responsibility should be taken. 'Irresponsible' may 
alternatively mean 'irresponsive' in the sense of not responding to punishment or 
reward, although this term is unlikely to be understood by a jury. The meaning of 
diminished responsibility may be described more appropriately as representing a 
"diminished power to resist temptation, or, conversely, excessive sensibility to 
temptations"."^ 
To summarise, it is an individual's responsibility for his acts which should lie at the 
centre of a defence of diminished responsibiUty. For Parliament to have confused this 
concept by inserting the word 'mental' in front of 'responsibility' is to have 
compacted two ideas together^ '^* to the point of eliminating their true meaning. The 
concepts of reduced capacity and reduced liability need to be kept separate. An 
individual's mental capacity should determine, firstly, whether he is minimally 
Mackay, above n.445, 192. 
"° This is also the view of the Butler Committee, above n.472, para 19.5. 
Wootton, above n.509, 231. 
Ibid., 231. 
"Mbid.,231. 
"" Griew, "Reducing Murder to Manslaughter: Whose Job?" (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 18, 
19-20. 
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responsible. Only when he is found to be a responsible agent should the question of 
his reduced mental capacity enable his reduced liability to punishment to be taken into 
account. 
3.3 Partial Responsibility 
The defence of diminished responsibility offers an uncomfortable compromise 
between ascribing full responsibility for a crime and the removal of all responsibility. 
An individual who successfully uses the defence will be found guilty of a lesser crime 
and liable to a lesser degree of punishment. It has been suggested that the appropriate 
use of the defence of diminished responsibility should never be to mitigate a 
sentence.^" If we do not view the defendant as culpable, there should be a complete 
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acquittal. Sparks suggests that it is not only the extent of mental impairment which 
must be considered but also whether the defendant could have avoided doing the act. 
It must be true that an individual either could or could not have avoided committing 
the act. I f he could, then he should be held responsible. If he could not, then he should 
be completely excused from punishment.^^^ It makes no sense to punish an individual 
who is mentally i l l . Lord Justice-General Normand, in a Scottish case,^ ^^  said: "The 
defence of impaired responsibility is somewhat inconsistent with the basic doctrine of 
our criminal law that a man, i f sane, is responsible for his acts, and, if not sane, is not 
responsible." 
Wasik suggests that if we do not use the term 'responsible' in the above quote but, 
instead, substitute 'liable to punishment' then the statement appears less true. In moral 
Sparks, above n.454. 
'^^Ibid., 15-16. 
Ibid., 16. 
Kirkwood v H.M. Advocate, 1939 J C 36, 40. 
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terms, it is possible to have a "gradation in the efficacy of various excuses."^^^ While 
it is probable that we would find a mother who kills her terminally i l l child in order to 
save him from further pain less blameworthy than a serial killer, nevertheless, i f she 
acted rationally, she is a moral agent who is eligible to be held responsible for her 
actions. The question is whether we would be able also to describe her as less 
responsible. The two concepts are not inextricably bound. An individual who is less 
blameworthy may be fully responsible though his reasons for his act and surrounding 
circumstances affect his blameworthiness. A mercy killer, for example, will be fully 
responsible but less blameworthy. Such an individuals ought not to be obliged to rely 
upon the defence of diminished responsibility, since it does not accurately reflect his 
condition, but no other option is currently available. 
As discussed above,^ ^^ a person may be irrational in terms of his conduct, emotions 
and attitude. Morse's 'working definition' of rationality requires consideration of "the 
sensibleness of the actor's goals and the logic of the means chosen to achieve 
them."^^' Rationality is the ability 'to be sensitive and responsive to relevant changes 
in one's situation and environment - that is, to be flexible.'^''^ 'Irrationality', Morse 
describes, as the opposite of all these criteria.^^^ While the defence of insanity gives 
an excuse where there is a total lack of rationality, there will be degrees of rationality 
along a continuum and it is possible that an individual who is not entitled to a full 
™ Wasik, "Partial Excuses in the Criminal Law" [1982] M L ^ 516,517. 
"° See Chapter Three, 2.2.7. 
Morse, above n.218,783 
Wolf, Freedom within Reason (New York, 1990), 69, from Morse, "Diminished Capacity" in Action 
and Value in Criminal Law, eds. Shute, Gardner and Horder (1993), 248. 
Morse, above n.532, 248. 
117 
excuse may nevertheless be 'non-culpably compromised' and ought to be partially 
excused."'* 
Abolition of the partial responsibility variant of diminished responsibility is advocated 
also by those who argue that individuals should be punished to the same extent as 
those with the same mens rea for a particular crime. While there is a moral claim for 
allowing the defence, the difficulties in implementing it without too arbitrary use of 
discretion are insurmountable in legal terms. 
Morse argues, when we consider a mercy killer, we must distinguish between finding 
him legally responsible for his act and not wanting to blame him as much as a cold 
blooded killer due to his reduced cu lpab i l i ty .He suggests a 'guilty but partially 
responsible' verdict, which would apply to all crimes and offer a mandatory reduction 
in sentence, recognising the defendant was responsible but not completely so.^ ^^  In the 
case of a mercy killer, who can be described as fully responsible for his actions, it 
may be preferable to recognise a reduced level of blameworthiness in the form of an 
alternative defence to diminished responsibility, because of his reasons for killing, 
rather than a reduced level of responsibility. A mercy killer ought not to be given 
automatically the same sentence as a cold blooded killer, nor should he be 
convicted of the same offence. 
Ibid., 249. 
Morse, "Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity" 75 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 1, 30. 
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Ibid., 36. 
Morse, above n.532,271. 
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3.4 Diminished Responsibility and Provocation 
While diminished responsibility enquires into an individual's abnormality of mind, 
the defence of provocation, now contained under s3 of the Homicide Act 1957, 
originally set its standard by the reasonable man. It has been suggested that the 
partially objective test of provocation is not helpful in assessing why an individual 
failed to control himself, as most jurors will not have experienced such an extreme 
situation as leads a person to kill.^^^ Also, the objective test, in recent years, has lost 
much of its objectivity, given that many characteristics of the defendant may now be 
taken into account in assessing whether the reasonable person would have acted as the 
defendant did. As some of these characteristics may be linked to the defendant's 
mental state, the substantial overlap which now exists between the defences of 
provocation and diminished responsibility requires further consideration. 
The law is prepared to allow provocation as a defence of partial responsibility to 
individuals who are, arguably, less deserving than the mentally abnormal .Unt i l the 
House of Lords judgment in Smith^'^^ the extent of the overlap between diminished 
responsibility and provocation was not settled. Despite indications to the contrary 
from the Privy Council case of Luc Thiet-Thuan,^^^ the House of Lords in Smith has 
shown a continued willingness to allow a jury to take into account, where it is 
necessary in the interests of justice, characteristics which have a bearing on the 
accused's level of self-control. This decision, as with the Court of Appeal decisions in 
Mackay, above n.451, 74. 
"^^  Morse, above n.535, 30. 
[2000] 3 WLR 654. 
'"^[1997] AC 131. 
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cases such as A/i/Mwa//a, Humphreys, Dryden and Thornton (No.2), has 
indicated a large area of overlap between the two defences. 
The defendant in Smith was suffering from a depressive illness which affected his 
capacity for self-control. The Court of Appeal substituted his murder conviction for 
manslaughter, and the House of Lords, by a majority decision, dismissed the Crown's 
appeal. Lord Slynn suggested that Lord Diplock in Camplin^'^^ did not limit 
characteristics which could be applied to the reasonable man to those of only age or 
sex. Lord Slynn was of the opinion that section 3 does not intend such a rigid 
distinction between two different types of characteristics '^*^ and he suggested that the 
same view was held by Lord Diplock in Camplin when he stated '^*^ "[t]he distinction 
as to the purposes for which it is legitimate to take the age of the accused into account 
involves considerations of too great a nicety". Lord Slynn did not consider that s2 of 
the Homicide Act 1957 prevented this conclusion, pointing out that the two defences 
are significandy different in that provocation deals with external factors to the 
defendant whereas diminished responsibility does not.^^° 
Lord Hoffmann gave a similar analysis of Camplin. While age was singled out as the 
relevant characteristic for Camplin, it was not meant to be a "one-size-fits-all 
direction".^^' On the distinction between diminished responsibility and provocation, 
his Lordship conceded that there is a philosophical distinction between partially 
[1992] 4 All ER 859. 
^""[1995] 4 All ER 1008. 
'«[1995]4A11ER987. 
'''*[1996]2A11ER 1023. 
[1978] AC 705,717. 
[2000] 3 WLR 654, 661. 
[1978] AC 705,718. 
[2000] 3 WLR 654, 661. 
Ibid., 671. 
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excused normal behaviour in response to external circumstances and mental 
characteristics which prevent a defendant from acting normally, but thought it was 
difficult to distinguish between the two in practical terms and that "it is wrong to 
assume there is a neat dichotomy between the "ordinary person" contemplated by the 
law of provocation and the "abnormal person" contemplated by the law of diminished 
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responsibility." Parliament may not have given any thought to there being an 
overlap between the two defences but, unless juries are told to ignore characteristics 
in a provocation case which could lead to a defence of diminished responsibility, 
"there is no point in claiming that the defences are mutually exclusive."^^^ 
Lord Clyde, also concurring, was of the opinion that there was room for overlap 
between the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility and that the scope 
of the common law defence of provocation, as is now defined by statute, "should not 
be determined by the arrival of the distinct statutory defence of diminished 
responsibility."^^"* Al l characteristics of the defendant, save for pugnacity and 
excitability, should be taken into account and this includes characteristics which have 
a bearing on the defendant's level of self-control.^^^ 
Lord Hobhouse, dissenting, argued that while the function of the defence of 
provocation was to show mercy for inadequates, this ancient sentiment is no longer 
significant since the introduction of the defence of diminished responsibility and 
"[t]he absence of a consideration of the significance of s2 of the act of 1957 is a 
Ibid., 672. 
Ibid., 673. 
Ibid., 680. 
Ibid., 684. 
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striking feature of most of the judgments on s3."^ ^^ Both sections address the fact that 
the defendant's act was unlawful but recognise that he may not have been completely 
responsible at the time of committing the offence.Significantly, Lord Hobhouse 
pointed out that this case, as with other similar cases, had come before the courts 
where the defendant had failed, or in other cases been unwilling, to satisfy the jury of 
his entitlement to the defence of diminished responsibility. It would seem to be 
"contrary to....policy to extend s3 to give him the defence advisedly denied him by 
s2." His Lordship criticised the failure of the courts to take into account the 
"interaction of sections 2 and 3", not only to show that s3 is strained in its 
interpretation, but also to show that s3 does not need to be strained to avoid injustice, 
as s2 is sufficient to avoid such difficulties. 
Lord Millett, also dissenting, contrasted the two defences: with diminished 
responsibihty, the jury may say that the defendant was not responsible for his actions; 
with provocation, "[a]ny one of us might have reacted in the same way... ."The 
defendant's loss of self-control "must be attributable to something which is external to 
himself."^^" His Lordship argued that post-natal depression, personality disorders and 
chronic inability to exercise self control ought not to fall within the defence of 
provocation and that, even if they could not be brought within the defence of 
diminished responsibility, "the objective element of provocation should not be eroded 
Ibid., 693-694. 
^" Ibid., 694. 
''^ Ibid., 695. 
Ibid., 696. For example, the Court of Appeal in Byrne ruled out provocation as a defence to a sexual 
psychopath. Diminished responsibility was the only defence available to him. 
Ibid., 711. 
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and its moral basis subverted in order to provide a defence of diminished 
responsibility outside the limits within which Parliament has chosen to confine it."^^' 
The effect of the decision in Smith is to allow for so many characteristics of the 
defendant to be included in the objective test that it can no longer be described as 
truly objective. Such characteristics will not only be confined to mental disorders 
which affect the gravity of the provocation but to most other characteristics, save for 
pugnacity, jealousy or excitability,^^^ which affect the level of the defendant's self-
control. The breadth of such acceptable characteristics is unclear. Lord Hoffmann 
stated^^^ that the circumstances must be "such as to make the loss of self-control 
sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence from murder to 
manslaughter." Simester and Sullivan^^* point out: "Al l that may be safely gleaned 
from the judgments of Lords Hoffman and Clyde is that an admissible characteristic 
may be temporary or permanent, may fall short of any recognised medical disorder, 
but will not include the destabilising effects of drugs or alcohol and shortcomings of 
character." 
Lords Hoffmann and Clyde suggested^^^ that the term 'reasonable man' should no 
longer be used in order to avoid confusing directions to the jury. Although these 
comments do not represent a majority decision, if followed, the test for provocation 
would become an extensive one. Wherever there is a sympathetic element to a case, 
then it will be better for the defendant to plead provocation, given the lower burden of 
Ibid., 718. In fact, it is likely that all such conditions would fall within the defence of diminished 
responsibility. 
Ibid., 674, 678, (Lord Hoffmann); 684 (Lord Clyde). 
Ibid., 678. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, www.hartpub.co.uk/Updates. 
[2000] 3 WLR 654, 678, 684. 
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proof. The only proviso to this is that there must be an incident of provocation. Where 
there is none, only diminished responsibility can be used. 
J. C. Smith found it unlikely that, in drafting sections 2 and 3 of the Homicide Act 
1957, the draftsman intended the same kind of mental abnormality to apply to both 
defences.^ *^" He highlighted the distinctions between the defences: the one requiring a 
person suffering from an abnormality of mind; the other, a reasonable person; both 
defences having different burdens of proof which render consideration of both 
defences at trial an unenviable task.^ ^^ 
However, it is likely that the substantial overlap between the defences of diminished 
responsibility and provocation will remain. Perhaps the situation which Lord Diplock 
envisaged in Camplin has never been more accurate that "it is now possible for a 
defendant to set up a combined defence of provocation and diminished responsibility, 
the practical effect being that the jury may return a verdict of manslaughter if they 
take the view that the defendant suffered from an abnormality of mind and was 
provoked. In practice this may mean that a conviction of murder will be ruled out 
although the provocation was not such as would have moved a person of normal 
mentality to kiU."^^^ 
[2000] Crim LR 1004, 1007. 
[2000] Crim LR 1004, 1007. It was also the view of Lord Goff in Luc Thiet-Thuan [1996] 2 All ER 
1033, 1046, that a defendant who failed to establish a defence of diminished responsibility might 
employ the same evidence to succeed in a plea of provocation, on the basis that the latter defence sets a 
lower burden of proof. 
[1978] AC 705, 726-727. 
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Given that psychiatric evidence is more readily admissible^^^ in cases of diminished 
responsibility, there is a benefit to be gained from running both of the defences 
together, as a jury will tend not to separate the evidence from issues concerning the 
provocation.There may be situations where a condition falling short of being a 
mental abnormality affects a person's capacity for self-control. The combination of 
defences are of particular use to women who have been abused as the defence of 
provocation requires them to show a sudden and temporary loss of self control in 
circumstances where there may have been a delay between the last act of provocation 
and the killing. The judge can order provocation to be used as a defence where 
diminished responsibility is raised, thus allowing the same evidence to be used. 
Where, however, the prosecution accepts a plea of diminished responsibility, then 
issues relating to provocation will not go before a jury, and may not be reflected in 
sentencing.Mackay suggests^ ^^ it is best to run both pleas if a defendant showed 
signs of mental abnormality at the time of the provocation. 
While Lord Hobhouse viewed this as a poor state of affairs,^^^ it is possible that, 
where the inadequacies of the two defences prevent justice from being done in 
individual cases, their overlap may restore the balance. However, i f this is to be the 
current position, there should be formal recognition of the fact. The two defences 
should be combined into one defence of emotional disturbance, requiring one burden 
of proof, that is capable of applying to the mentally normal and abnormal. While this 
The Court of Appeal in Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 held that "jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell 
them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses 
and strains of life", 842. While psychiatric evidence may be admissible in provocation cases to explain 
the defendant's loss of self-control, it would not be admissible in explaining whether the ordinary 
person would have done the same: Camplin [1978] 2 All E R 168, 182-183. 
Mackay, above n.445, 201. 
Mackay, above n.451, 64. 
Mackay, above n.445, 202. 
[2000] 3 WLR 654, 696. 
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may not have been the intention of the Parliamentary draftsmen, our understanding of 
conditions which reduce responsibility has altered substantially in the past few 
decades. With recognition of the effect of such conditions as post-traumatic shock 
disorder, battered woman's syndrome and pre-menstrual tension on the 'ordinary' 
person, the division between who is normal and abnormal is much less clear. This 
recognition is demonstrated by recent Court of Appeal authorities and the majority 
decision in Smith. While the reasoning of the majority is less compelling than that of 
the minority, and has led to a "muddle"^ '^* in the law of provocation, it reflects a need 
to develop one defence which can cater for our willingness to understand that many 
factors can reduce a person's responsibility for murder. 
4. Reform Proposals 
When the diminished responsibility defence was introduced, it was anticipated that 
there would continue to be more pleas for insanity. This has not turned out to be the 
case.^ ''^  The implication of this is that we are punishing, albeit at a reduced level of 
responsibility, a greater number of individuals who are suffering from mental 
conditions than we would be i f the insanity defence provided an adequate alternative. 
This section will examine the following proposals for reform of the defence: the 
abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder, and consequent abolition of the 
defence of diminished responsibility; the extension of a version of the defence to all 
offences; UK reform proposals; the introduction of a mens rea variant of the defence; 
the separation of provocation and diminished responsibility through the use of a 
[2000] Crim LR 1004, 1009. 
See above, 1. 
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medicalised definition; and, the merging of the two defences to give one defence of 
emotional disturbance. 
4.1 Abolition of the Mandatory Life Sentence 
The Butler Report's first preference for reform was the abolition of the diminished 
responsibility plea and of the mandatory life sentence.^ ^^ While abolition of the 
mandatory life sentence may result injustice being achieved in terms of sentencing, it 
cannot be desirable for certain less blameworthy individuals to share the stigma of a 
murder conviction with serial killers and those deserving of being called murderers. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee, in its Fourteenth Report,^ ^^ has rejected that 
murder and manslaughter be replaced by one offence, with gradations, and although 
the Committee was divided on the abolition of the mandatory life sentence it 
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considered that partial excuses should be retained even i f it were to be abolished. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that one offence of homicide, with varying degrees of blame, 
will be introduced in this country, especially given that: "Homicide covers such a 
wide moral range that pressure for the recognition of moral and legal subdivision is 
bound to occur."^^^ It is also unlikely that the mandatory life sentence, until opinion is 
less divided, will be abolished. In brief, the principal argument in favour of its 
abolition is that murder is not a homogenous offence and can range from brutal killing 
Above n.472, paras. 19.14-16. 
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, Offences Against the Person, Cmnd. 7844 
(1980), para. 84. 
'™ This opinion was also expressed by Lord Hoffmann in Smith (Morgan), 666 and Lord Clyde, 681. 
Wasik, "Partial Excuses", [1982] MLR 516, 530. 
Above n.577, para. 76. 
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581 to ending an individual's suffering through mercy killing. Sentencing should reflect 
this differing range of culpable behaviour. 
Those opposed to the abolition of the mandatory life sentence argue that a penalty for 
this unique crime should carry the greatest deterrent effect. In addition, judges are 
582 
unable to know when it will be no longer dangerous to release such an offender, 
although, as the Butler Committee has recognised,^^^ this has been occurring with 
those offenders who have successfully employed a defence of diminished 
responsibility for many years. 
As Dell points out,^ "^* i f the life sentence for murder were to become discretionary, the 
effect of a diminished responsibility defence would be reduced considerably. 
However, this should not mean that the defence should be abolished, since it is not 
desirable to label less blameworthy individuals as murderers. The CLRC feared that 
removal of the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation might result in 
sympathetic juries acquitting an individual who acted while suffering from a mental 
abnormality, rather than labelling such an individual a murderer.^ **^  However, there is 
no suggestion that juries employ this tactic in relation to other serious offences such 
as rape.^ ^^ The CLRC's second argument was that judges would not know from the 
jury's verdict whether to impose a harsh or lenient sentence. Both of these arguments 
give force to the view that the defence of diminished responsibility ought to be 
Dell, above n.509, 815. 
Ibid., 815. 
Above n.472, para 19.11(c). 
'^••Dell, above n.509, 815. 
Above n.577, para. 76. 
Dell, above n.509, 816. 
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extended to all crimes, which neither the Butler Committee nor the CLRC 
considered necessary. 
The abolition of mandatory hospitalisation where the defendant is found not guilty by 
reason of insanity to a murder charge may be preferable to abolition of the diminished 
responsibility defence. As was predicted by Mackay,^^° the failure to do so has led to 
a murder charge rarely attracting a finding of insanity or unfitness to plead.^^' Since 
the House of Lords decision in Antoine,^^^ defendants have been unable to avoid the 
mandatory disposal consequences of an unfitness to plead outcome to a murder charge 
by pleading diminished responsibility to the 'trial of facts.' Approving the Court of 
Appeal's decision that diminished responsibility was not available to a defendant on a 
'trial of facts,' Lord Hutton found that it was only up to a jury to find the defendant 
did the act charged against him, so that he could be protected from a charge of 
murder. This decision will lead to unfair results.^ ^^ In this case, the defendant's co-
accused was able to rely upon the defence of diminished responsibility, while the 
defendant was unfit to plead and therefore unable to do so.^ '^* 
4.2 Application to all Offences 
Morally, we are prone to blame some individuals less than others. Legally, the same 
occurs where there is diminished capacity.^^^ This argument calls for extension of the 
Ibid., 817. 
Above n.472, para 19.9. 
Above n.577, para 98. 
"^^  Mackay, The Operation of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964: An Empirical Study of 
Unfitness to Plead and the Insanity Defence (1991), 28. 
Mackay, above n.451, 57-58. 
[2000] 2 All ER 208; See Chapter 2 above at 2.3.1 
Mackay, above n.451, 59. 
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Morse, above n.532, 250. 
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defence of diminished responsibility to all crimes. While it is recognised that the 
defence is of greater utility for the offence of murder which carries the mandatory life 
sentence, recognition of a reduced level of responsibility, especially for stigmatic 
crimes, ought to be given at trial by a jury. This would be preferable to placing 
reliance upon justice being done during the plea in mitigation after a finding of guilt 
has already been made. While justice can be reflected adequately in sentencing 
policy,^^^ there appears to be no justification for restricting a defence which is based 
on principles of desert and fairness exclusively to murder. It is at the stage of 
attributing responsibility for a crime that a reduction in such responsibility ought to be 
recognised. 
However, Wasik believes "it is a mistake to regard the fixed penalty and the 
availability of partial excuses as causally dependent on each other.. .It is rather that 
both phenomena stem from a third consideration: the fact that murder is marked as a 
'crime standing out from all others.'"^^^ 
The principle that an individual is less culpable in circumstances where he is less able 
to act rationally or responsibly, which lies behind the defence of diminished 
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responsibility must have equal application to all offences, and yet, in practice, both 
the Homicide Act and the Model Penal Code only allow the defence to apply to 
homicide. To extend the defence to all crimes, unlike the mens rea variant of the 
defence, might result in many offenders receiving lighter sentences, but no defendant 
need be freed unconditionally.^^^ 
Ibid., 267. 
Wasik, above n.529, 521. 
Morse, above n.535, 22. 
'"'Ibid., 24. 
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In Germany, the defence is available to all categories of crime and operates as a 
means of reduction of sentence rather than altering the offence itself.^™ A "partial 
defect of mind" in Italy will also reduce the length of sentence.*""' In South Africa the 
same applies, plus the defence will sometimes alter the category of offence. '^^ ^ Horder 
recommends^"^ an intermediate "diminished responsibility" verdict to be available to 
all offences. A verdict in itself, it would allow the judge to make a range of orders 
along similar lines to the disposal consequences for the Special Verdict. 
However, it appears that no Anglo-American jurisdiction has allowed the use of a 
diminished capacity defence to all crimes.^ *^ "* Of note in Scottish law, though, is the 
case of HM Advocate v Blake^^^ in which the diminished responsibility plea operated 
to reduce a charge of attempted murder to one of 'assault to severe i n j u r y ' T h i s is 
unusual in that it has been held^°^ that diminished responsibility could not be used to a 
plea of culpable homicide. 
It was the view of the Butler Committee that the defence would not be needed 
elsewhere given that it was considered only necessary where the offence carried a 
mandatory penalty and the court have a wide range of powers to deal with mentally 
^ New German Criminal Code, paras. 21, 22 and 61; Wasik, above n.529, 522. 
Walker, "Butler v The C L R C and Others" [1981] Crim LR 596, 597. 
Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (AD); Wasik, above n.529, 522. 
Horder "Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity" [1993] CL/298, 316-317. 
^ Morse, above n.532, 242. Morse is of the view that the mens rea variant of diminished capacity 
should be extended to all offences that have a lesser included offence: Morse, above n.535, 14. 
1996 SLT661. 
The Scottish version of the defence refers to a state of mind bordering on insanity: HM Advocate v 
Savage 1923 JC 49. Since the cases of Rose and Seers, this comparison is no longer relevant to the 
English defence. 
HM Advocate v Cunningham 1963 JC 80. 
131 
disordered offenders who are convicted of offences other than murder.''^ ^ However, 
the extension of the defence of diminished responsibility to all offences need not 
mean the artificial reduction of offences to lesser charges. It could instead lead to a 
reduction in sentence^^^ or even a substituted v e r d i c t . I t would seem that such a far-
reaching reform is unlikely. 
4.3 UK Reform Proposals 
The Butler Committee favoured retention of a version of the diminished responsibility 
defence^'' where an individual's mental disorder "was such as to be an extenuating 
circumstance which ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter."^'^ 
Clause 56(1) of the Draft Criminal Code adopted the version suggested by the 
CLRC:^'^ 
"Where a person kills... he shall not be convicted of murder i f there is medical or 
other evidence that he was suffering from a form of mental disorder as defined in 
section 4 of the Mental Health Act, and if, in the opinion of the jury, the mental 
disorder was such as to be a substantial enough reason to reduce the offence to 
manslaughter." This division between murder and manslaughter would be for the jury 
to decide. The most significant benefit of this definition would be to remove the 
ambiguous term 'mental responsibility'.^''* 
™* Above n.472, para. 19.9. 
*^ Walker, above n.601,597. 
Border, above n.603,316. 
The Butler Committee suggested that 'diminished responsibility' was no longer an appropriate terms 
and preferred the use of the phrase "persons suffering from mental disorder." Above n.472, para 19.18. 
Ibid., para. 19.17 
'^^  Above n.577, para. 93. 
^''Dell, above n.509, 817. 
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Use of the phrase 'mental disorder' in place of 'abnormality of mind' would follow 
the definition in the Mental Health Act 1983^^ ^ to mean "mental illness, arrested or 
incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or 
disability of mind."^'^ This is a much broader definition that that given in the current 
parenthesis as there would be no requirement that the disorder be caused by disease, 
other inherent causes or injury.^'^ This may lead to the inclusion of some transient 
disorders of the mind to fall within the defence which would not previously have been 
618 
identified as so falling. 
It may be the s2 and the CLRC's recommendation for a new defence of diminished 
responsibility are not far enough apart to effect a true reform of the defence. The 
proposed defence requires a jury to decide whether a mental disorder is 'substantial 
enough reason' to reduce the offence to manslaughter, which, it is assumed, requires 
that the reason has an effect on culpabihty.^'^ Yet, with neither version of the defence 
is a minimum amount of culpability set for the offence of murder nor a maximum 
degree of culpability which could be entertained for manslaughter 620 
4.4 A Mens Rea Variant 
There are two variants of the diminished responsibility defence in the United States of 
America: the mens rea variant and the partial-responsibility variant.^^' The mens rea 
In the new Mental Health Act the particular categories of mental disorder will not be defined, so that 
no clinical diagnosis will limit the way in which the compulsory powers may be used: Reforming the 
Mental Health Act, Part I, the New Legal Framework, Cm 50161, paras. 3.4-3.5. This could broaden 
significantly the scope of the proposed diminished responsibility defence. 
''^Section 1(2). 
Griew, above n.495, 79. 
'^^  Ibid., 80. 
Griew, above n.524,21. 
'^ o^ Ibid., 21. 
Morse, above n.532, 240. 
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variant allows defendants the opportunity to 'defeat allegations of guilt',''^^ while the 
623 
partial-responsibility variant operates as an excuse. 
The mens rea variant of a diminished capacity defence allows a defendant who lacked 
capacity to form mens rea to demonstrate that he is not guilty due to a lack of mens 
rea.^^^ This will seldom occur since mental abnormality rarely results in a defendant 
being incapable of forming mens rea.^^^ It is not, strictly, a defence; it is an absence of 
proof. Although Morse, who favours this variant, argues that public safety will not be 
compromised by use of this variant,^^^ this cannot be true where a defendant secures 
an acquittal based on a lack of mens rea due to mental illness unless civil proceedings 
are available to ensure his treatment and detention until such time as he can be 
released without posing any risk to the community.^^^ For policy reasons, the mens 
rea variant has been either rejected by some States, which have mistakenly assumed it 
was a partial responsibility variant and should be introduced through State legislature, 
or limited to murder or specific intent offences.^^^ While in principle any individual 
lacking mens rea should be acquitted, in practice policy decisions are necessary to 
prevent dangerous individuals from remaining a threat to the community. 
Given that in English law, where an individual lacks mens rea due to, for example, 
sleepwalking, the courts will construe this as insanity leading to the Special Verdict, 
the mens rea variant of diminished responsibility does not appear to have a role to 
Ibid., 243. 
Ibid., 247. 
This the 'dominant approach' in the United States. Morse, above n.535, 1. 
Morse, above n.532,244. 
Ibid., 246. 
This is a possibility recognised by Morse: above n.535, 17. 
Mackay, above n.451, 67. 
Ibid., 67. 
134 
play in this country.^ ^*^ Where an individual satisfies the prerequisites for moral 
agency, he will be legally responsible for his acts. However, all legally sane 
individuals will not be equally rational at the time of committing an offence.^^' The 
partial responsibility variant, which operates in the UK, recognises that the individual 
seeking to rely on a diminished capacity defence was less responsible at the time of 
acting due to his mental condition.^^^ 
4.5 A Medicalised Definition 
A medicalised definition of diminished responsibility, giving a clearer definition of 
'abnormality of mind' and the four aetiologies, would assist in separating the defence 
from provocation. However, the same result could have been achieved through the 
minority judgment in Smith. A medicalised term would take the decision making 
further from the jury into the hands of medical experts. This is not advisable given 
that juries may legitimately differ to medical experts in finding a defendant 
blameworthy.^^^ When Dell carried out research into the increase in prison 
sentences^ "^* for those who had successfully used the defence of diminished 
responsibility, she discovered that the reason for this was largely attributable to judges 
following medical advice in almost all cases. It was speculated that recommendations 
by doctors were made due to overcrowding in Special Hospitals.^^^ However, doctors 
did vary on the use of the four aetiologies, sometimes omitting reference to a cause of 
the abnormality.''^ *^ Such an arbitrary approach is to be avoided at all costs. 
Ibid.. 67-68. 
Morse, above n.535,21. 
632 Ibid., 5. 
As was stated in Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1, 5. See above, 1. 
Dell, above n.482, 14. The increase in prison sentences rose from two thirds of all cases being made 
hospital orders in the 1960's to the reverse by the end of the 1970's: ibid., 3. 
Ibid., 14. 
Ibid., 39. 
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In order to alleviate the situation of medical experts pronouncing on the availability of 
the defence, they ought to be prevented from giving a diagnosis. Rather, they should 
be encouraged to describe the defendant's mental state at the time of the offence as 
completely as possible. This will avoid distracting the jury from the central issue, 
avoid confusion and prejudice arising from medical terms and keep battles between 
expert witnesses out of the court.^'^ 
4.6 A Demedicalised Definition 
A demedicalised version of the defence may reduce the dependence on medical 
experts and increase the role of the jury. The Northern Territory of Australia has 
deleted the four aetiologies. While there had been a suggestion at the Committee 
stage of the Homicide Bil l in the House of Commons that the four aetiologies be 
replaced by the phrase 'however arising', this was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not exclude outbursts of rage and jealousy.^^^ Parliamentary critics sought to 
show that the four aetiologies were unnecessary because normal reactions of jealousy 
and bad temper would not qualify as an abnormality of mind in any event.^ "*" Mackay 
suggests that the 'simple way' to improve on the defence might be to follow the 
example of the Northern Territory of Australia.^'^' 
Further, deletion of the term 'abnormality of mind' as well as the four aetiologies 
would force medical experts to rely on descriptions of the defendant's state of mind 
Morse, above n.535, 51-53. 
Criminal Code of the Northern Territory, s37. 
Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, vol. 1 (1968), 151. 
Griew, above n.495, 78. 
Mackay, above n.451, 65. 
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rather than seeking to fit mental conditions into the definition of the defence. 
The State of Queensland has replaced the term 'mental responsibility' for 'his 
capacity to under stand what he is doing, or his capacity to know that he ought not to 
do the act or make the omission...'^'^^ The danger, here, is that the defence may be so 
specific as to exclude, for example, the mercy killer, who will not satisfy this narrow 
definition.'^'*^ 
4.6.1. Combining Provocation and Diminished Responsibility 
The combining, at trial, of the pleas of diminished responsibility and provocation may 
enable jurors to be more lenient towards deserving defendants. The decisions 
surrounding the objective test may be said to have done the same already.^ '*^ While 
Lord Goff in Luc Thiet-Thuan and the dissenting minority in Smith are opposed to the 
combining of these defences, the majority in Smith and the Court of Appeal on several 
occasions^ "*^  have recognised that this occurs. Mackay argues that the two defences 
are "slowly collapsing or merging into one another" and that now may be the time to 
"accept this coalescence fully in favour of a 'partial responsibility' plea, which 
encompasses both".^ '*^ 
The United States Model Penal Code sets out a defence to murder of 'extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance'^ "*^ which appears to combine the defences of provocation 
Queensland Criminal Code, s304A (introduced in 1961). 
Mackay, above n.451,65. 
^ Ibid., 75. 
See, e.g., the statement of Beldam LJ in Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306, 315: "There is no doubt that 
the two defences are not incompatible where the evidence which is given enables them to be 
combined." 
Mackay, above n.451, 77. 
S210.3(l)(b). 
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and diminished responsibility.^'^^ Most of the States which have adopted the definition 
have omitted the word 'mental', thereby restricting the scope of this defence.^ '*^ One 
combined defence would standardise the burden of proof, allow for combined use of 
evidence and reduce confusion among jurors, who would be able to return a verdict of 
manslaughter in deserving cases. 
5. Recommendations 
Although any new proposal may have the effect of narrowing the scope of the 
diminished responsibility defence, given that its obscure wording has enabled it to be 
applied widely,^^° a new defence, which is capable of consistent application, is 
necessary in the interests of justice.^^' 
There will be times where an individual, who satisfies the minimum criteria to be a 
moral agent, commits an offence under circumstances where we are prepared to 
recognise a reduced level of responsibility. It may be preferable to regard the partial 
defence of diminished responsibility not as an aberration of the traditional model of 
excuses but as a form of excuse which falls further down the scale from those which 
allow complete exemption from responsibility.^^^ It follows that there is no just reason 
why a diminished responsibility defence should not be extended to all other 
offences.^^^ However, such a proposal is unlikely to be introduced in English law. 
Mackay, above n.451,68. 
Ibid., 68. 
Griew, above n.495, 87. 
Mackay, above n.451, 79. 
Wasik, above n.529, 524-525. 
Mackay, above n.445, 206. 
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Even i f the mandatory life sentence for murder were to be abolished, a diminished 
responsibility defence should exist in order to distinguish between degrees of 
culpability in homicide. Also, it must be assumed that the diminished responsibility 
defence will continue to be required independently of any reforms which are carried 
out in relation to the insanity defence, as there will still be occasions where a 
defendant may be denied an insanity defence in relation to a murder charge, having 
acted in a state of mental disturbance.^ ^"* 
The major difficulty lies in determining what mental conditions should fall within the 
defence. Williams saw that the defence had 'worked both badly and well' and 
proposed that the term mental abnormality be removed from the defence, allowing a 
jury to reduce a murder conviction where culpability is diminished.^^^ Rather than a 
full overhaul of the diminished responsibility defence, Mackay proposes^^^ deletion of 
the term abnormality of mind and all of the words in parenthesis so that psychiatrists 
can concentrate on issues they understand. 
Certainly, demedicalising the defence should return the decision making to the courts, 
limiting the role of experts to a descriptive one. Such a reform would remove some of 
the few remaining distinctions between the defences of diminished responsibility and 
provocation. This reality needs to be accepted and developed. The distinction between 
the individual suffering from an abnormality of mind and the reasonable individual 
sharing many characteristics of the defendant is no longer significant. Juries have 
been dealing with both defences side by side for some time. The complications they 
Griew, above n.495, 75. 
Williams, above n.463, 558. 
Mackay, above n.445, 203. 
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face are of the strained definitions and varying burdens of proof. This situation could 
be eased by the introduction of one partial responsibility defence combining 
provocation and diminished responsibility. This could be achieved through the 
introduction of a defence of mental and emotional disturbance, similar to that of the 
Model Penal Code which provides that a person who intentionally kills shall be guilty 
of manslaughter where such killing is "committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. 
The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse should be determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be."^" 
Simester and Sullivan suggest that such a defence "would offer a more 
straightforward, less covert negotiation of the divide between murder and 
manslaughter." The defence would represent a more accurate recognition of the 
overlap between provocation and diminished responsibility and would allow for a 
demedicalised defence which could be taken out of the remit of medical experts and 
placed directly into the hands of the jury. 
6. Infanticide 
Distinct from the defence of diminished responsibility, but recognising a similar 
reduction in culpability is the offence of infanticide which is a lessor charge to murder 
set out under si(1) of the Infanticide Act 1938. This homicide offence allows the 
mother who kills her child below the age of 12 months, the balance of her mind being 
'*''§210.3(i)(b). 
•^ '^  Simester and Sullivan, above n. 489, 356. 
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disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the birth or her still 
suffering the effects of lactation, to be treated as though she is guilty of manslaughter 
rather than murder. The offence can be described as "a more accommodating ground 
of mitigation than diminished responsibility"^^^ especially since it can avoid the 
distress of an initial charge of murder. There is also no requirement that the defendant 
be suffering from a clinical disorder.^''^ 
It appears there is no burden of proof on the defendant, merely an evidential burden, 
although most cases result from a guilty plea to the offence, and are accepted as such 
where there is evidence of emotional disturbance at the time of the offence.^^' It is 
worth noting that social and familial circumstances^^^ surrounding the birth may cause 
in the defendant a disturbance of mind but, were the offence to be strictly enforced, 
would not satisfy its provisions and also that the second limb of the offence has been 
discredited.^^'' 
While the Butler Committee reconmiended the abolition of the offence in favour of 
the further reaching defence of diminished responsibility, the CLRC did not agree. 
The offence of infanticide avoids a charge of murder and the elements of the offence 
would be easier to satisfy than the defence of diminished responsibility.^^"* 
Ibid., 582. 659 
Ibid., 582. 
Mackay, "The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children" [1993] Crim LR 21. 
Maier-Katkin and Ogle, "A Rationale for Infanticide Laws" [1993] Crim LR 903. 
Bluglass, "Infanticide" [1978] Bulletin of The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 14. The Butler 
Committee considered that with most cases of infanticide the link between the effects of childbirth or 
lactation was remote, above n.472, paras 19.23-19.24. 
J. C. Smith, above n.476, 386. 
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Thus, the suggestion of the Law Commission in its Draft Criminal Code is to be 
preferred: "A woman who, but for this section, would be guilty of murder or 
manslaughter of her child is not guilty of murder or manslaughter, but is guilty of 
infanticide, i f her act is done when the child is under the age of twelve months and 
when the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of the effect of giving birth or 
circumstances consequent upon that birth."^^^ 
Even so, this reformulated offence would not take into account the situation where a 
mother kills her older child as well, or where the child was over twelve months old.^^^ 
A defence of emotional disturbance, discussed above, would be able to take such 
factors into account. 
Law Commission, No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, (1989), CI.64(1). 
Simester and Sullivan, above n.489, 583. 
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CONCLUSION 
The criminal law is still prepared to punish many individuals who ought not to be held 
eligible for blame and punishment, either because of the involuntariness of their 
actions, their lack of moral agency, or due to a lack of rationality. 
While the decisions in Larsonneur and Winzar remain good law, individuals may 
continue to be punished for being in an involuntary state of affairs. It is suggested that 
these decisions should be treated as mistakes, and no longer be followed. The 
preferable model to follow is evident from the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama in Martin,^^^ which found that voluntariness was required, in circumstances 
similar to Winzar, and in O'Sullivan v Fisher,the Australian case which allowed 
the same conclusion. 
The choice theory of excuse regards as moral agents those individuals who have the 
capacity to understand what the law is, while the character theory requires that the 
individual has a deeper understanding of moral qualities in order to be regarded a 
moral agent. While the choice theory of excuse remains the preferred theory for the 
society in which we currently live, in the future the character theory of excuse may be 
perceived as the better option. The principal difficulty in adopting the character theory 
of excuse currently is to exclude those individuals from the criminal law, to whom we 
currently desire, above all others, to attribute liability - the dangerous severely 
personality disordered. It is apparent that the public are not ready to allow this to 
occur. It is possible, when a greater understanding of the personality disordered has 
Martin v State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (1944). 
[1954] SASR33. 
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been gained, better diversionary systems are in place for the protection of society, and 
attitudes have altered, that the DSPD individual would be described more accurately 
as being incapable of moral agency. Currently, when such individuals come before the 
courts there is an impetus to treat them as normal. However, i f we become able to 
reliably identify them, predict their dangerousness and provide better treatments, it 
may be preferable to divert them and not subject them to trials. Such a time has not 
yet arrived. 
Even on the choice theory of excuse, certain individuals who currently fall within our 
criminal justice system, should not be regarded as moral agents. The severely and 
permanendy mentally i l l , those who lack the capacity to choose, ought not to be held 
blameworthy. This ineligibility for blame ought to be conferred as a status. Although 
the unfitness to plead legislation recognises the position of such individuals, arguably, 
a status of exemption from criminal liability should arise prior to this point, through 
civil proceedings. 
Where an individual is eligible to be considered a moral agent, but suffers a temporary 
lack of rationality, the defence of insanity reveals so many deficiencies that 
diminished responsibility is clearly the best resort on a charge of murder. Not only are 
the disposal consequences unacceptable on a charge of murder, and the social stigma 
compounded by the inclusion of, inter alia, diabetics and epileptics within the 
definition of 'disease of the mind', crucially the M'Naghten Rules do not address the 
issue of the defendant's lack of rationality. Many individuals who ought not to be 
regarded as rational choose to plead diminished responsibility, as a preferable 
alternative. 
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However, diminished responsibility grants only a partial reduction in criminal 
responsibility. While the defence often appears to provide justice in practical terms, it 
does not recognise the true nature of the defendant's defence, which may be 
attributable to emotional instability, overlapping with the defence of provocation, 
moving through the range of mental conditions to irrationality, where the more 
appropriate defence should be insanity. A better drafted insanity defence, carrying 
flexible disposal consequences on a charge of murder, would reduce the need for such 
pragmatic flexibility within the defence of diminished responsibility. The defence 
could be redrafted, then, and combined with the defence of provocation to allow 
consideration of those individuals who are emotionally destabilised, rather than 
irrational, and who ought to be entitled to a reduced form of criminal responsibility. 
Consideration of the extent of an individual's criminal responsibility ought to be the 
responsibility of the jury, based on medical evidence which is limited to a description 
of the defendant's mental condition. 
Certain individuals ought not to be subjected to a criminal trial due to their status of 
ineligibility to be considered moral agents. This status applies to children below the 
age of ten and ought to apply to the severely and permanently mentally i l l . Aside from 
these two categories, the most appropriate vehicles in criminal proceedings for 
consideration of a defendant's moral agency, based on his rationality, are the 'trial of 
facts' on examination of his unfitness to plead, or the insanity defence. It is hoped that 
when the inadequacies of the insanity defence are addressed, the need for 
inappropriate use of the defence of diminished responsibility wil l be reduced. 
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